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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

JAMIS M. JOHNSON,
Appellant

:
:
:

VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THE MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

:

Ct. of Appeals no. 20041122

vs.
JAYSON ORVIS,
Appellee

:

Appellant, Jamis M. Johnson, appearing pro se, respectfully submits this Verified
Memorandum Of Law In Support Of The Motion For Summary Disposition.
INTRODUCTION
The grounds for reversing summary judgment below are as follows:
1. The district court committed reversible manifest error by erroneously applying
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to dismiss Appellant's cause of action where the
elements necessary for applying the doctrine were not met or satisfied.
2. The district court improperly weighed the contested facts and Appellant's
credibility when it concluded that it was satisfied that Appellant was "avoiding creditors"
in an unrelated prior case and, therefore, he could not maintain a partnership action
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against Appellee in this case, and the court entered a declaratory judgment against
Appellant declaring that no partnership existed between Appellant and Appellee.
As shown herein, this Court should grant this motion for summary disposition
and reverse the grant of summary judgment below as a matter of law for manifest error
on the foregoing grounds and as further argued herein below.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
PARTNERSHIP:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3(1)(a) and 48-1-4(4)
CASES
MANIFEST ERROR STANDARD:
1. Mary J. Bailey (Adams) v. Spencer Adams, 1990.UT.213, 798 P.2d 1142,143 Utah
Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 09/19/90)
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL;
2. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509,132 P.2d 388, 390
(Utah 1942)
3. Nebekerv. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180
4. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, (Utah 1996)
5. Masters v. Worstey, 1989.UT.175, 777 P.2d 499, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah
Appeal 1989),
6. Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)
PROHIBITION OF ATTORNEY BUYING JUDGMENT AGAINST CLIENT:
7. Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 1999 UT 49, 369 Utah
Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1999)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD:

2

a. Facts viewed in light most favorable to Appellant below:
8. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1988)
b. Credibility not to be weighed in Motion for Summary Judgment;
9. Winegarv. Froereret. al., 1991.UT.110, 813 P.2d 104, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah
1991

EXHIBIT LIST
Exhibit 1:
Exhibit 2:
Exhibit 3:
Exhibit 4:
Exhibit 5:
Exhibit 6:
Exhibit 7:
Exhibit 8:
Exhibit 9:
Exhibit 10:
Exhibit 11:
Exhibit 12:
Exhibit 13:
Exhibit 14:
Exhibit 15:
Exhibit 16:
Exhibit 17:
Exhibit 18:

Deposition of Will Vigil
Deposition of Tommy Triplett
Deposition of Jade Griffen
Demand for Audit and Accounting to Orvis, August 2001
SBA Deposition of DaNell Johnson, April 1999
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Jayson Orvis' Motion for
Summary Judgment; and Affidavit of Jayson Orivs.
SBA Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 1999.
Memorandum of Jamis Johnson in Opposition to Jayson Orvis'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Minute Entry, District Court, Judge Timothy Hanson, October 20,
2004
Judgment; and Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement
1994 Partnership Memorandum
Assignment of Trade Name, January 2001
Orvis Supplemental Answer To Interrogatory No. 11
Sundry Orvis-Johnson correspondence reflecting profit share and
partnership.
Jamis Johnson Deposition in this case, June 2002
Letter To Dan Berman, August 2001
FACTS

The facts relied upon herein are supported by the sworn verification of Appellant
Johnson. The facts demonstrating the partnership between Appellant Johnson and
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Appellee Orvis will be presented first to present a proper background of the matter as
was presented to the district court. Because of the district court's improper application
of the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on a purported inconsistent statement by
Appellant in a prior unrelated proceeding between the SBA and Appellant, said facts
will be included here as well to illustrate the clear manifest error by the district court.
For clarity, the parties will be intermittently referred to hereinafter by their proper names
rather than their appellate designations.
1. Brief Outline of Factual and Procedural History
1. Appellee Orvis (Plaintiff below) and Appellant Johnson (and wife DaNell)
have a partnership extending back to 1994 and dividing profit share on a group of credit
repair businesses.
2. The partnership is documented and evidenced by written agreements, course
of performance and financial records.
3. The partnership and businesses grew to be extremely profitable now involving
millions of dollars.
4. Appellant asserts that Appellee Orvis first began embezzling and
misappropriating partnership profit share as early as 1997. Discovery to date,
particularly deposition testimony of Appellee employees, confirm this. (See the
deposition testimony of Will Vigil excerpted herein on pages 14 and 15, infra, and in
Exhibit 1; See the deposition testimony of Tommy Triplett excerpted herein on pages 15
through 17, infra, and in Exhibit 2; and see the deposition testimony of Jade Griffen,
excerpted herein on pages 14 and 15, infra, and in Exhibit 3.)
5. In July 2001, Appellant made demand on Appellee for an accounting and an
4

audit. (See Demand For Audit and Accounting, Exhibit 4.)
6. In August 2001, Appellee Orvis, using partnership funds, purchased an SBA
judgment against Appellant to use offensively to mask the preceding fraud, to attempt
to extinguish the partnership, and to seize profit share distribution; and upon acquiring
the SBA judgment did withhold, seize, and convert profit share that had hitherto been
distributed to the Johnsons.
7. The SBA judgment was purchased with the counsel and participation of
Victor Lawrence, attorney for DaNell Johnson and for Appellant, in the SBA case, and
numerous other personal matters, and in business affairs of the partnership. (Triplett
Deposition, Exhibit 2, See excerpts and discussion, pages 15 through 17 infra; See
SBA deposition of DaNell Johnson, Exhibit 5, and discussion and excerpts thereof,
page 19 and 20 infra.)
8. These actions by Lawrence and Orvis are in breach of attorney fiduciary duty
and partner fiduciary duty; the object of this conspiracy by Lawrence and Orvis was to
take the profit share owed to the Johnsons, which at this date would exceed $1.5 Million
(based on the last six months of actual profit share) and is closer to $5 Million based on
amounts concealed and converted by Mr. Orvis; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence profited
by these acts by converting Appellant profit share and dividing it between themselves.
9. In August 2001, after Appellant's demand for accounting, and in concert with
his purchase of the SBA judgment, Appellant Orvis brought this suit in Third District
Court against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant had no
partnership with Appellee or alternatively such interest was limited to 25% of two
specific businesses.
5

10. Appellant counterclaimed for an accounting and for profits; DaNell Johnson
was joined as a Third Party Plaintiff, and Victor Lawrence and others as Third Party
Defendants.
11. On March 29, 2004 Appellee Orvis moved for summary judgment. (Exhibit
6 contains both the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Jayson Orvis' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Jayson Orvis.) Citing only an 1857
Tennessee case as support, Appellee asserted that Appellant was judicially estopped
from asserting a partnership interest with Appellee Orvis; this estoppel was based of
an Orvis' interpretation of a response by Appellant in a deposition taken by the SBA in
an unrelated prior case between the SBA and Appellant. Appellee Orvis asserted that
Johnson responded to the SBA that he did not have partnerships. (It is the judgment in
this SBA case that was purchased by Appellee.) (Exhibit 7 is the November 1999 SBA
Deposition of Jamis Johnson.)
12. Appellant opposed the summary judgment motion. (Exhibit 8 is the
Memorandum of Jamis Johnson in Opposition to Jayson Orvis' Motion for Summary
Judgment.) Appellant asserted that i.) the quote was misconstrued, but was irrelevant
regardless under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and ii.) the doctrine of judicial
estoppel, to be operative here, requires that the prior (SBA) action and this present
action be between the same parties; the prior action involve the same issues as this
action; the prior action be "successfully maintained"; and that Appellee must have
detrimentally relied on the statement in the SBA deposition. Appellant argued that
Appellee met none of the requirements for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to be
applicable in this case.
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13. The court heard oral argument on August 9, 2004. (Exhibit 9 is the
transcript of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.)
14. In its minute entry of October 20, 2004, the Court granted summary
judgment to Appellee, stating "...there was no question of mistake, Johnson testified
as he did [in the prior unrelated SBA deposition] so as to avoid collection efforts from
the Small Business Administration." [Emphasis added]; the court found that Appellant
Johnson should be judicially estopped in this case from asserting a partnership based
on the contested SBA deposition statement; and the court granted summary judgment
to Appellee Orvis. (Exhibit 10 is the district court's minute entry dated October 20,
2004.)
15. Appellee drafted a Judgment and a Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law which were executed by the district court on October 20, 2004. That findings of
fact were entered is evidence alone of improper weighing of facts as opposed to issues
of law which is the only consideration for granting summary judgment. (Exhibit 11
contains both the Judgment, and the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.)
2. Evidence of the partnership between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis.
16. Extensive and substantial evidence exists documenting the partnership
between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. The evidence includes not only written
partnership agreements, and profit share distribution checks, but letters, recorded oral
statements of the parties and witness testimony. The evidence is so extensive that
only portions were presented in district court in support of the opposition to the motion
for summary judgment. Discovery was not complete when summary judgment was
entered. Here, only a portion of the existing evidence submitted below will be
7

referenced but sufficient evidence to demonstrate a partnership under Utah statutes
and case law. The evidence of the partnership is presented here by type: first
documentary evidence then deposition testimony of third parties and of Mr. and Mrs.
Johnson.
A. Written Documentation of the Qrvis-Johnson Partnership.
17. There are numerous documents providing clear evidence of the OrvisJohnson partnership and that that Orvis and Johnson operated a partnership or joint
venture to engage in activities broadly described as the "credit repair" business.
i.) The Partnership Agreement
18 Perhaps most compelling of these documents is an "Agreement", a copy of
which Mr. Orvis produced in discovery. (Attached as Exhibit 12 is the Agreement).
Though undated, the Agreement was signed by both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson in May
of 1999 along with other documents. (Hereinafter this said Agreement is referred to as
the "1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement".) It memorializes and sets forth the
terms of a pre-existing and continuing arrangement between the Orvis and the
Johnsons to share profits from businesses providing "credit repair services." This is, of
course, the very definition of a partnership. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3(1 )(a) ("a
partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit"), 48-1-4(4) ("[t]he receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business."...)
19. In its recital paragraphs, the 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement
recounts the history of the business relationship between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson.
It states "Orvis and Johnson have developed over the last several years enterprises
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that provide credit repair services to a nationwide clientele." 1999 Orvis-Johnson
Partnership Agreement, at 1 (emphasis added).
20. The 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement then details the credit
repair services of these "enterprises." and explains their growth: "Such credit repair
services include, but are not limited to a range of activities, including telemarketing,
internet marketing, consulting, law representation, and the enterprises have grown
over the years and have acquired a variety of tangible and intangible assets including,
without limitation, for example equipment, computers, software, furniture, knowledge,
methods, techniques in marketing, lead sources, internet operations." Id. (emphasis
added).
21. The 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement also states that "the
parties acknowledge that they have governed and operated these enterprises under an
outline agreement and under a course of performance that they desire to continue."
Id. (emphasis added).
22. The1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement also explains, to some
extent, what has occasioned its execution. It states "the parties desire to provide for
the unimpaired continuation and growth of the business to the mutual benefit of the
parties," and that "an agreement was put in place reciting that all assets of this
enterprise are placed in the name of Jayson Orvis so as to protect these assets and
provide for the continued growth and mutual profitability." Id.
23. Against the backdrop of these recitals - which are acknowledged and
agreed to by both Orvis and Johnson - the parties then expressly agree (1) that
"(g]ovemance and compensation/allocation of profits shall continue in the percentages
9

as heretofore provided under the operating arrangements and as the enterprise
continues to grow"; (2) that "all monies shall be paid to Jayson Orvis or his business
entity . . . and Jayson Orvis shall provide Johnson's share or allocation to any party
directed by Johnson"; and (3) that "the intent being that these enterprises shall
continue to grow, expand, multiply as directed by the parties under their outline
agreement and course of performance to their mutual economic benefit." Id.
(emphasis added).
ii.) The 1994 Memorandum
24. The 1999 Partnership Agreement alone, is blatant, unequivocal evidence of
the Orvis-Johnson partnership; it is executed by the parties and specifically identifies
and defines the ongoing partnership. But it is hardly the only document evidencing the
partnership. For instance, as early as 1994, there is a memorandum dated September
1,1994 from Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis, and others, and addressed to these same
individuals, which memorializes the formation of an entity called "The Genesis Project."
Mr. Orvis produced a copy of this memorandum. (Exhibit 13 is the Genesis Project
Agreement.) The Memorandum reflects that, in consideration for their respective
contributions (which are specified in the Memorandum), the parties expressly agree (1)
to establish "The Genesis Project," "whose purpose is to create and manage profitable
entities for the five partners," id. (emphasis added), and (2) to "[djivide equally the
equity and profits of The Genesis Project." Id. (emphasis added). This memorandum
is further evidentiary support" for the partnership, with, as Johnsons claim, it inception
back as far as 1994.
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iii.)

Assignment of trade name January 20001 is evidence of OrvisJohnson partnership

25. On January 12, 2001, Mr. Johnson executed an Assignment to Mr. Orvis
assigning the trade name "Lexington Law Firms'* to Mr. Orvis to hold for the mutual
benefit of both. (Exhibit 14 is the Assignment of trade name.)
26. Mr. Orvis obtained this Assignment from Mr. Johnson, references it in his
Complaint and produced it in discovery. He recorded it and it is on file with the
Department of Commerce.
27. This Assignment is clear evidence of the ongoing Orvis-Johnson
partnership. It sates:
WHEREAS, the said trade name [Lexington Law Firms] is an asset actually
owned jointly bv Jamis M. Johnson and Javson Orvis. and
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson and Javson own intellectual property and
tangible and intangible assets for the business of credit repair and per
prior agreement, this trade name is to be assigned by Jamis M. Johnson
to Javson Orvis. and
WHEREAS, Jayson Orvis has established a limited liability company
called Attorneys For People, LLC, of which he is the only member in
which he was to hold some of these joint assets and through which he
administrates fsicl some of the credit repair business, and
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson desires to assign the trade name to Jayson
Orvis/Attorneys For People and it shall form and is part of these assets
jointly owned bv Johnson and Orvis and administrated bv Orvis;
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing recitals and upon the prior
agreement of the parties ... [Johnson assigns trade name to Orvis]
[Emphasis added]
28. Thus, only a few months before Mr. Orvis secretly purchased the SBA
judgment and filed this lawsuit claiming Mr. Johnson had no partnership, Mr. Orvis and
Mr. Johnson are passing a legal document between them clearly describing the
11

ongoing partnership.
iv.) Documents Evidencing Payments of "Profit Share" to Johnsons
29. The partnership, from the start of 1998, had an unbroken chain of profit
share checks distributing profits between the partners on an agreed upon formula.
The payments distributed to Johnson, by agreement from 1996, were consistently
distributed to Mrs. DaNell Johnson, wife of Appellant, (or to her business entities) who
per prior agreement held the beneficial interest and received the distribution. Such
profit share distribution is demonstrated by these checks from late 1997 until August of
2001 when Appellee Orvis simultaneously purchased the SBA judgment (referenced
herein) and filed this suit for a declaratory judgment that there was no partnership and
withheld all further profit share distribution. Mr. Orvis, in discovery, produced a partial
but nonetheless extensive list of the profit share distribution to Johnsons. That list is
set out in Mr. Orvis' response to discovery. In Supplemental Responses to Mr.
Johnson's First Set of Interrogatories, Mr. Orvis admits that he (or the Orvis entities)
made substantial payments to Johnson on a regular basis until August of 2001. See
Plaintiff, Counter Defendant and Third-party Defendant Jayson Orvis' Supplemental
Responses to Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third-party Plaintiff Jamis Johnson's
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, at 8-9
(Interrogatory No. 11) (Attached as Exhibit 15; see also Complaint, fl 24). Other
documents evidence the shared profits from the credit repair business. There is, for
example, a memo authored and signed by Mr. Orvis, addressed to Mr. Johnson, and
dated March 2,1998, which refers to the parties' "profit shares." (A copy of this memo
is attached hereto as Exhibit 10 thereto.)
12

30. In his interrogatory answers, Mr. Orvis, while admitting the substantial
distributions, characterizes this long history of payments as "voluntary], and in Orvis'
full discretion as to both amount and frequency," id. This answer, that the profit share
distributions were essentially a gift to Mr. Johnson, obviously lacks basic credibility.
The payments are substantial (some as much as $34,000), regularly made on a
specific monthly basis, and per the agreed on formula, and the payments continue
without interruption from 1998 through August of 2001, when Mr. Johnson demanded
an accounting and audit of the partnership, and Mr. Orvis filed his declaratory
judgment Complaint. This continual history of payments referred to by both parties as
profit share is concrete course of performance and blunt evidence of the OrvisJohnson partnership.
v.) Correspondence Between Orvis and Johnson Concerning Their Business
Relationship.
31. In addition to these documents, there is a long history of correspondence
exchanged between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis between 1999 and 2001 right up to a
few days before Mr. Orvis filed this lawsuit, concerning their profit share and ongoing
partnership. This correspondence provides further evidence of the Orvis-Johnson
partnership.
32. By the end of 1998, Mr. Johnson was facing enormous professional
problems. He was facing disbarment. See In the Matter of the Discipline of Jamis M.
Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (2002) (upholding the same district court's summary judgment
order disbarring Johnson). 1
1. Judge Timothy Hanson, Third District Judge, was both the trial judge in this matter and in the bar
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33. And, through failed business ventures several money judgments had been
entered against him, including a substantial judgment in favor of the Small Business
Administration. Further, the State of Tennessee had brought suit against Mr. Johnson
in his capacity as the "dba" of Lexington Law Firm, one of the entities managed by the
Orvis-Johnson partnership.
34. Mr. Orvis insisted that he manage the partnership assets for the
partnership. (See the 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement, Exhibit 12.)
Nevertheless, throughout this period, both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson worked for the
benefit of the partnership; profit share was distributed, the SBA was provided discovery
by Mr. On/is and Mr. Lawrence; Mr. Johnson negotiated a consent order with
Tennessee; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson dealt with the bar matter and installed Victor
Lawrence as the directing attorney for Lexington Law Firm with Mr. Johnson resigning
that post; and throughout this time, profit share was distributed. Their written
exchanges reflect the continued existence of a partnership through this period: The
following (copies of which are collected in Exhibit 16) are some excerpts of these
exchanges:
a. January 22. 199 fsicl [actual date: 1999] Letter from Orvis to Johnson - In
this letter, Mr. Orvis tells Mr. Johnson that "I really don't want to spend more of my time
on your contingency plan. I would like you to work that out and let me know what your
plan is when you feel ready." He then sets forth five criteria it must meet to be
acceptable to him, one of which is that "those of us with profit share and salary
disciplinary matter against Mr. Johnson.
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commitments will continue to receive our same compensation and will continue to
receive it in proportion to growth and revenue." (emphasis added). In the letter, Mr.
Orvis also states that he is glad Mr. Johnson "turned away from the idea of a straight
buyout, as I was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the figures being
discussed."
b. November 1. 1999 Letter from Johnson to Orvis - (produced by Mr. Orvis) In
this letter, Mr. Johnson Moutline[s] the substance of our conversations and
understanding regarding the management and operations of our ventures and the way
forward." He then states that he understands Mr. Orvis "will continue to manage these
businesses for our joint benefit." To that end, Johnson agrees Orvis "may have
'control' to manage these businesses and [he/Johnson] will not attempt to exercise
managerial control over these endeavors." Johnson closes by saying "I sincerely hope
that all this may result in business growth, exceptional mutual prosperity, and
partnership tranquility between us."
c. January 3. 2000 Letter from Johnson to Orvis (produced by Orvis). In this
letter, Johnson says that he is "going to jump into the void," and try to exercise faith
and trust in Orvis because "I am coming to believe that you deserve the trust." He
then says "in the ongoing attempt to keep the spirit of whatever our contract is, try to
get me to $45,000 per month from the growth."
d. August 29, 2000 Memo from Johnson to Orvis (produced by Orvis) In this
memo, Johnson raises "a few issues that have come up in the last month or so that we
deed [sic] to get resolution on." He then sets forth his view regarding "Lexington's and
affiliated companies' work on a move to a new location," payment of an extra fee to
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Orvis and "Sam" for personally guaranteeing a company lease, and the fact that
H

[p]rofit share was down in July as you predicted.... I have great hopes for profit

share at the end of this month but even greater hopes for the fourth quarter of the
year."
e. August 30. 2000 Memo from Orvis responding to Johnson: Orvis says he
*'feel[s] awkward discussing the particulars of firm management" but he is "pleased to
continue paying your company as an adjunct consultant to my consulting services
agency

While the terms of the compensation I pay your company are foggy at

best, I believe that you have been pleased with the amount of compensation afforded."
Mr. On/is closes with the following:
"Might I make a suggestion? I would suggest that we just let our foggy, little
business relationship continue down it's [sic] foggy, little course. You have no
reason to believe that I will stop compensating your company for consulting
services along the lines already established. Attempting to fortify your position
can only heat up the debate. I am committed to making a bigger pie for as long
as is feasible, and that has been nothing but good for both of us."

f. August 13, 2001. Orvis telephone message to Johnson. In a message left on
Mr. Johnson's telephone discussing profit share, just days prior to his bringing a suit for
a declaratory judgment that there is no partnership or profit share, Mr. Orvis calls Mr.
Johnson and discusses profit share being slow this month and volunteers to get more
to Mr. Johnson. The transcription was taken by attorney Cheryl Mori-Atkinson and
submitted under her affidavit to the district court.
g. In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Johnson kept a running journal, produced to
Mr. Orvis and a monthly accounting of Mr. Orvis1 "accounting" for monthly profit share.
These are not attached as Exhibits.
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FINAL DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTING AND AUDIT
35. The chain of correspondence continues through August 16, 2001. Then, on
that date, Johnson writes to say "for various reasons of which you are aware, we have
come to the point where we need a full accounting of all business operations since our
inception." Memo from J. Johnson to J. Orvis, dated August 16, 2001. ("Demand For
Audit and Accounting" of "Demand") (Exhibit 4 is the Demand For Audit and
Accounting). Mr. Orvis' declaratory judgment Complaint was filed within two weeks of
Mr. Johnson's Demand to Mr. Orvis.
B. Testimony of Witnesses evidence the Orvis-Johnson partnership.
36. The testimony of individuals also provides evidentiary support for Mr.
Johnson's claim that a partnership existed between him and Mr. Orvis, and that it
continued until the filing of the lawsuit. Several witnesses have testified that Mr. Orvis
referred to Mr. Johnson as his "partner" or otherwise held Johnson out as a partner,
both before and after the SBA deposition of November, 1999. (Witnesses have also
testified that Mr. Orvis was actively hiding partnership funds and misappropriating
partnership funds—a further proof of the partnership, also dealt with herein below.)
37. For instance, under questioning from Orvis counsel, Wilfred M. Vigil,
employee of Orvis and attorney Lawrence, testified, at his deposition, as follows:
Q.
Did you - during your employment with Lexington at any time before
or after '99, or during, obviously did you have any conversations with
Jayson Orvis with regard to his business relationship with Jamis Johnson?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What did he say?
A.
He said basically that Jamis was a partner in the firm, that he was
getting certain amounts of money from the firm.
Q. And when was it that he told you that?
A.
I'd say it would have to be back in -1 don't know the precise date.
17

We talked numerous times. I would say probably 2000, roughly.
Q.
Did that testimony - did that conversation, did that position ever
change?
Did he ever tell you anything about a change in that position?
A.
No. As a matter of fact, we did talk a lot about it when there was a
confrontation between he and Jamis.

Deposition of Wilfred M. Vigil, at 135 (Attached as Exhibit 1.)
38. Witnesses have similarly testified that they understood Orvis and Johnson
were sharing profits from the credit repair businesses. For instance, Jade Griffen
testified as follows:
Q.
. . . Are you aware - do you know who took the bulk of the funds
out of
Lexington Law Firms and out of Johnson & Associates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How do you know this?
A.
We would sit and go over money and what it looked like, and I knew
that you [Jamis Johnson] were receiving monies, and I had an idea what
the percentages were.
Q.
You used the term profit share. What's your understanding of profit
share?
A.
A certain percentage of the profits were put away from employees
and for certain benefits for them. There was a portion set apart for the
principals, what we called the principals, Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis,
and Griffin.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And if there was money after bills were paid each month, those
amounts were split up and disbursed.
Q.
So its your understanding that profit share came out after bills?
A.
Right.
Deposition of Jade W, Griffin (taken in Tennessee v. Lexington Law Firm, Civil No.
3-96-0344, M.D. Tenn.), at 21-22 (Attached as Exhibit 3 with the pages for the cited
statement.) Finally, witnesses have testified that Orvis began taking steps to exclude
Mr. Johnson from the partnership, to hide its operations and finances from him, and to
manipulate its finances to minimize Johnson's share. Jade Griffin, for instance,
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testified:
Q.

Was there also a representation that Jayson would manipulate the
incomes of the businesses to prevent Jamis Johnson from
making any
monies?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was it that Jayson said?
A.
Basically that he would cut Jamis Johnson off if things got too ugly.
Id. at 25; see also Deposition of Wilfred M. Vigil, Ex. 1, at 104-06 (Jayson Orvis directed
Mr. Vigil to move clients away from certain credit repair entities in order to reduce
payments to Johnson). See Exhibits 1 and 3.
39. The deposition testimony of Orvis" personal assistant, Tommy Triplett, taken
in this case provides additional evidence which illustrates the nature of Orvis' and
Johnson's partnership and profit sharing agreement, and Mr. Orvis' misappropriation of
partnership property. (Exhibit 2.)
Q. Other than the fact Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson didn't seem to have a
particularly close relation, did you ever get an explanation from Mr. Orvis about
why Mr. Orvis was providing goodwill checks to Mr. Johnson?
A. Yes, quite a few times. Basically how it breaks down is, and this is the
extent to which I know it, there was several partners involved in the founding of
the company. I think it was NADA or NACA or something like that.
Q. NACA?
A. North American Credit Association. And it began to trickle apart. Then
the Lexington was formed after that, Johnson & Associates was formed, and this
was primarily through Jayson and Jamis.
(Triplett Deposition p. 20 line 24 - p. 21 line 13, Exhibit 2)
Q Going back to this relationship between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. I
take it Mr. Orvis had indicated to you that he was trying to keep Mr. Johnson at
bay. At bay, did he tell you at bay with respect to what?
A. With respect to his control over the company and control over profit
shares and basically money.
Q. Control over the company, which company do you have in mind?
A. Johnson & Associates and Lexington Law Firm.
Q To your knowledge, did Mr. Johnson claim ownership in those entities?
A. I knew he felt he was entitled to money. I don't know if he ever claimed
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ownership. I mean, the name Johnson & Associates, Johnson referring to Jamis
Johnson, he founded in some way or another, so I know that he was an original
partner.
(Triplett Deposition at p. 22 line 21 - p. 23 line 10, Exhibit 2)
That's the extent which I know. I know that the suit was against Jamis Johnson,
that it was his - his I guess you'd say butt on the line that was kind of under fire.
And that's one of the things that he did mention when he was always cutting a
check to Jamis Johnson.
(Triplett Deposition, p. 38, lines 7-12, Exhibit 2)

40. Mr. Triplett's testimony also provides specific evidence of Orvis' scheme to
defraud Johnson by misrepresentations and other means. This sworn testimony of
Orvis' personal assistant also demonstrates Orvis' intent to figure out a means to stop
paying the share of partnership profits owed to Johnsons.

Q. Were there any discussions to which you were present regarding -between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence regarding means to exert pressure on Mr.
Johnson or prevent him from filing the lawsuit?
A. Well, there was the monthly payment I mean, Jayson told me, I don't
know if he ever said this to Jamis, but he said to me that if Jamis ever, you know,
got teeth and tried to bite he would just stop sending the checks, and he would
use that money to hire the best attorney he could and fight him back. I don't know
if he ever said that to Jamis. I would assume he would as a means to keep Jamis
at bay, but I don't ever recall him ever saying that to him.
(Triplett Deposition p. 44 line 23 - p. 45 line 10, Exhibit 2)
41. When Mr. Orvis1 misappropriation of partnership funds was suspected by his
partner, Mr. Johnson, Orvis became more aggressive in his attacks on Johnson's
partnership interests. Here, Mr. Triplett provides testimony regarding a consultation
Orvis sought with attorney Victor Lawrence (attorney who had represented Johnson and
his wife, among in before the SBA and elsewhere, and also represented On/is and the
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Orvis-Johnson partnership). Orvis seeks advice from the attorney Lawrence concerning
the purchase and use of the judgment that arose from the SBA case.
Q. Do you recall any discussions with Mr. Orvis regarding any judgments,
legal judgments against Mr. Johnson?
A. Oh, yeah. Yeah, that was in that conversation, too.
Q. That conversation?
A. The conversation that Victor had with Jayson Orvis.
Q. That we discussed a little while ago?
A. Yeah, that was - Jamis had some judgments against him, and Jayson
had come to Victor and asked him if -- what, you know, he's like, can I buy these
against him. And Victor said to the effect that -- this is all Jayson recounting this
to me. At one time he said, well, you can, but you're pretty ruthless. And so I
believe Jayson went and bought those as sort of another means to control Jamis.
(Triplett Deposition, p. 45 line 11 - p. 46 line 2, Exhibit 2)
C. Mr. Johnson's testimony evidences the claims.
42. Mr. Johnson has also provided testimony in this case, and it provides further
evidentiary support for his claims. First, he testified that "I have a partnership
agreement with Jayson Orvis that we share all the credit repair business that he does."
Deposition of Jamis Johnson, June 11, 2002, at 20, Ex. 11; see also Deposition of
Jamis Johnson, June 5, 2002, at 12-13, a copy of pages with the statement is attached
hereto as Exhibit 17. ("Mr. Orvis and I had an ongoing partnership that did a lot of
credit repair business and what could also be called credit repair law").
43. Second, he testified that as a result of his looming Utah State Bar problems
and other issues including the Tennessee litigation, he, Mr. Orvis, and others,
commences to develop "contingency plans" to protect the credit repair enterprises, and
that these plans included, among other things, "tak[ing] Victor [Lawrence], who was
already [an employee lawyer] running portions of the credit law practice, and put him in
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[as a new directing attorney of Lexington Law Firm]and Jayson and I would deal with
our ownership of assets as well in contemporaneous agreements." [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 22. See Exhibit 17.
44. Third, he testified that in this time frame he and Orvis entered an agreement
(see supra) pursuant to which "all of the assets, intellectual property that we own jointly
would be held in Jayson's name for our mutual benefit and that the payment
arrangements and profit shares would continue and that the businesses would expand
and our profit share would expand." Id. at 86. Fourth, he testified that "[f]rom the
outset of our partnership, I had explained that the beneficial interest of this endeavor
would be owned by my wife or her entity and that the payments should go to my wife or
her entity and that's what happened." Deposition of Jamis Johnson, June 11,2002, at
68-69. See Exhibit 17.
45. Mr. Johnson's testimony clearly provides "evidentiary support" for the
claims he asserted in Johnson's Answer to Complaint and Third Party Complaint.
II. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson's Testimony in the prior unrelated SBA case
46. The prior law suit between the SBA and Mr. Johnson arises from an entirely
different matter unrelated to the partnership case before the district court.
47. In the late 1980s Mr. Johnson guaranteed an SBA loan to a small
manufacturing company in Vernal, Utah. The business failed and the SBA sued Mr.
Johnson on a foreclosure deficiency and under his guarantee and after protracted
litigation, a judgment was entered against Mr. Johnson.
48. As referred to above, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis were concerned about the
impact of this judgment and others on their credit repair business. Mr. Orvis insisted
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that he take control of all partnership assets and that Mr. Johnson take a more
"passive" role. That led to their agreement to (1) title all of the partnership property "in
the name of Jayson Orvis so as to protect these assets,'1 and (2) agreeing that Orvis
would continue to "provide Johnson's share or allocation to any party directed by
Johnson1' i.e. Continue to provide profit share to the beneficial interest of DaNell
Johnson or entitles controlled by her as had transpired for several years.
49. Following the entry of SBA judgment, the SBA commenced post judgment
discovery to aid in its attempt to collect the judgment. The post judgment discovery
included depositions of Mr, and Mrs. Johnson and interrogatories and document
productions from the credit repair business.
50. Mr. Orvis and company attorney Mr. Lawrence assisted Mr. Spendlove in
complying with the interrogatories and document production and the company attorney
Mr. Victor Lawrence (who was also the Johnsons' attorney in other matters) entered an
appearance for Mrs. Johnson in the SBA matter, defended her position before the
SBA, and also scheduled the depositions of Mr. Johnson and counseled him therein.
Mr. Orvis, Mr. Spendlove who ran operations, Mr. Lawrence the attorney and Mr. and
Mrs. Johnson all worked in concert with the SBA to present an accurate picture.
a. SBA deposition of Mrs. Johnson (questioned by attorney Victor Lawrence)
demonstrates profit share distributed by Orvis-Johnson partnership to beneficial
interest of Mrs. Johnson.
51. In April of 1999, the SBA subpoenaed DaNell Johnson for deposition on
May 18,1999.
52. At that deposition, DaNell Johnson was represented by attorney Victor
Lawrence. (Mr. Lawrence had represented Mrs. Johnson on several other matters as
well.) At this deposition, DaNell Johnson truthfully disclosed her business
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relationships.
53. Victor Lawrence himself questioned DaNell Johnson thusly:
[Q= Questioning by Mr. Victor Lawrence.]
A= Answer by DaNellJohnson
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

A

Okay. When that business first started, it was just a handful of
friends and associates"
Right.
Now that has somewhat blossomed, but you don't know really what
the company does now, is that correct?
Yes, because it has expanded quite a bit.
In fact, aren't the funds that you received a profit share that you
receive?
That's what I understood it to be, yes.
Are you being paid for anything else? Do you do any type of
consulting for Johnson and Associates right now?
(Nodded no.)
You have to answer audibly.
I'm sorry.
Do you do any consulting for Johnson and Associates?
No.
Do you do any consulting for Lexington Law Firm?
No.
You may sit on the board and you may receive a compensation for
that, but you are aware that you receive a compensation in some
type of profit sharing arrangement, is that correct?
That's right.
54. Thus here, guided by attorney Victor Lawrence, Mrs. Johnson explains that

profit share comes to her from the operations.
(Exhibit 5 is the relevant pages of the SBA Deposition of DaNell Johnson.)
b. Mr. Johnson's SBA Testimony
55. It was under these circumstances when in November 1999 at Mr.
Johnson's third SBA deposition wherein the purported inconsistent statement was
made.
56. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true copy of the 1999 SBA Deposition of Jamis
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Johnson.
57. In his deposition, Jamis Johnson accurately disclosed the information
requested by the SBA. The following are excerpts and references of some of the
deposition:
Jamis' role at P.M. Johnson and Associates. L L C (DaNell Johnson's LLC)
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 14 lines 1-3, Exhibit 7.)
Q. Are you a member ofD.M. Johnson & Associates, LLC?
A. No.
Ownership of Lexington dba:
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 22 lines 14-25 and p. 23, Exhibit 7).
Q. Do you still operate your law practice under the assume name of Lexington
Law Firms?
A. I never operated my practice under an assumed name of Lexington Law
Firms.
Q. Okay. The state records show that the d.b.a. is registered to you and has
been ever since 1994 and will be until the year 2000.
A. I think that's accurate. The state records show that
Q. So who do you claim uses the name?
A. Oh, Lexington Law Firms?
Q. Yes.
A. I think we provided you with a bunch of that information before, and you
should know that, and I'm surprised you don't But I resigned with any
involvement in Lexington Law Firms because of the pending bar problem.
Bar Status affects Jamis' operational Lexington role
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition p. 24 lines 1-10, Exhibit 7).
A. _ / don't know if we've ever registered the fact that it was assigned [to Orvis].
I was sued by the State of Tennessee, you know, personally because Lexington
Law Firms was in my name, but since that time and with my bar problem I have
completely relinquished any interest. They paid me a little bit, made my payment,
and I resigned. Now, if it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're
going to have to go in and change that. But, you know, they're operating without
me.
Interests in any partnerships
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(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition p.30 lines 16-25 and p. 31 lines 1-24, Exhibit 7.)
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships?
A. No. I mean, you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody, but I
don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. You know, if I get a
deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to summit
county and buy a lot.
Q. So a joint venture?
A. Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't have any outgoing partnerships.
Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies?
A. No. I had an interest in a limited liability company in California called
Simmons Shores, LLC. The property got foreclosed out from underneath it. I
made some money from raising loans for it, but I know that no longer exists. I had
an interest in an outfit called Western Equities, LLC, but that is no longer
functional. I have no interest in LLCs or corporations.
Q. How about Summit Insured Equity Limited Partnership?
A. I had- that was a-1 had shares of stock in Summit that I got in exchange for
legal work and sold them, I'm thinking, in either late 1997 or '98, early '98.
Q. So you now longer have any interest in that limited partnership.
A. No.
Q. And you received no income.
A. No. It was a small amount of money. I got three grand from it

DaNell sits on the board at J&A:
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 32 lines 12-15, Exhibit 7.)
Q. Currently is she employed by anybody?
A. Yeah. Well, she's not employed. She doesn't get a W-2. She sits on the
board of Johnson & Associates.
Q. Does she earn any money for that?
A. Yeah, I think she does. I think she covered all of that with you. _
DaNell's Lexington compensation for board position and certain contributions:
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition p. 42 lines 1-5 and lines 17-25, p.43 lines 1-3, Exhibit
7.)
Q. So if Johnson & Associates pays your wife money it's for her services as a
trustee.
A. Yeah. She sits on the board. She also - yeah, she also - she did some other
things for them occasionally, but not much.
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Q. So your wife goes into the office there and does work or A. She does some work, yeah. She does some minimal work. She's also on the
board. She also donated, you know, as she told you in her deposition, early on a
bunch of computers and furniture and, you know, a lot of facilities to get it
started. It's got a combination of things there. I mean, I think you know this
because we've given you the checks, or she's given you the checks or Johnson
& Associates have given you the checks. All of those checks have been made
available to you.
DaNell still on board of J & A:
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 80 lines 10-12, Exhibit 7.)
Q. So your wife at this time is still on the board of Johnson & Associates.
A. Yes. What was that you just turned off?
DaNell Johnson's LLC's sources of income. Lexington makes regular payments
to DaNell
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 87 lines 3-15, Exhibit 7.)
Q. So the LLC's main source of income right now is the DaNell's trusteeship in
Johnson & Associates and some of these hard money deals. And anything else?
A. Lex. You mentioned $465 payment from Lex.
Q. Lexington Law Firm does credit repair, right?
A. Uh-huh. DaNell gets payments from Lex. Then she also has - well, if a big
deal comes along she gets some of that money. We sold some of that real estate.
We bought some lots and sold them in the fall. I mean in the spring.
58.

When viewed in light of the entire deposition and the series of questions

before and after the alleged disavowing of a partnership interest in the credit repair
partnership, the more likely interpretation is that Mr. Johnson was responding to a
question that in his mind was referring to real estate partnership or LLC. No where in
the entire deposition did Mr. Johnson expressly or implicitly disavowed any interest in
the credit repair business.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Manifest Error
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I.

THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED BY IMPROPERLY
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO
DISMISS APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN THE
ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE WERE NOT MET OR
SATISFIED.

A.

Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for
judicial estoppel; Mr. Orvis did not rely on any statement made
by Mr. Johnson during his SBA deposition.

B.

The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the
same and so the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable.

C.

The subject matter of the prior case is different from the
subject matter of the present case.

D.

The prior position must be "successfully maintained" for
judicial estoppel to apply, and in the SBA case there was no
position maintained; and Mr. Johnson could not have
successfully maintained a position that he had no partnership
interest in the credit repair business because he did not take
that position during the SBA post judgment discovery.

II.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE MANIFEST ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT TO WEIGH FACTUAL ISSUES AND MR. JOHNSON'S
CREDIBILITY IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
Manifest Error
Manifest error is clear in this case where the evidence of the partnership is so
overwhelming and the district court decided to ignore all of it on the basis of a "no"
response to a vague and ambiguous question from a post judgment deposition in a
prior unrelated case. Manifest error exists where the lower court clearly misapplies the
law to the facts of the case. Please see Mary J. Bailey (Adams) v. Spencer Adams,
1990.UT.213, 798 P.2d 1142, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ut Appeal 09/19/90) [District
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Court committed manifest error when it applied Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) (Supp.
1990) to reduce child support without a motion to modify the support order or any
evidence of change of circumstances.]. Similarly here, and as shown below, the district
court committed manifest error. This it did in two ways: First, the district court
committed manifest error when it granted summary judgment dismissing Appellant's
partnership claim on the basis of the misapplication of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Moreover, and second, in granting summary judgment against Appellant, the district
court must have weighed Appellant's version of his SBA deposition testimony in the
prior unrelated SBA case, and deemed Appellant's version incredible which clearly
constitutes manifest error when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Both
instances of manifest error, the misapplication of the law of judicial estoppel and the
improper weighing of Appellant's credibility and material facts interpreting the SBA
deposition statement, will be discussed herein below.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED BY IMPROPERLY
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO
DISMISS APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN THE
ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE WERE NOT MET OR
SATISFIED.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel is well settled in Utah and its application
requires the district court to find several separate and independent elements: (1) The
person seeking relief, Mr. Orvis, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel must have relied
on the prior deposition statement by Mr. Johnson. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., v.
Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942). 2) The prior
proceeding (the SBA proceeding) must be between "the same persons or their privies"
as the parties in this case; (3) The prior action must involve "the same subject matter"
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as this case; and (4) The prior position must have been "successfully maintained."
Nebekerv. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT74, fl 15. 34 P.3d 180,187; Salt Lake
Cityv. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996).
The district court simply concluded the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Mr.
Johnson's partnership claim without analyzing the applicability of the four elements of
the doctrine. As shown next, the district court should not have applied the doctrine of
judicial estoppel on the disputed facts asserted by Mr. Orvis.
A.

Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for
judicial estoppel; Mr. Orvis did not rely on any statement made
by Mr. Johnson during his SBA deposition.

As in any estoppel, the essential element of judicial estoppel is detrimental
reliance. Mr. Orvis, as his offensive strategy, tries to claim that Mr. Johnson's
ambiguous SBA statement about "no" partnerships is a misstatement, but unless Mr.
Orvis actually relied on that statement made to the SBA, it cannot operate to estop Mr.
Johnson from asserting his partnership claims and pursuing the misappropriation,
against Mr. Orvis. Reliance by Mr. Orvis on any statement by Mr. Johnson is critical to
the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, yet the district court ignored this
element altogether. In Masters v. Worsley, 1989.UT.175, 777 P.2d 499.112 Utah Adv.
Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 1989), the court of appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's
holding on this issue:
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d
388, 390 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial
estoppel must show that he or she has done something or omitted to do
something in reliance on the other party's testimony in the earlier proceeding,
and will be prejudiced if the facts are different from those upon which he or she
relied. Id. However, "there is no estoppel where there was no reliance and the
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parties had equal knowledge of the facts." Id. at 390-91. However, in Richards
v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971), the court clarified that
the doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues
actually litigated, not those which merely could have been determined.
[Emphasis added.]

The glaring error with the district court's ruling is the blatant failure by Mr. Orvis
to establish that "he . . . has done something or omitted to do something in reliance
on...[Mr. Johnson's] testimony in the earlier proceeding." Mr. Orvis has not and cannot
establish the essential element of reliance thus making the doctrine of judicial estoppel
wholly inapplicable. For this reason alone, the district court has committed manifest
error.
First, Mr. Orvis has never, in any way, pled or claimed reliance on the Johnson
SBA statement—not in his motion for summary judgment, nor in his affidavit, nor in any
other pleading.
Nor is it possible to infer reliance by Mr. Orvis because there are no facts, actual
or alleged, anywhere in this case, from which reliance may be inferred.
Further, Mr. Orvis' actual actions are the antithesis of reliance.
Perhaps most telling (and most pernicious), when Mr. Johnson, concerned about
misappropriation of partnership funds, demanded from Mr. Orvis an audit and an
accounting, in July of 2001, (Exhibit 4), Mr. Orvis did the following: As discovery
indicates, (Deposition testimony of Orvis employee, Mr. Triplett, Exhibit 2) Mr. Orvis
consulted with Mr. Victor Lawrence (attorney for DaNell and Jamis Johnson in the SBA
matter and in the partnership matters). Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence determined to
acquire the SBA judgment as a means to extinguish the partnership with Johnson and
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mask the fraud that had preceded, and take and divide the Johnson profit share. Mr.
Orvis, within days of the demand letter (using the instrumentality of a defunct Utah LLC,
and using partnership monies), paid to the SBA the exact sum that Mr. Orvis and Mr.
Lawrence knew had been offered to the SBA by Mr. Johnson in prior negotiations.
Thus, the SBA judgment was acquired to be used to deal with the existing OrvisJohnson partnership. This very act by both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence in buying the
judgment to use against Mr. Johnson also voids the judgment. Please see Snow,
Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 1999 UT 49, 369 Utah Adv. Rep.
36 (Utah 1999). A few days thereafter, Mr. Orvis brought this Complaint, and withheld
all further partnership distribution.
While this act of buying the SBA judgment in itself constitutes breach of fiduciary
duty by Mr. Orvis as partner, and Mr. Lawrence as lawyer, it clearly also demonstrates
that Mr. Orvis did not detrimentally rely on Mr. Johnson SBA deposition statement in
November 1999. Mr. Orvis paid to acquire the SBA judgment three years after the SBA
statement. Indeed, Mr. Orvis did not have to be in the position he is in now by having
purchased the SBA judgment. He came to the SBA judgment to use it for a fraudulent
and aggressive purpose. And his purpose was to use the SBA judgment to attempt to
extinguish the existing partnership that he knew existed. His very act of buying the SBA
judgment is itself proof that he understood that he had a partnership with Johnson and
was seeking an offensive weapon. This is the opposite of reliance.
Indeed, once the SBA judgment was acquired, Mr. Johnson was summoned to
the offices of Berman, Tomsic & Savage, where attorney Dan Berman informed Mr.
Johnson that Mr. Orvis had purchased the SBA judgment and that Mr. Johnson must
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abandon the partnership. Mr. Johnson wrote a confirmatory letter to Mr. Berman and
that letter acknowledges that Mr. Orvis purchased the judgment and would pay Johnson
between $16,000 and $18,000 per month for two years. (Exhibit 17, Letter to Dan
Berman.) The letter is attached because it reveals the mind and intent of Mr. Orvis.
The payment of $16,000 to $18,000 per month is for the purpose of settling the
partnership claim and having Mr. Johnson thereafter abandon the partnership with Mr.
Orvis. Thus, Mr. Orvis believes there is a partnership and his purpose in acquiring the
SBA judgment is to use it to offset and extinguish the on-going partnership. Again, this
is precisely the opposite of what would constitute detrimental reliance on a response in
an SBA deposition three years earlier, by Mr. Orvis.
Additionally, Mr. Orvis' actions toward the SBA prevent there from being any
reliance. Mr. Orvis did not rely nor cannot claim reliance on the SBA statement
because he helped Mr. Johnson outline the information to the SBA. The conclusion
seems unavoidable that Mr. Orvis clearly understood what he was doing and was
apprised of the SBA matter. Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence were actually part
of the team that prepared discovery to the SBA showing the flow of profit share checks
and their distribution. Attorney Victor Lawrence (with the knowledge of Mr. Orvis and
while working also for Mr. Orvis) actually represented and counseled DaNell Johnson in
her deposition by the SBA where, at his directed questioning, she laid out to the SBA
the profit share distribution—this only months before Mr. Johnson's SBA deposition.
Mr. Lawrence counseled Mr. Johnson also in his depositions. Mr. Lawrence and Mr.
Orvis and Mr. Johnson jointly conferred on the depositions and the discovery. Mr. Orvis
and Mr. Lawrence knew so much about the SBA judgment that they actually knew the
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amount Mr. Johnson was negotiating to settle this claim with the SBA and using that
inside knowledge (gained from the attorney fiduciary relationship) they took advantage
of it and paid the SBA exactly that amount to buy the judgment instead of settle it. Mr.
Orvis and Mr. Lawrence cannot (without deliberate misrepresentation) state that they
did not understand the nature of the partnership and the profit share distribution or that
they did not assist in establishing and outlining to the SBA an accurate picture of the
partnership. "There is no estoppel... where the parties had the same knowledge of the
facts." Again, Mr. Orvis cannot claim to detrimentally rely on the SBA statement of Mr.
Johnson.
After November 1999, the date of the SBA deposition, Mr. Orvis did not change
his position from being a partner with Mr. Johnson to a position that Mr. Johnson had
no partnership with him. Instead Mr. Orvis did the opposite. Profit share distribution
(distributed by Mr. Orvis) not only continued uninterrupted on a monthly basis but
increased dramatically over the next two years up to as high as $35,000 per month just
before Mr. Orvis filed this lawsuit; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson continued to execute and
exchange written documents regarding the partnership, and; their active course of
performance after the SBA statement also evidences the ongoing partnership
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Orvis relied in any way on
the SBA statement by Mr. Johnson.
"There is no estoppel where there was no reliance" is the controlling principal
here. Since the district court failed to place the burden on Mr. Orvis to show his
reliance; and there is no evidence, nor can there be evidence of reliance, the grant of
summary judgment was clear manifest error that calls for summary reversal of the
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district court. Appellant respectfully urges the court for summary disposition reversing
the grant of summary judgment below.
B.

The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the
same and so the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable.

For judicial estoppel to apply, the parties in the prior case and in this case must
be the same. The parties are not the same for three reasons:
I.) The actual parties are not the same.
ii.) Mr. Orvis, who claims to be a privy to the SBA because he purchased the SBA
judgment, did so with monies misappropriated from the partnership, and he is not,
therefore, the "privy" because the SBA judgment would actually be the property of the
partnership, which would be the "privy";
iii.) The SBA judgment was purchased in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duties
and is void in Mr. Orvis' hands.
The parties in the prior case were Mr. Johnson and the United States
Government (the SBA). The parties in this current matter are Mr. Johnson and Mr.
Orvis and several others. The parties are clearly not the same. However, Mr. Orvis
claimed, and the district court agreed, that Mr. Orvis was a privy with the SBA. The
district court held that Mr. Orvis was in privity with the SBA since he purchased the SBA
judgment against Mr. Johnson. The facts regarding the issue of being a privy are
however, legitimately very much in dispute. Mr. Johnson asserts that Mr. Orvis was
embezzling partnership money and purchased the SBA judgment using partnership
funds wrongly taken from the partnership. If this is so, then the SBA judgment that he
purchased would be the property not of Mr. Orvis but of the partnership. Accordingly,
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this would make the partnership a "privy" of the SBA, not Mr. Orvis. Since this is a
genuine factual issue raised below that had to be tried, this element of whether the
parties are the same or privies precludes summary judgment. Further, Mr. Johnson, as
partner, charges Mr. Orvis and Mr. Victor Lawrence with fraud, conspiracy to defraud,
breach of both partner and attorney fiduciary duties, embezzlement, theft and criminal
conversion by taking partnership assets and purchasing the SBA judgment for the
malicious purpose of using it to deny Mr. Johnson his profit share and his partnership
interest and also to mask their own ongoing fraud. There is significant testimony to this
effect in the depositions of Tommy Triplett, (Orvis employee), Will Vigil (Lawrence and
Orvis employee) and Jade Griffen, (Orvis employee). The substance of and references
to these depositions were amply spread before the district court in the relevant
pleadings. Such acts would void the SBA judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis, and he
would not be a privy. Also argued in the district court, is that Mr. Victor Lawrence and
Mr. Orvis manage, work for, and profit by Lexington law firm, Mr. Lawrence's firm. Mr.
Lawrence is also the attorney for the Johnsons in the SBA matter and in partnership
matters. If is patently illegal for him, and for Mr. Orvis, in conspiracy with him, to
acquire a judgment against a client. This act, if proven, not only voids the SBA
judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence, (Snow. Nuffer et al v. Tannasse.
supra) but it is a criminal offense.
These are all substantial and material issues of fact raised below but ignored by
the district court in its grant of summary judgment to Mr. Orvis. And again, these issues
would go directly to whether Mr. Orvis may claim to be a "privy" or not for purposes of
judicial estoppel. Mr. Orvis' status as a "privy" is a material issue of fact prematurely
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and erroneously ruled on by the district court.
C.

The subject matter of the prior case is different from the
subject matter of the present case.

The prior case was a contract guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency
action brought by the SBA against Mr. Johnson. The SBA obtained a money judgment
against Mr. Johnson. In the present action, Mr. Orvis seeks a declaratory judgment that
would extinguish Mr. Johnson's partnership interest in their credit repair business, and
Mr. Johnson is counterclaiming for an accounting, for conspiracy, and related claims.
The subject matters of the prior action and this action are clearly different.
This distinction between the subject matter of the prior SBA case and this case is made
clearer by a 1971 Utah Supreme Court clarification of the doctrine of judicial estoppel
by holding that "the doctrine [judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could have been determined.''
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971). The only issue
litigated in the prior SBA action was the foreclosure action and the guarantee contract.
The specific partnership of the credit repair business in this case was not litigated in the
prior SBA action, and no determination was there made as well. A vague and
ambiguous "No" response to a general question followed by a statement showing Mr.
Johnson thinking about real estate partnerships as he admitted to have had joint
ventures is not a determination, let alone a litigated determination, that Mr. Johnson has
no partnership interest in the credit repair partnership.
There is no litigated determination regarding these responses; the only subject matters
in the SBA case that have passed through litigated determination, so as to conform with
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the standard set out in Richards above, are issues relating to the contract and real
estate. And thus these would be the only issues arising from the SBA case that may be
considered in analyzing the applicability of judicial estoppel and because these SBA
issues are different from those issues pending in this case, judicial estoppel is not
applicable. It is reversible manifest error for the district court to have granted summary
judgment through the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel when the issues
here are different from the issues in the prior case.
D.

The prior position must be "successfully maintained" for
judicial estoppel to apply, and in the SBA case there was no
position maintained; and Mr. Johnson could not have
successfully maintained a position that he had no partnership
interest in the credit repair business because he did not take
that position during the SBA post judgment discovery.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires, as one of its tests of applicability, that
the prior position be "successfully maintained". As cited above, this court, citing
Richards v. Hodson with approval, stated:
...in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971), the court
clarified that the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which merely could have been
determined.
There was no discernable action by the SBA or by Mr. Johnson, which was
"maintained" or pursued, let alone concluded "successfully" involving the "position", i.e.
that there was no Orvis-Johnson partnership. The district court manifestly erred in
looking to the SBA statement of Mr. Johnson as the basis to grant summary judgment
and to declare that no partnership existed between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson.
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Further, based simply on the information submitted to the SBA by the Johnsons, both in
depositions, and through document production (provided in part by Mr. Orvis and Mr.
Lawrence), it is highly improbable, even if Mr. Johnson had wanted to, that he could
have successfully maintained a position that he had no interest in the credit repair
businesses. This is because there is, in fact, a partnership interest in the credit repair
businesses and the totality of the discovery to the SBA reflects this. There was a
variety of evidence submitted to the SBA in discovery (collected and submitted in large
part—profit share checks for example—by Mr. Orvis himself and Mr. Lawrence, for the
partnership) and elicited from Mr. and Mrs. Johnson in multiple depositions. This
evidence taken in context, accurately demonstrate the nature of their business
relationship with Mr. Orvis.
Mr. Orvis, who had access to all the SBA depositions and document production
(because he bought the SBA judgment) submitted to the district court only a one word
quote "no" from nearly 1,000 pages of discovery over four years, to support his claim
that Mr. Johnson stated there was no partnership. Mr. Orvis had to ignore hundreds of
pages of depositions and hundreds of produced documents, checks, agreements, etc.,
to try and persuade the district court. And the district court uncritically assumed Mr.
Orvis' posture.
Any reasonably complete review of the entire discovery responses to the SBA's
post judgment discovery will clearly show that Mrs. Johnson, supported by their attorney
Victor Lawrence and business associates Mr. Orvis and others, held, for many years,
the beneficial interest and was receiving profit share distribution in the credit repair
businesses. Additionally, Mr. Johnson was resigning from being the directing attorney
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for Lexington and Johnson and Associates, and was to take a more passive role in the
business with Mr. Orvis managing the day to day affairs of the businesses. The SBA
had substantial documentary (including checks) and testimonial evidence of this
position. While there was no legal determination for or against the assertion of this
position, this was the position that was the thrust of the responses to the SBA discovery
requests. Mr. Johnson was asked in various depositions about the credit repair
businesses, Lexington and Johnson and Associates, as was Mrs. Johnson. Mr.
Johnson's responses were accurate. In addition to those questions, Mr. Johnson was
asked about other partnerships. His answer containing the "no" response clearly
reflects that he understood the SBA to be inquiring, in this line of questioning, about
real estate partnerships. And this answer was in conjunction with his other answers
about Lexington and about Johnson and Associates which he responded to earlier in
the deposition and would respond to later in the deposition. The SBA already knew
what his position was from his and DaNell Johnson's prior depositions.
Further, the position taken by the Johnsons vis a vis the SBA was not a recent
concoction to defend against the SBA but was the manner the Johnsons have
conducted their financial affairs for years. The Johnson's separated real property
ownership and taxation in 1989. In 1994 the Johnsons operated an interest in a
medical facility in Louisiana with Mrs. Johnson holding the beneficial interest, sitting on
the board, etc. In 1996 Mr. Johnson and his wife DaNell Johnson entered into an
agreement wherein DaNell would be the owner of all their properties including the
beneficial interest in various business ventures including the partnership venture with
Mr. Orvis. This information was given to the SBA in depositions in 1997,1998, and
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1999 by Mr. Johnson and by Mrs. Johnson. What is more, this was explained to the
district court in Mr. Johnson's opposition to Mr. Orvis' motion for summary judgment.
The entirety of Mr. Johnson's deposition testimony espouses this fact very clearly
especially as to the credit repair business. Indeed, nowhere in Mr. Johnson or Mrs.
Johnson's deposition was any testimony that they did not have any interest in the
credit repair business. Nonetheless the district court found that Mr. Johnson took the
position that he had no partnership interest in the credit repair business, and that is
absolutely incorrect. If Mr. Johnson did not take the position that he had no interest in
the credit repair business than he could not have successfully maintained that position.
Moreover, the issue of what Mr. Johnson said, the meaning, the intent of both
the examiner and deponent, the understanding by deponent of the question and a host
of other incidental issues are fraught with multiple interpretations that would, under any
circumstances, need to be examined by a trier of fact rather than ignoring them as the
district court did on summary judgment.
II.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE MANIFEST ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT TO WEIGH FACTUAL ISSUES AND MR. JOHNSON'S
CREDIBILITY IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The district court stated in its minute entry that it was satisfied that Mr. Johnson
was avoiding creditors.2 This statement clearly reveals the mental processes the court
engaged in when deciding to grant the motion for summary judgment on the basis of
2. The district Judge Hanson manifested pronounced Dias in open court against Appellant. At the first
hearing in this case, the Judge indicated that he had read only the Movant's brief, (Mr. Lawrence, at this
time); he had not then read the Appellant's brief, nor could clearly recall the complaint's causes of action,
but had decided that Appellant was "lying" to the SBA and should be reported to the U.S. Attorneyadopting the inflammatory view of the Lawrence brief. That brief was significantly in factual error as has
since come to light. This judge, having previously handled the Utah Bar matter against Appellant seems
to have maintained an undue bias in this case. Appellant asserts that this bias may be the reason the
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judicial estoppel. To be satisfied that Mr. Johnson was avoiding creditors, the court
must have adopted Appellee Orvis' contested interpretation of deposition testimony.
Mr. Orvis claimed that Mr. Johnson meant by a response therein that he does not have
a partnership interest in the credit repair businesses. Mr. Johnson claims the opposite
- that his response when taken in context and all the discovery responses up to and
after the deposition clearly shows that he never disavowed his partnership interest in
the credit repair businesses that he had for years with Mr. Orvis. [Mr. Johnson's
version or position as to this factual issue must, as a matter of law, be accepted for
purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d
758, 759 (Utah 1988)].
To be satisfied that Mr. Johnson was avoiding creditors, the district court was
indeed accepting the version of the facts presented by Mr. Orvis and rejecting Mr.
Johnson's version that he never disavowed his partnership interest in the credit repair
businesses with Mr. Orvis. To be satisfied of one set of facts over another involves a
weighing of the two sets of facts. This of course is not permissible, as a matter of law,
on a motion for summary judgment. Winegarv. Froereret. ai% 1991.UT.110, 813
P.2d 104, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah 1991). Moreover, since Mr. Johnson's set of
facts involves the issue of his credibility, the district court's rejection of his version of
the facts, is a clear repudiation of his credibility as well. Weighing parties' credibility is
also improper and it is another manifest error by the district court requiring this court to
grant summary disposition reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment.
court here seemed to ignore well established standards for deciding a motion for summary judgment.
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Maters v. Worsley, 1989.UT.17, 777 P.2d 499, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal
1989).
CONCLUSION

Certain matters are clear here. Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson have a partnership.
Mr. Orvis purchased the SBA judgment against Mr. Johnson to use it as a defense
against Mr. Johnson's partnership claims. Mr. Orvis, extracts the word "no" from a 52
word quote, found in one of the SBA depositions he owns and uses this truncated
quote as a means to argue to the district court that Mr. Johnson has made a
misrepresentation to the SBA or has alternatively "disavowed" the Orvis-Johnson
partnership. This argument forms the basis for Mr. Orvis' summary judgment motion.
The district court erred in finding that Mr. Johnson was "avoiding creditors" and finding
that Mr, Johnson is judicially estopped from any claim of partnership with Mr. Orvis.
The district court committed manifest error with this ruling because the court
misapplied the doctrine of judicial estoppel and he improperly weighed Mr. Johnsons'
credibility and contested facts. It is clear that judicial estoppel has no applicability
because not one of the four requirements are met. First, reliance is a critical element of
judicial estoppel and Mr. Orvis did not rely on the SBA statement, nor did he plead any
reliance and his actions in buying the SBA judgment are the opposite of reliance, and
as this court has noted "where there is no reliance, there is no estoppel; Second, the
parties in the SBA case and in this case are different. Mr. Orvis cannot claim to be a
privy because he purchased the SBA judgment with misappropriated partnership
assets and the real owner of the SBA judgment and the "privy" is the Orvis-Johnson
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partnership. Further the judgment is void in the hands of Orvis for breach of partner
fiduciary duty, and conspiracy with attorney Lawrence to breach attorney fiduciary duty;
Third, the issues In the SBA case and the issues here are different and preclude the
application of judicial estoppel, and only litigated issues may be considered and the
litigated SBA issues are totally different from issues here; and Fourth, the prior position
must be successfully maintained, and there is no discernable evidence that there was
any effort at maintaining any position with regard to the SBA judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court committed manifest error and the
decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Mr. Orvis
should be summarily reversed.
DATED this 1 d

day of February, 2005

ellant
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something that you weren't aware of?
A.

Absolutely.

Q.

They might have been reporting to Mr. Orvis

or Mr. Griffith; is that

correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know whether the lawyers were paid

for their

services?

A.

I don't

know there was that

compensation,

but I did overhear certain instances of profit sharing.
Q.

You don't know how they were paid?

A.

No f

Q.

You testified about a point in time when

I don't

know.

there was a shifting of some clients
Firm to Johnson

& Associates.

from Lexington Law

Do you recall that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And tell me how you were aware of that.

A.

I was aware of that in that I was the

fulfillment manager.

I was directed

to send the

clients, the E-clients, the lower end paying clients
from our firm, Lexington Law Firm, over to Johnson &
Associates.
Q.

Who instructed you to do that?

A.

Jayson Orvis.

Q.

Did he tell you why he wanted you to do

that?

L
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No

Q.
was b e i n g

Did you h a v e an u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of why t h a t

done?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And where did that understanding come from?

A.

From previous conversations with Mr, Orvis.

Q.

Tell me about that.

First of all, what was

your understanding?
A.

My understanding was that we were looking

to -- my understanding was that there wasn't much focus
on Lexington Law Firm building its profits, and my
understanding was also that we were to send over the
E-clients over to the Johnson & Associates department
simply because the money was being divided up amongst
different individuals.
Q.

From Johnson & Associates?

A.

Exactly.

Q.

And from L e x i n g t o n

A.

Exactly.

Q.

Did t h a t

understanding,

shifting

Law F i r m ?

of c l i e n t s ,

in

your

h a v e a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h J a m i s

A.

I n my u n d e r s t a n d i n g ?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was

that?
C i t i C o u r t , LLC
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The fact that the less profits we had at

Lexington, you know, the less money we got paid,
Mr. Johnson got paid.
Q.

How did you have that understanding?

A.

Because I was told that by Mr. Orvis in

conversations.
Q.

And when did those conversations take place?

A.

They took place periodically around the time

of the move, which was about the latter part of 2000.
Q.

And do you recall specifically what

Mr. Orvis told you with regard to the intent to shift
clients from Lexington to Johnson & Associates and the
effect that it would have on Jamis Johnson's payment?
MR. BOGART:

Objection.

A.

Not directly.

Q.

You don't recall what he said?

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

That was just the understanding you had had

from the conversations?
A.

Yes .

Q.

Is it possible that you might have

misunderstood what Mr. Orvis was intending with that
shifting of clients?
A.

Yes.
MR. ATKIN:

Take a few minutes break.
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Did you -- during your employment with
Lexington at any time before or after '99, or during,
obviously, did you have any conversations with Jayson
Orvis with regard to his business relationship with
Jamis Johnson?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did he say?

A.

He said that basically that Jamis was a

partner in the firm, that he was getting certain
amounts of money from the firm.
Q.

And when was it that he told you that?

A.

I'd say it would have to be back in —

don't know the precise date.

I

We talked numerous times.

I would say probably 2000, roughly.
Q.

Did that testimony -- did that conversation,

did that position ever change?

Did he ever tell you

anything about a change in that position?
A.

No.

As a matter of fact, we did talk a lot

about it when there was the confrontation between he
and Jamis.
Q.

And when was?

A.

That was around 2000.

Q,

And what did you talk about with regards to

A.

The fact that we were supposed to not engage

that?
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25 to 35 thousand were simply calculations that he
pulled out of his rear, that had no bearing on any of
the accounting practices or any of the -- you know,
regardless of what Jamis -- or Johnson & Associates was
doing.
Q.

So the checks were not even a rough function

of profits or checks coming out of Johnson &
Associates, to your understanding?
A.

Right.

But they would reflect -- if Johnson

& Associates did well that month, the checks would
generally be a little larger.
Q.

Why was this a hot topic?

A.

It was something we talked about from time

to time.

There was some -- there was animosity between

Jamis and Jayson.

So it was -- Jamis worked, you know,

in a separate office, and I got the impression that
Jayson didn't like to go visit him and that's why he
always sent me to deliver the checks.
the go-between for both of them.

So I was just

And throughout the

course of my employment they exchanged a few -- they
talked about a number of things, and I don't think they
ever threatened each other, but they were tense
conversations.
Q.

Other than the fact Mr. Orvis and

Mr. Johnson didn't seem to have a particularly close
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Tnomas Tripietc,

d i d you e v e r g e t an e x p l a n a t i o n

from

Mr. Orvis a b o u t why Mr. O r v i s was p r o v i d i n g
checks t o Mr.
A.

Johnson?

Yes,

q u i t e a few t i m e s .

breaks down i s ,
it,

and t h i s

of the company.

B a s i c a l l y how i t

is the e x t e n t

t h e r e was s e v e r a l p a r t n e r s

something l i k e

goodwill

I think i t

involved

t o which I know
in t h e

founding

was NADA or NACA or

that.

Q.

NACA?

A.

North American Credit Association.

began to trickle apart.

And it

Then the Lexington was formed

after that, Johnson & Associates was formed, and this
was primarily through Jayson and Jamis.

The details

I'm never -- If ve never -- he's never told me and I've
never been clear about.
At some point in time Jamis got out of the
deal, either a buyout or he left or something, I have
no clue.

But at any rate, he lost, you know, some sort

of profit shares or didn't have any profit shares or
any claim to any of the profits, so -- but Jayson
always said that just out of his goodwill -- it really
wasn't out of a goodwill but just to -- this is the way
he would phrase it, just to keep him off my back and to
keep him from suing me.

Which he said even if he did

it would be futile, but I just don't want to —
CitiCourt, LLC
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rather just pay him money and keep him at bay and we go
on with our merry lives.
Q.

Did you form a view about what Mr. Orvisfs

monthly gross income was?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What was your view?
MR. ATKIN:

A.

Objection, lacks foundation.

First month —

during the interview when he

hired me he told me that he made $96,000 that month.
Later he said that for the last five or six months
before my employment was when the checks started really
getting big, around to the $90,000 mark.

Throughout my

employment they increased, one month $125,000.

Towards

the end it was about $153,000.
Q.

How did you come to have this feeling?

A.

I deposited the checks, so I had a pretty

good idea of what was coming in.

And he told me half

the time, so I was pretty in the loop.
Q.

Going back to this relationship between

Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson.

I take it Mr. Orvis had

indicated to you that he was trying to keep Mr. Johnson
at bay.

At bay, did he tell you at bay with respect to

what?
A.

With respect to his control over the company

and control over profit shares and basically money.
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441

Thomas T r i p l e t t ,
Q.

23

8/22/L-

Control over the company, which company do

you have in mind?
A.

Johnson & Associates and Lexington Law Firm.

Q.

To your knowledge, did Mr. Johnson claim

ownership in those entities?
A.

I knew he felt he was entitled to money.

don't know if he ever claimed ownership.

I

I mean, the

name Johnson & Associates, Johnson referring to Jamis
Johnson, he founded in some way or another, so I know
that he was an original partner.

And to what extent

he -- and I have no idea how he lost it or got out of
running and managing the company or being a part of the
profit sharing.

I have no idea how he I guess got out

of control.
Q.

Aside from Mr. Orvis's statements that

Mr. Johnson was not a partner, do you have any other
reason to believe Mr. Johnson was not a partner in
these enterprises?
A.

No, not offhand.

Q.

Did Mr. Orvis, to your knowledge, have any

partners in these credit repair enterprises?
A.

Yeah, he —

believe -- oh, gol.

I was settled as partner and I
Sam Spendlove and Spence -- I

cannot remember his name.
Q.

Bingham?
CitiCourt, LLC
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that they're pretty vague in general.

The regulations,

telemarketing and Internet regulations on how to sign
up clients, retain clients, and represent them were a
little unclear and that they were able to clarify them.
And he said it actually turned out to be in their
favor.
That's the extent which I know.

I know that

the suit was against Jamis Johnson, that it was his -his I guess you'd say butt on the line that was kind of
under fire.

And that's one of the things that he did

mention when he was always cutting a check to Jamis
Johnson.

It was one of the things he would mention,

Jamis did put in —

he did stick out his neck a little

bit for the company and because of the lawsuit and
that, you know, there was —

because there was the

threat of worst case scenario, there was the threat of
him being disbarred and things.

So in that sense he

said that was one of his motivations for giving him the
monthly check of, you know, 30 thousand.
Q.

These conversations you had with Mr. Orvis

regarding the Tennessee litigation, did Mr. Orvis ever
tell you that the litigation concerned only Mr. Johnson
and did not concern Johnson & Associates or Lexington
Law Firm?
A.

No.

Well, he could have.
CitiCourt, LLC
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2

Q.

44

Was that the only meeting you sat in on with

between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence?

3

A.

I believe so.

4

Q.

In that meeting was there any discussion of

5

Mr. Johnson?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

What was the discussion with respect to

8

Mr. Johnson?

9

MR. ATKIN:

Objection, lacks foundation.

10

A.

11

recall.

12

things that were done, and there were a few like

13

derogatory comments made but nothing -- nothing --

14

nothing specific that I can think of.

15

Q.

Nothing that -- nothing specific I can
They were upset at him because of some of the

Whether at this meeting or in some telephone

16

conference or otherwise, do you recall any discussions

17

to which you were present between Mr. Orvis and

18

Mr. Lawrence regarding removal of Mr. Johnson from

19

Johnson & Associates or Lexington Law Firms?

20

A,

It was my understanding that when I came to

21

work for Jayson that Jamis Johnson was already removed

22

from the companies.

23

Q.

Were there any discussions to which you were

24

present regarding —

between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence

25

regarding means to exert pressure on Mr. Johnson or
CitiCourt, LLC
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prevent him from filing the lawsuit?
A.

Well, there was the monthly payment.

I

mean, Jayson told me, I don't know if he ever said this
to Jamis, but he said to me that if Jamis ever, you
know, got teeth and tried to bite he would just stop
sending the checks, and he would use that money to hire
the best attorney he could and fight him back.
know if he ever said that to Jamis.

I don't

I would assume he

would as a means to keep Jamis at bay, but I don't ever
recall him ever saying that to him.
Q.

Do you recall any discussions with Mr. Orvis

regarding any judgments, legal judgments against
Mr. Johnson?
A.

Oh, yeah.

Yeah, that was in that

conversation, too.
Q.

That conversation?

A.

The conversation that Victor had with Jayson

Orvis .
Q.

That we discussed a little while ago?

A.

Yeah, that was -- Jamis had some judgments

against him, and Jayson had come to Victor and asked
him if -- what, you know, he's like, can I buy these
against him.

And Victor said to the effect that

this is all Jayson recounting this to me.

—

At one time

he said, well, you can, but you're pretty ruthless.
CitiCourt, LLC

And so I believe Jayson went and bought those as sort
of another means to control Jamis.
Q.

:

Why do you believe Mr. Orvis bought the

judgments?
MR. ATKIN:
A.

Objection, lacks foundation.

He was tired -- what I understood was that

he was tired of harassments and the constant
accusations that he got from Jamis Johnson.
Q.

Maybe that question was phrased poorly.

not asking what Mr. Orvis's motivation was.

I'm

I'm

asking, you said you believe that Mr. Orvis actually
bought the judgments.
A.

Oh, yes.

Q.

And what I want to know is, why do you have

that belief?
A.

I never actually saw any paperwork regarding

it, but I believe Jayson said it and I remember talking
to Jayson —

or Jamis on one occasion saying that

Jayson had -- that Jamis had found out from one means
or another that Jamis owned those -- Jayson owned those
or had attempted to own them or something like that,
and —

but I never saw any actual paperwork or anything

regarding that.
Q.

So you didn't write the checks in connection

with that?
CitiCourt, LLC
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you, as a partner, a ten percent Lexington person •A.
Right.
Q.
would forego some money so that the
Johnson k Associates side of things could make it
financially?
A.
Right.
Q.
Did you ever get reimbursed for those -*
A. No.
Q.
checks?
A. No.
Q.
No. Are you aware -• do you know who took
the bulk of the funds out of Lexington Law Firms and out
of Johnson k Associates?
A.
Jayson Orvis,
Q.
Jayson Orvis? What about Jamis Johnson?
Has he also getting funds from both organizations?
A. Yes.
Q.
How do you know this?
A.
He would sit and go over money and what it
looked like, and I knew that you were receiving monies,
and I had an idea what the percentages were.
Q.
You used the term profit share. What's your
understanding of profit share?
A.
A certain percentage of the profits were put
away from employees and for certain benefits for them.
_ _ _
22
There was a portion set apart for the principals, what
we called the principals, Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis
and Griffin.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And if there was money after bills were paid
each month, those amounts were split up and disbursed.
Q.
So it's your understanding that profit share
came out after bills?
A.
Right.
Q.
Now, you left the organization, I think you
said.
Do you recall the date generally, the period
of time?
A.
Probably would have been fall of '99.
Q.
Has the Tennessee case pending when you
left, to your knowledge?
A. Yes.
0.
Hhen you left, you wanted to be bought out,
I think you said, your partnership bought out, and you
sold it to a guy named Deon.
Did anyone else offer to buy that from you?
A. Yes.
Q.
Hho?
A.
Jamis Johnson and Jayson Orvis.
Q.
Jayson Orvis offered to buy it, Jamis
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23
Johnson offered to buy it, and Deon Steckling offered to
buy it?
A. Yes.
0.
Now, who is Deon Steckling?
A.
A friend of Jayson Orvis 1 s,
Q.
What kind of friend? You mean an
acquaintance?
A.
Yeah, at the time just an acquaintance.
Q.
Hell, what is his job? Is he a credit
repair guy?
A.
No. At the time he was just a friend of
Jayson Orvis's.
0.
I've heard the term 'Impact.1 Do you know
what that is?
A. Yes.
Q.
Some sort of training for positive thinking
and such things; is that correct?
A.
Experiential training, sort of a gestalt
training.
Q.
Has he involved in running the Impact
courses?
A.
Yes. He was one of the trainers at the
Impact Institute.
Q.
Hho owned it?
A.
Hy understanding is a man named Hans Berger.
_ _ _
24
Q.
Hho owns it now?
A.
Hans Berger.
Q.
Now, Jayson was heavily involved in Impact,
was he not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And he had you take the training as well,
did he not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And he was a friend of Deon's from t h i s
experiential -«
A.
Right.
Q.
this Impact training?
A.
Right.
Q.
Hhen you were offered to be purchased, to be
bought out, Jamis Johnson wanted to buy you out, you
declined to sell it to him, or what happened?
A.
I didn't care who bought it. I just wanted
out. I needed the money ••
Q.
Okay.
A.
and he offered to buy it. Jayson Orvis
offered to buy it, Jamis Johnson offered to buy it, but
Jayson Orvis wouldn't allow - said he would block the
sale if I sold it to Jamis Johnson.
Q.
Did you call Jamis Johnson and inform him of
that?

CitiCourt, LLC
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A. Yes.
Q.
And tell him that buying your interest would
be a problem?
A. Yes.
Q.
Has there also a representation that Jayson
would manipulate the incomes of the businesses to
prevent Jamis Johnson from making any monies?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was it that Jayson said?
A.
Basically that he would cut Jamis Johnson
off if things got too ugly.
j
Q.
Did he say anything about manipulating
finances? In other words, see that there would be no
return to Johnson because he controlled the monies?
A. Yes.
Q.
Did you convey that to Jamis Johnson?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did Jamis Johnson buy your interest?
A.
No.
Q.
And it was purchased by Jayson*s friend,
Deon?
A.
Right. Jayson wanted a third party because
he didn't want - he wanted there to be more balance in
the decision making processes.
Q.
Okay. After this buyout and you left, did
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Yes.
Hho is Victor Lawrence and when did you come
to know him?
A. Mr. Lawrence is an attorney here in town
that Jayson Orvis brought in to serve as another point
of contact for clients.
Q. In Lexington, do you recall, was it uncommon
from time to time for Johnson and Orvis to bring in
three or four attorneys to sort of fill positions?
A. That was common.
Q. I mean, do you recall Doug Stoel, for
example?
A. Doug Stowell, Jin Mickelson.
Q. Linda Smith?
A. Linda Smith.
Victor Lawrence?
A. Victor Lawrence.
And a few others from time to time?
A. Uh-huh (yes).
Has Victor Lawrence brought in in that time?
A. Yes.
0. Do you have any knowledge -- when you left,
1 guess 1 should say, was Johnson & Associates and
Lexington Law Pirns still functioning in this building?
A. Yes.

A.
Q.

o.
o.
o.

PAGE 28

26
you talk with Jayson much?
A.
Not really.
Q.
How ••
A.
Prom time to time.
Q.
Prom time to time?
A. Yes.
Q.
And currently have you renewed your
acquaintanceship a little more in the last year or what?
A.
I speak with him fairly often. I don't
speak with him day-to-day like I used to.
Q.
Sure. Have you heard from Jayson O n i s
whether or not the Tennessee case was ever settled?
A.
Yeah. He was told that it was.
0.
What did he tell you about that?
A.
That there had been a favorable settlement
reached and that the FTC was satisfied with any changes
that had been made to the organization.
Q.
Now, Jamis Johnson and Jayson Orvis, do you
know what the nature of their relationship became after
you left? Did you ever have discussions with Jayson
Orvis about it?
A. Yes.
Q.
Do you know what happened, and let me ask
you this, first of all.
Do you know who Victor Lawrence is?
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Q.
And essentially side by side, as it were?
A. Yes.
Q.
Hell, do you have any knowledge of what
happened to the relationship between Orvis and Johnson,
and, again, I would admonish you to keep in mind that
you have to answer expansively and truthfully to the
best of your knowledge.
Do you have any knowledge of how their
relationship evolved after you left?
A.
Yes. It was my understanding that Jayson
Orvis was going to be working to remove Jamis Johnson's
name from the organization, from any relationship to the
organization, to protect the organization, because he
felt that Jamis Johnson had some problems with the Bar
and may not even be able to retain his law license and
that he was a liability, that he would still honor his
financial obligations to Jamis Johnson as long as Jamis
Johnson didn't cause problems.
0.
Let me ask you this: So was it your
understanding that Johnson would become passive, or
would he still be active?
A.
Yes, passive.
Q.
Was there some sort of agreement that was
entered into between Jayson and Johnson?
A.
I believe so.

CitiCourt, LLC
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We need to deal with the following:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

I need the figures for profit share splits for June and July. I
didn't get them for either month.
This confirms that for the month of July the payment (for
June's profit share) was reduced by $23,000 because of my
guarantee of the Paul Schewenke note.
You have stated to me that the bill for our Tennessee
counsel has finally been paid up to date for the Tennessee
litigation.
Re: Office payment. I have learned that you have not been
paying the office rent due. Johnson and Associates always
paid this. I haven't paid it. There is a demand for it and I
need it paid. Kim has the full amount. I will need it
reimbursed to me.
That raises the costs for the other rent. We've discussed it
but it has not been resolved. I am going to move to new
quarters. I will need the benefits that I was receiving
before the operations moved. That includes phone,
receptioning, office amenities (copying, fax, etc.). We have
discussed this but never resolved it. Sam works out of the
house now. I don't. I may also need temporary office
space during the transition. I don't want to be at Johnson
and Associates but I may lodge there for a month. I won't
know for two weeks.
There are regulatory problems where I am hanging out still
and I need assurance of continued protection.
Bar complaints. The bar has responded to my former
counsel regarding potential bar complaints you have against
me. They are asking if I am self reporting. I have told Sam
that I want all trust account checks. He says they are in
your control, not his. I need all of them.
Accounting. For various reasons of which you are aware,
we have come to the point where we need a full accounting
for all business operations since our inception. I am
prepared to engage the CPA firm to do this and I have

8.

talked to one. The cost of this should be borne by the
companies. If you won't pay for this then I will pay for this
unless there are discrepancies in which case it will be paid
for by the businesses. This review needs to be of all
operations. I want to start this September 15. You have
said you have put a controller in place so perhaps he is the
first place to start. I suggest we meet with him.
Incidentally I have learned that there is a debt settlement
operation and I have never had any accounting for it Steve
Paiige has also raised concerns about large amounts of
money coming in that are being diverted out of our
partnership arrangement. For these and all other reasons
we need an accounting.
Regulatory problems. Regulatory problems still exist.
a. Div. Of Consumer Affairs: You called me on Friday May
25 to warn me about a former employee/attorney named
Jan, no last name given. You indicated that there was a
file a foot thick about me at the Div of Consumer Affairs
at Utah and Jan had been contacted by them. You
indicated that you had promised that I would not follow
this up including contacting the Division or him because
he was so upset about their inquiry and you would take
care of this. I agreed to let you handle this for awhile but
have heard nothing. This concerns me.
b. State of Tennessee/FTC. This is hanging and unresolved.
I cant wait to get it resolved any further. You indicated
two weeks ago that you had finally gotten our Tennessee
counsel's bill paid current. That was why I was told that
profit share was lower.
c. State Bar. This is unresolved. As you know you
threatened to bring numerous bar complaints against me
if we litigated including for the trust account problem that
was already investigated by the bar for the trust account
that was managed by you and Sam. The bar has
responded to my former counsel but as yet not directly to
me. I still don't have the checks from Sam or you. This
needs to be investigated and settled.

9.

I just got notice that my families health insurance has
lapsed again for oversight from Trina I guess. I have kids
ail over the worid and I immediately need that reinstated. I
am having Kim call about that.

There are some other pending problems that I only have some notice
of. There is my IRS obligation for Johnson and Associates that I was
told was resolved finally but I have no data on that. We need to
discuss these and several other matters. Obviously the big matter is
the accounting.
As I have told you, I have been involved heavily in litigation and in
this San Diego deal over the past several months as you run the
operations but I am getting increasingly less info. I hope to have
some relief shortly. However, we need to meet. There are obviously
several other issues that I don't mention here, I would ask that we
meet to catch up. If you want to bring your attorney along feel free.
Please call Kim and set an appointment when I can be available or I
will call you.
^—v

Jamis
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
* * *

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Civil No, 2:95CV-838W

Judgment Creditor,

Deposition of:

vs.

DANELL JOHNSON

JAMIS M. JOHNSON,
Judgment Debtor,
*

*

•

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the ISth day of May,
1999, the deposition of DANELL JOHNSON, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled
action now pending in the above-named court, was taken before
Larene Pearce, a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:45
a,m. of said day at the offices of the Small Business
Administration, 125 South State Street, Conference Room 2222,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

ORIGINAL
INDEPENDENT REPORTING
& VIDEOGRAPHY
Larene Pearce
License No.
22-104852-7801

1220 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 638-2U3
Fax (801)538-2334

A P P E A R A N C E S

For the Judgment Creditor:

John S. Gygi
Special Assistant United States
Attorney
125 South State Street, Room 2237
Salt Lake City, Utah 84138

For the Witness:

Victor Lawrence
220 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Also Present:

Jamis M. Johnson
* * *

INDEX
WITNESS
DANELL JOHNSON
EXAMINATION
By Mr. Gygi
By Mr. Lawrence
By Mr. Gygi
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EXHIBITS
No. 1

Johnson and Associates Profit and Loss

13

No. 2

Johnson and Associates 1996 U. S.
Corporation Income Tax Return

15

DaNell Johnson 1997 U. S. Individual
Income Tax Return

15

DaNell Johnson 1996 U. S. Individual
Income Tax Return

15

No. 3
NO. 4

MR. LAWRENCE:

1
2

who is on that now.
MR. GYGI:

3
4
5

And we can get the papers to find out

Q

Okay.

(By Mr. Lawrence)

But you know at one time you were

on the board?

6

A

Oh, yeah.

7

Q

But right now you think you still are on the board?

8

A

I thought Jamis said something about the board

9

dissolving just in the conversation here.
MR. LAWRENCE:

10
11

We'll go ahead and provide the current

status.

12

Q

(By Mr. Lawrence)

But right now you think you're on

13

the board?

14

A

Oh, yeah.

15

Q

In regard to the payments that you received from

16

Johnson and Associates and whatnot, initially didn't you

17

contribute —

18

some furniture, right, when the business was first starting?

I think you stated you contributed some carpet and

MR. JOHNSON:

19

Computers.

20

Q

(By Mr. Lawrence)

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Did you contribute any computers as well?

23

A

Oh, yes.

24

Q

Okay.

25

Is that right?

When that business first started, it was just

a handful of friends and associates?

27

A

Right.

Q

Now that has somewhat blossomed, but you don't know

really what the company does now, is that correct?
A

Yes, because it has expanded quite a bit.

Q

In fact, aren't the funds that you received a profit

share that you receive?
A

That's what I understood it to be, yes.

Q

Are you being paid for anything else?

Do you do any

type of consulting for Johnson and Associates right now?
A

(Nodded no.)

Q

You have to answer audibly.

A

I'm sorry.

Q

Do you do any c o n s u l t i n g f o r Johnson and Associates?

A

No.

Q

Do you do any consulting for Lexington Law firms?

A

No.

Q

You may sit on the board and you may receive a

compensation for that, but you are aware that you receive a
compensation in some type of profit sharing arrangement, is that
correct?
A

That's right.

Q

And if Johnson and Associates has something to that

effect, you can go ahead or I can get that for you and turn that
over to Mr. Gygi?
A

Okay.

28
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN. TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant, Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAYSON ORVIS.
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF JAYSON ORVIS'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 010907449

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
JAMIS JOHNSON.
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYSON ORVIS. SAM SPENDLOVE.
DEON STECKLING. VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15.
Third-Party Defendants.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Jayson Orvis is the Plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action against the

Defendant Jamis Johnson. Plaintiff seeks, in this action, a judgment declaring that the
Defendant has no right, title or interest relative to any business or venture in which
Plaintiff has any ownership interest relating to the credit repair business; any real or
personal property or other assets relative to such businesses or ventures; or any
proceeds or profits relative to such businesses or ventures.
2.

Mr Johnson was sued by the Small Business Administration and judgment

was entered against him in that case on September 29, 1997. Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of
Jayson Orvis.
3.

In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes, Mr.

Johnson was deposed by the Small Business Administration. In that deposition, Mr.
Johnson categorically testified that he had no interest in or relationship with any
partnership or limited liability company, including Lexington Law Firm:
Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship....
Lexington Law Firm[) was in my name, but since that time and
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any
interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. But,
you know, they're operating now without me.

2

Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 5 to Affidavit of Jayson
Orvis, at 23:6-24:10.
4.

Defendant Johnson also testified before the SBA that he did not have any

interest in any partnership or limited liability company: "Q. Do you have any interest in
any partnership? A. No." MQ. Any interest in any limited liability companies? A. No."
Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Jayson
Orvis, at 30:16-31:4.
ARGUMENT
The Court should enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Mr. Orvis and against
the Defendant Mr. Johnson, declaring that Mr. Johnson has no claim to or interest in
any credit repair business entity or enterprise of the Plaintiff. The Court should enter
that Declaratory Judgment on the single ground of judicial estoppel.
In testimony before the Small Business Administration, Mr. Johnson, under oath,
completely disavowed any interest, partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair
business of Mr. Orvis. Before this Court, he now claims an interest in such business.1
Judicial estoppel will not allow Mr. Johnson to contradict his testimony before the Small
Business Administration and, accordingly, his current claim to an interest in Mr. Orvis's
business must fail.
!

To decide the case on grounds of judicial estoppel, it is not necessary to
determine on what (apparently shifting) basis Mr. Johnson rests his claim to interest in
Mr. Orvis's credit repair business.
3

The doctrine of judicial estoppel first made its appearance in 1857 in a case
before the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Hamilton v. Zimmerman. 37 Tenn. (5
Sneed) 39, 1857 WL 2547 (1857).2 The facts there are instructive. Plaintiff Hamilton
alleged that for several years he had been a secret partner of defendant Zimmerman in
a drug store;3 Zimmerman claimed that Hamilton was only a store clerk. In deciding the
case, the court pointed to pleadings from an earlier action wherein Hamilton had
testified that allegations describing Hamilton as a store clerk were "substantially true."
1857 WL at *4. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that Hamilton's answer was an
implicit admission, under oath, that he was a clerk in the employ of Zimmerman, and
that this answer estopped Hamilton from asserting in the case before the court that he
and Zimmerman were partners:
This is at least an implied admission of the truth of the
statement of Zimmerman - that Hamilton was merely his clerk.
And for all the purposes of this present bill, the admission
must be taken as true, without enquiring whether, as a matter
of fact, it be so or not. The law, as against the complainant
presumes that it is true . . . .
Id. The court explained the policy behind the judicial estoppel doctrine:
This doctrine is said to have its foundation in the obligation
under which every man is placed to speak and act according
}

Mr. Orvis attaches a copy of this case for the Court's convenience.

3

As the court found, Hamilton was a secret partner because, "as against his
creditors, it was a matter of absolute necessity to conceal his true relation to the
business as partner... ." 1857 WL at *2.
4

to the truth of the case; and in the policy of the law to
suppress the mischiefs from the destruction of all confidence
in the dealings of men, if they were allowed to deny that which
by their solemn and deliberate acts thev have declared to be
true. And this doctrine applies with peculiar force to
admissions or statements made under the sanction of an
oath, in the course of judicial proceedings. The chief security
and safeguard for the purity and efficiency of the
administration of justice is to be found in the proper reverence
for the sanctity of an oath.
id, (emphases added).
While the Supreme Court of Tennessee was the first court to apply the doctrine
of judicial estoppel, it certainly has not been the last. Utah courts have adopted the
doctrine, and courts throughout the country regularly apply it to prevent litigants from
doing precisely what Mr. Johnson attempts to do here, that is, to engage the judicial
system in a farce and a fraud. These courts have used a variety of colorful metaphors
to describe judicial estoppel, "characterizing it as a rule against "'playing "fast and loose
with the courts,"M blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands/ or 'hav[ing] [one's]
cake and eat[ing] it too.1" Reynolds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 861 F.2d 469,
472 (6lh Cir. 1988) (internal cites omitted; alteration in original).4 But however
described, the purpose of the doctrine is, as the Supreme Court of Utah has explained,
"to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial

*As the court in Reynolds observed: "Emerson's dictum that 'a foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds' cuts no ice in this context." 861 F.2d at 47273.
5

process from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the court." Salt
Lake Citv v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995).
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, focuses solely Mon
the relationship between the litigant and the judicial system, and seeks to preserve the
integrity of the system."5 Delqrosso v. Spang & Co.. 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 1990);
see also Lowerv v. Stovall. 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[Judicial estoppel is
designed to protect the integrity of the courts rather than any interests of the litigants.");
Oneida Motor Freight. Inc. v. United Jersey Bank. 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988)
("Judicial estoppel looks to the connection between the litigant and the judicial system
while equitable estoppel focuses on the relationship between the parties . . . .").6
indeed, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that a court may raise and
apply the issue of judicial estoppel sua sponte and for the first time on appeal:
We are not a bit concerned that the matter of judicial estoppel
was not raised in the lower court or argued by either of the
parties. This court has general superintending control over all
the courts of the state and the Wyoming judicial system in
general. It is our duty to protect its integrity and prohibit
dealing lightly with its proceedings. We are at liberty to
decide a case upon any point which in our opinion the ends of
justice require, particularly on a point so fundamental that we
must take cognizance of it.
5ii

[E]quitable estoppel. . . focuses on the relationship between the parties
Delgrosso. 903 F.2d at 241.
6

For this reason, Mr. Orvis and his relationship to Mr. Johnson are entirely
irrelevant to the inquiry here.
6

Allen v. Allen. 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976). The facts of Allen are also
instructive. There, the defendant had testified in divorce proceedings against his wife
that he owned a parcel of land in name only and therefore did not have an Interest in it.
Later, in a dispute over the ownership of the land between the putative owner (the
defendant's father) and the defendant, the defendant argued that he did in fact own the
land. The Supreme Court of Wyoming emphatically denied the defendant's claim:
[l]t would be highly inequitable for the defendant to have a
decree in his divorce case holding the property not to be his
and at the same time to be held the owner of an interest in
this proceeding. It is that very inconsistency that judicial
estoppel will not tolerate. Defendant's statements in the
previous action are the very highest order of evidence against
him and are entitled to judicial sanctity. He cannot play
hanky-panky with the courts of this state and thus interfere
with the integrity of the judicial system.
idL (emphasis added).
The reasoning of Allen applies with full force here. Mr. Johnson has lied - either,
under oath, before the United States government in the form of the Small Business
Administration or, under oath, before this Court. Judicial estoppel exists to Mraise[] the
cost of [such] lying." Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co. 11 F.3d 1420,1428 (7,h Cir.
1993). The cost to Mr. Johnson is that he must be held to his testimony before the
Small Business Administration. To this end, this Court should declare, on grounds of
judicial estoppel, that Mr. Johnson has no claim to or interest in any credit repair
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business entity or enterprise of Mr. Orvis, and enter a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
on his Declaratory Judgment claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his Declaratory Judgment claim.
DATED: March

2004.

BERMAttMOMSIC & SAVAGE

a

PeggyJ^Jbrasic. Esq.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant Jayson Orvis
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doctrine of estoppel applies with peculiar force, to
admissions or statements made under the sanctum
of an oath, in the course of judicial proceedings.
But in either case, if it satisfactorily appear that the
party made such admissions inconsiderately or
without full knowledge of the facts, it is proper that
the court should relieve him from the consequences
of hiserTor.

December Term, 185
Estoppel C=>52(2)
156k52(2) Most Cited Cases
West Headnotes
Estoppel 0=>3(3)
156k3(3) Most Cited Cases
Where the complainant in a bill against his alleged
partner for a settlement of partnership accounts,
declared himself a secret partner in the concern, and
entitled to half the profits thereof, which the
defendant denied, alleging that the complainant
was, during the whole time, only a salaried clerk;
and it appeared in proof, that in some collateral
litigation in which both parties were defendants,
that the defendant, in his answer, among other
things, averred that the complainant was his
clerk-and the complainant in his answer admitted
that the facts stated in defendant's answer were
substantially true; it is held in a case where the
proof is conflicting and irreconcilable, and in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation of said
admission, thai the complainant is thereby estopped
from denying that he was a clerk as charged.
Estoppel €=>5
156k5 Most Cited Cases
Estoppel €=>88(1)
I56k88(l) Most Cited Cases

The doctrine of estoppel has its foundation in the
obligation under which every man is placed, to
speak and act, according to the truth of the case;
and in the policy of the law to suppress the mischief
which would arise from the destruction of all
confidence in the intercourse and dealings of men,
if they were allowed to deny that which, by their
solemn and deliberate acts, they have declared to be
true.
Evidence €=>596(1)
157k596(I) Most Cited Cases
Pretrial Procedure C=*552
307Ak552 Most Cited Cases
It is a rule of practice alike applicable in equity as at
law, that the party who asserts a claim or right
against another, must establish such claim or right,
by competent and satisfactory proof; and the test of
what is satisfactory proof, is the sufficiency of the
evidence to satisfy the mind of the probable truth of
the fact alleged, upon which the right is grounded.
If unable to do so. the court cannot do otherwise
than dismiss his suit.
Exemptions O l 5
163k 15 Most Cited Cases

Evidence €=>205(I)
157k205(I) Most Cited Cases

Husband and Wife C=>4
205k4 Most Cited Cases

While admissions or declarations made in pais are
often entitled to little or no consideration, because
made inconsiderately or in ignorance of the facts, or
not eoirectly understood or reported; yet, the

Child Support C=>24
76Ek24 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 285k3.1(2))
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The debtor is under a positive obligation in law as
well as morals, to support and maintain his wife and
infant children. This is his first and most imperative
duty. But while this is so, and while he will be
countenanced by the law in its proper discharge, he
cannot make it the pretext for covering up and
protecting from the just claims of creditors, any
surplus fund accruing from his labor or vocation,
whatever it may be.
FROM DAVIDSON.
*1 The complainant filed this bill in the chancery
court at Nashville, for a settlement of partnership
accounts between himself and the defendant, with
whom he claims to have been a secret partner in the
business of druggist. The facts are fully given in the
opinion. At the November term, 1857, Chancellor
Frierson, rendered a decree for the complainant.
The defendant appealed.
E. H. Swing and W. F. Cooper, for the
complainant; John Trimble and Foster, for the
defendant.

McKinney, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
Tin's was a bill for a partnership account. The
complainant alleges that, for several years, he was a
secret partner with the defendant in a drug store in
the city of Nashville, earned on in the name of J. M.
Zimmerman, under a verbal agreement between
them, to share equally the profits of the business.
The fact of partnership is expressly denied by the
defendant. To establish his interest as a partner in
the concern, the complainant relies on the oral
admission of the defendant, made to various
persons, at different periods during the continuance
of the alleged partnership. And to show that such
was not the fact, and that the complainant's only
connection with the business was in the capacity of
clerk, in the employ of defendant, resort is had to
the same sort evidence, namely, the verbal
declarations of the complainant, often repeated, to
the effect that he was not a partner with defendant
in the business, but simply a salaried clerk; and, in
addition, the defendant
relies
upon the
complainant's implied admission in a more solemn
form, contained in his answer to a bill in chancery,
to disprove the allegation of the present bill. It
seems, from the allegations and proof in the cause,

Be

2

that on the 18th of November, 1850, McNairy &
Hamilton, druggists, of Nashville (the firm
consisting of the complainant, M. Hamilton, and W.
H. McNairy), being about to fail, sold and
transferred their
stock
to the defendant,
Zimmerman, who executed his several notes for the
consideration agreed to be paid payable in future
installments which notes were transferred by Mc
Nairy & Hamilton to N. A. McNairy. as collateral
security, to indemnify him on account of his
liabilities for the firm of McNairy & Hamilton.
The bill, in substance, charges that about the time
of the sale by McNairy & Hamilton to Zimmerman,
the complainant, reduced to poverty by the failure
of said firm, and deprived of the means of support
for his family, proposed to Zimmerman, who was
comparatively a stranger in Nashville, that he, the
complainant, who was familiar with the business,
and had an extensive acquaintance in the
community, would, as a secret partner, join with the
former in the purchase of the said stock of drugs
and medicines from McNairy & Hamilton, and in
carrying on said business in Nashville, upon the
terms that they should equally share the profits of
the business. To this proposition, as the bill alleges,
Zimmerman readily assented. The bill further states,
in substance, lhat, being insolvent, and looking to
his interest in the profits of this new business as (he
only means of furnishing a support for his
increasing family, "it was absolutely necessary that
his (complainant's) connection with Zimmerman in
the purchase should be kept secret, otherwise the
whole object had in view might at any moment be
defeated. Accordingly the fact was not made known
to the public," and complainant "went into the new
business, ostensibly, as clerk, and so held himself
out to the world," etc. But that in reality he was a
full and equal partner in the business, and so
continued up to some time in 1856, when
Zimmerman sold out the entire establishment, and
denied that complainant had any interest as partner
in the same, or any right to a share of the profits.
The bill alleges lhat the complainant withdrew from
the concern upwards of $4,000, and the defendant
nearly 58,000; and that after this deduction, and an
adjustment of all the liabilities of the concern, there
remains a balance of clear profits of from $10,000
to $14,000 to be divided: and to one-half of which,
complainant, by the agreement, is entitled.
*2 The answer denies, in strong terms, the
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existence of any agreement or understanding that
Hamilton was to have any interest, or that he ever
had any interest, as partner, in the purchase of the
stock of drugs and medicines, or in the business
carried on by the defendant, and positively asserts
that he was merely employed and taken into the
store as clerk, in the early part of the year 1852; and
thai he remained, and served in that capacity alone,
until in 1856, when defendant sold out the
establishment; and that the money stated to have
been drawn from the concern by the complainant
was received as compensation for his services as
clerk, and not otherwise,
This is an extraordinary case. The solemn
asseverations of the parties in ihe bill and
answer-both of which are sworn to-are positively
contradicted and disproved by the previous repeated
declarations of the parlies. It is satisfactorily proved
that the defendant, on different occasions, during
the continuance of the business, distinctly admitted
the interest of complainant as a partner, and that, as
such, he was entitled to a share of the profits. And,
on the other hand, it is as fully established that the
complainant denied more frequently, perhaps, that
he had any interest whatever as partner; and
asserted thai he was merely a clerk, receiving a
salary for his services.
Perhaps no case of conflicting evidence, of more
difficult solution than the present, can be imagined,
if we look merely to the oral admissions and
declarations of ihe parties. It is impossible to
reconcile the statements of the parties wiih each
other; and it is no less impossible to reconcile the
statements of either, made prior to this suit, with his
own allegations in ihe pleadings. The attempt to do
so would be alike painftil and fruitless. If there were
nothing more in the case, we should feel driven to
the necessity of resorting to the principle, alike
applicable in equity as at law, lhai the party
asserting a claim or right against another must
establish such claim or right by competent and
satisfactory proof; and the tesl of what is
satisfactory proof is the sufficiency of the evidence
to satisfy the mind of the probable truth of the fact
alleged, upon which the party grounds his right. If
unable to do this, the judicial tribunal appealed to
cannot do otherwise than dismiss his suit. But it has
been argued for the complainant, with great
ingenuity, that the supposed inconsistency of his
previous declarations with the sworn statement of

the bill is apparent rather lhan real; that such
declarations are entitled to no force, and should not
be permitted to prejudice his rights, because they
are shown to be compatible with the intention of the
parties, and the end to be accomplished-which was
to secure the means of support for himself and
family; and that, to effect this end as against his
creditors, it was a matter of absolute necessity to
conceal his true relation to the business as partner,
and to hold him out to the public in the relation of
clerk merely.
*3 This argument involves a conclusion as hard to
be maintained, perhaps, in law, as in sound
casuistry.
We fully assenl to the correctness of the position
assumed by the counsel for the complainant, that
since the abolishment of the arrest or imprisonment
of the body of a debtor the creditor has no more
power over the person lhan over the will of his
debtor. He cannot be heard to insist that his debtor
shall apply himself to labor, either of mind or body,
so as thereby from his daily earnings to accumulate
a fund for the benefit of creditors. In law- however
it may be in morals-the debtor may resign himself
lo hopeless and endless want, or he may limit his
exertions to just such an extent as may be adequate
to furnish him the means of a scanty subsistence;
and in all this he violates no legal right of his
creditor. And. for the same reason, it would seem
that he might in favor of his wife and children
create a sort of lien, so to speak, upon the earnings
of his daily labor, for their maintenance, in defiance
of creditors. And this might be blameless in morals
as well as in law, under some circumstances.
The debtor is certainly under a moral obligation to
use nil reasonable exertions to satisfy the just claims
of creditors; but he is under a positive obligation, in
law as well as morals, to support and maintain his
wife and infant children. This is his first and most
imperative duty. But while this is so, and while he
will be countenanced by the law in its proper
discharge, he cannot make it the pretext for
covering up and protecting from the just claims of
creditors any surplus fund accruing from his labor
or vocation, whatever it may be. He has an election
to labor or not. as he may please, with which the
law will not interfere so long as he keeps himself
from without the scope and operation of such police
regulations as, in the economy of every
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well-ordered state, are deemed necessary. But
beyond the necessary wants of his family there is a
limit which the law will not allow him to transcend.
He cannot treasure up a fund, no matter from what
source derived, and claim that it shall be protected
for the benefit of himself or family, against the
demands of creditors.
If the foregoing reasoning be correct, there existed
no sufficient reason for concealment of the truth, or
representation of an untruth, if nothing more were
contemplated by the complainant's connection with
the business than to obtain the means of an adequate
support for his family; and if more than this was
intended, and the concealment was a mere
subterfuge, such intention must be regarded as a
meditated fraud upon creditors. And from the
complainant's own showing it is somewhat difficult
to escape the latter conclusion; for, after $4,000, or
upwards, had been received by him, which was
about $1,000 a year, during the period he remained
in the store, and double that sum had been
withdrawn by the defendant, there still remained a
neat balance of from $10,000 to $ J 4,000 profits to
be equally divided, upon the assumption of the bill.
*4 In this view, the argument denying the
complainant a status in a court of equity is
plausible, to say no more of it. Wc do not, however,
rest the decision of the case upon this ground alone,
but mainly upon a different one. It has been already
slated that the notes executed by Zimmerman to
McNairy & Hamilton were transferred for the
indemnity of N. A. McNairy. And the complainant
in his bill alleges that on the 13th of March, 1852,
he and his former partner, to whom said notes were
made, together with the personal representative of
N. A. McNairy, filed a bill against Zimmerman to
enforce the specific execution of the contract
between the parties, and to have his stock of drugs,
medicines, etc., attached, for the purpose of
discharging said notes, upon the express allegations
that Zimmerman had failed to meet the payment of
some of said notes, and that he had declared freely
his design to leave the state, and had offered to sell
out his entire establishment with a view of doing so,
and other charges of like import.
Zimmerman, in his answer to that bill, after an
express denial of all the charges against him, made
the following statement; "Resp't, by way of showing
the great injustice done him by the charges in the
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bill, states that, at the time this bill was filed, one of
the complainants in the bill" (meaning Hamilton)
"was then in the house of resp't as clerk, and had
full knowledge of the whole business of resp't, and
knew perfectly well that the debts resp't owed the
firm of McNairy & Hamilton were perfectly good,"
etc. At the same time, Zimmerman filed a cross-bill,
to obtain a credit for certain claims alleged to be
due from McNairy & Hamilton to him.
And in his answer to said cross-bill. Hamilton, the
present complainant, states, "that he has read
carefully the answer of Zimmerman, and also his
bill, and believes that the allegations in said answer
and bill are substantially true."
This is at least an implied admission of the truth of
the statement of Zimmenman-that Hamilton was
merely his clerk. And for all the purposes of the
present bill, the admission must be taken as mie,
without enquiring whether, as a matter of fact, it be
so or not. Trie law, as against the complainant,
presumes that it is true: and this presumption
proceeds upon the doctrine of estoppel, which, from
motives of public policy or expediency, will not, in
some instances, suffer a man to contradict or
gainsay what, under particular circumstances, he
may have previously said or done. This doctrine is
said to have its foundation in the obligation under
which every man is placed to speak and act
according to the truth of the case; and in the policy
of the law to suppress the mischiefs from the
destruction of all confidence in the intercourse and
dealings of men, if they were allowed to deny that
which by their solemn and deliberate acts they have
declared to be true. And this doctrine applies with
peculiar force to admissions or statements made
under the sanction of an oath, in the course of
judicial proceedings. The chief security and
safeguard for the purity and efficiency of the
administration of justice is to be found in the proper
reverence for the sanctity of an oath.
*5 Admissions or declarations made in pais are
often entitled to little or no consideration, because
made inconsiderately or in ignorance of the facts, or
not correctly understood or reported. And even
when made with more deliberation, and under oath,
it may be made to appear that they were made
inconsiderately or by mistake: and if this be so, the
party ought certainly to be relieved from the
consequences of his error.
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In the present instance no explanation is given of
the admission, either in the bill or in the proof. And
it is vain to attempt to evade its force by saying that
the statement was an immaterial matter in the
former suit, and therefore not likely to have
challenged the attention of Hamilton, or to have
been one of the "allegations" the truth of which he
intended to admit. As a matter of law, the statement
may have been of no importance in that cause; but
as a matter of fact, from the obvious import of the
statement, it was material to Hamilton, if the truth
were otherwise.
There are other inferences arising from the fact of
filing the former bill, and from the allegations
made, and the relief sought thereby, which,
unexplained as they are, cannot fail to prejudice the
complainant's right to bring the present bill. But we
leave the case, resting its determination mainly
upon the legal principle that the complainant is
precluded by his admission, without undertaking to
adjudge how the truth of the matter really is.
The entire costs of the cause will be equally
divided between the parties.
Decree reversed, and hill dismissed.

37 Tenn. 39, 5 Snccd (TN) 39. 1857 WL 2547
(Tenn.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant. Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAYSON ORVIS.
Plaintiff.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAYSON ORVIS

vs.
Case No. 010907449
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant.

JAMIS JOHNSON.
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYSON ORVIS. SAM SPENDLOVE,
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15.
Third-Party Defendants.

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Jayson Orvis, being first duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action against the

defendant Jamis Johnson. I am seeking, in this action, a judgment declaring that the
defendant has no right, title or interest relative to any business or venture in which I
have any ownership interest relating to the credit repair business; any real or personal
property or other assets relative to such businesses or ventures; or any proceeds or
profits relative to such businesses or ventures.
2.

I have been involved in businesses relating to credit repair since at least

1993. As a result of my involvement with credit repair businesses, I have up until the
present designed and licensed software, trademarks, trade names and processes used
in credit repair businesses through various entities which I have created and in which I
own an interest.
3.

In addition to owning and licensing intellectual property and processes

used in the credit repair business, I also provide expert consulting and services to
companies and law firms that are engaged in the credit repair business.
4.

I first became acquainted with the defendant Jamis Johnson in

approximately 1994, as a result of my association with a now-defunct credit repair
marketing entity. In approximately January of 1995,1 assisted Mr. Johnson in setting
up the business processes, software and marketing for a credit repair law firm owned
solely at the time by Mr. Johnson, who was at the time an attorney. This law firm
2

adopted the name Lexington Law Firm. In early 1996, I assisted Mr. Johnson in
establishing J&A, which was formed to act as the "fulfillment" department, that is, the
department where the actual credit repair work was done for Lexington. I developed
and owned intellectual property and processes that I licensed to Lexington and J&A
and that were utilized by the defendant to provide credit repair services to his clients.
Defendant Johnson had no involvement in the development, improvement or
ownership of any of the intellectual property or processes. Defendant Johnson's role
and interest in the credit repair business was limited to his ownership of the law firm
and J&A, and his position as directing lawyer responsible for supervising the actual
legal work being done by employee non-attorneys.
5.

In April of 1997, defendant Johnson and I formalized our agreement with

regard to the defendant's utilization of the intellectual property and processes that I had
developed and owned. That agreement simply reflected in writing the status of our
respective ownership rights and business relationship prior to that time and after that
time. In that agreement, the defendant also relinquished any possible claim to the
trade name, Lexington Law Firm, and assigned such to me. A copy of this agreement
is attached as Exhibit 1.
6.

Sometime after April of 1997 and before May of 1999, I entered into a

written agreement with the defendant memorializing our working relationship and
verbal agreements and clarifying that the defendant would continue to be compensated
3

in a manner consistent with previous compensation as long as he served as and
performed the duties of the directing attorney of Lexington/J&A. At the same time, I
was actively providing my credit repair consulting services, properties, marketing and
software to other credit repair firms and companies, to the full knowledge of Mr.
Johnson, and without any compensation flowing to him as a result of these activities,
outside of Lexington. Our understanding at the time we executed this agreement was
that the defendant was and would be compensated for performing his duties as
directing attorney for Lexington and J&A alone and that Mr. Johnson did not have an
interest in any business endeavor of mine other than that of the law firm owned and
supervised by Mr, Johnson. That agreement is attached as Exhibit 2.
7.

Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, the Utah State Bar filed a

disciplinary action against the defendant for conduct predating and unrelated to his
involvement with Lexington or J&A. That action eventually led to the defendant being
disbarred as a lawyer in Utah.
8.

As a result of defendant Johnson's troubles with the Utah State Bar,

defendant Johnson could no longer perform his duties and obligations as the directing
attorney. He therefore transferred all his credit repair clients to attorney Victor
Lawrence who assumed and continues to perform credit repair-type legal services
utilizing my processes, software, marketing and consulting services. A copy of this
agreement is attached as Exhibit 3.
4

9.

The defendant had no right, title, interest or involvement with Lexington or

J&A or relative to any of my businesses or ventures relating to credit repair after he
was disbarred, resigned his position as directing attorney and transferred the Lexington
credit repair law clients to Mr. Lawrence on May 21, 1999. After that date, Mr.
Johnson had no managerial, financial, or other involvement with Lexington or J&A.
10.

When the defendant was disbarred and transferred his credit repair clients

to Victor Lawrence, I had become aware that, in addition to problems with the Utah
State Bar, the defendant was having problems with a number of creditors, The
defendant, contrary to our agreement, began to make demands and claims relative to
my businesses. I made it clear to the defendant that all obligations had been fulfilled to
the defendant and that our business relationship had been terminated by his actions.
However, because we were friends at that time and to avoid any further problems, I
told the defendant that, at my discretion and as long as he did not serve as a nuisance,
I would pay him an amount on a monthly basis based on my own subjective decision. I
made it clear to the defendant, however, that I had no obligation or duty and he had no
right relative to any further payments or compensation.
11.

Defendant Johnson was sued by the Small Business Administration

("SBA"), and judgment was entered against him in that case on September 29,1997.
This judgment is attached as Exhibit 4.

5

12.

In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes,

defendant Johnson was deposed by the SBA. In that deposition, the defendant
categorically testified that he had no interest in or relationship with any partnership or
limited liability company, including Lexington Law Firm:
A:

Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship. . . .
Lexington Law Firm was in my name, but since that time and
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any
interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that.
But, you know, they're operating now without me.

Exhibit 5, Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999 at 23:6-24:10.
Q:

Do you have any interest in any partnership?

A:

No.

Q:

Any interest in any limited liability companies?

A:

No.

Exhibit 6, Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999 at 30:16-31:4.
13.

I was never deposed by the SBA nor have I had any interaction with it.

14.

I have never agreed, reached any understanding, or made any

commitment which was intended to or in fact defrauded any creditor of the defendant,
including the SBA. I have never agreed, reached any understanding or made any
commitment that was intended to conceal or transfer or concealed or transferred any
6

asset of the defendant from any creditor of defendant, including the SBA, nor would I
havo ever had a reason to do so.
DATED: March . 3 y £ 2004.

Jayson Orvis

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ^ / d a v of March. 2004.

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on March 31. 2004. I caused a true and correct copy
of AFFIDAVIT OF JAYSON ORVIS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street
#304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Blake S. Atkin
Atkin & Hawkins
136 South Main Street, #610
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
Attorney for Third Party Defendants

S^J^/jJ^c tu^o
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Exhibit 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAH
-0O0-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 2:95-cv-838W

Plaintiff,

Deposition of:
JAMIS M. JOHNSON

vs .
JAMIS M. JOHNSON,
Defendant.
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of
November, 1999, the deposition of JAMIS M. JOHNSON,
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the
Plaintiff, in the above-entitled action now pending
in the above-named court, was taken before Jerry
Martin, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary
Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing at
the hour of 11:00 a.m. of said day at the Federal
Building, 125 South State Street, Room 2231,
Salt Lake City, Utah

ORIGINAL
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1

Q.

2

Associates, LLC?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Now, your wife previously provided tax

Are you a member of D.M. Johnson &

5

returns for D.M. Johnson, LLC, and it shows you as a

6

50 percent owner.

7
8

A.

I think what it showed

-- I don't think

it showed me as a 50 percent owner.

9

Q.

That's what the schedule K-1 shows.

1 0

A.

What happens is they -- you would have to

1 1

ask my tax preparer -- they take an LLC, and if

1 2

you've had income they allocate that income, and you

1 3

pay taxes personally on whatever flows through, and

14

I'm not listed as a member of D.M. Johnson, LLC.

1 5

There are two other members.

1 6

that I have billed D.M. Johnson for.

1 7

standard LLC.

1 8

Q.

I have done some work
But it's just a

It's --

I understand how an LLC works, and I

1 9

understand tax returns for LLCs.

20

the LLC shows they gave you Schedule K-1.

21

you K-1 returns as a 50 percent owner, allocating

22

income and losses.

23
24
25

A.

No.

Is that

For 1996 and 1997
They gave

inaccurate?

They allocated the income and

losses, but I'm not an owner.
Q.

But you're getting 50 percent of the
14
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1

2

Q*

When is your tax preparer supposed to

have your 1998 returns done?

3

A.

Well, he should have them done now.

In

4

October we discussed that he was missing a couple of

5

items.

6

really within the next 30 days I should have them

7

done.

8
9

I actually got those items, and I think

You know, it will be for '98.
Q.

Have you given him all the information he

needs to prepare them?

10

A.

Yeah.

Yeah, there were a couple of

11

items.

12

I think we've got them.

13

together.

14

Q.

15
16
17
18

He needed some from Danell and some from me.
We're trying to get them

Do you still operate your law practice

under the assumed name of Lexington Law Firms?
A.

I never operated my law practice under an

assumed name of Lexington Law Firms.
Q.

Okay.

The state records show that the

19

d.b.a. is registered to you and has been ever since

20

1994 and will be until the year 2000.

21
22

A.

I think that's accurate.

The state

records do show that.

23 I

Q.

So who do you claim uses the name?

24 |

A.

Oh, Lexington Law Firms?

25 I

Q.

Yes.
22
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1

A . I

think we provided you a bunch of that

2

information before, and you should know that, and

3

surprised you don't.

4

involvement in Lexington Law Firms because of the

5

pending bar problem.

6
7

Q.

But I resigned with any

Aren't we talking Johnson & Associates,

not Lexington Law Firms?

8
9

A.

No.

I resigned from anything.

I have

practiced law under Jamis M. Johnson and Jamis M.

10

Johnson & Associates.

11

not-for-profit corporation, and you've been told

12

this.

Nobody has shares of stock.

13

that.

Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and

14

another attorneys have taken over all of that.

15

indemnified them, they have indemnified me.

16

resigned from any relationship.

17

was just an operating entity that was doing credit

18

repair.

19
20
21

I'm

Q.
entity.

Johnson & Associates is a

I resigned from

I've

I've

Lexington Law Firm

Now, Lexington Law Firms is not an
It's an assumed name registered to you.

A.

Actually, I think what happened -- and

22

I'll have to recall this -- but I assigned -- a

23

couple of years ago there was a corporation being set

24

up, but that was assigned -- the name was assigned

25

to -- it was going to be assigned into a corporation.
23
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1

I don't know if we've ever registered the fact that

2

it was assigned.

3

Tennessee, you know, personally because Lexington Law

4

Firms was in my name, but since that time and with my

5

bar problem I have completely relinquished any

6

interest.

7

payment, and I resigned.

8

assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're going have to

9

go in and change that.

10

I was sued by the State of

They paid me a little bit, made my
Now, if it's listed as an

But, you know, they're

operating now without me.

11

Q.

So you don't use that name in any way.

12

A.

I have actually never actively used it.

13

I registered it.

14

Q.

Haven't you written checks with the name

A.

There was a -- there were checks written

15

on it?

16
17

that had my signature, computer-generated signature,

18

and I was on the account.

19

I've ever signed one of those checks.

20

fairly big organization.

21

entity.

22

Q.

Actually, I don't think
It was a

It was just a marketing

Do you want me to show you all checks

23

that you've handwritten out, checks that say

24

Lexington Law Firm?

25

A.

Yeah, why don't you.

My recollection is
24
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1
2

A,

No, there is no cash value on any

insurance policy.

5
6

But there's no cash value in either

policy?

3
4

Q,

Q.

Doesn't the universal life policy have

cash value by its nature?

7

A.

You know, it may.

That's owned by my

8

wife, but I would be glad to have you look at it.

9

it does have some accrual, it might be a thousand

10

bucks.

11

out.

12

it's the property of -- it's not property the SBA

13

could grab.

14

know, that policy.

15

The term is a million bucks.

16
17
18

That's a good question.

I could find that

I don't know if anybody would care.

Q.

If

But again

As I recall, it's about $150,000, you
The other one is a million bucks.

Do you have any interest in any

partnerships?
A.

No.

I mean, you know, often I'll have a

19

joint endeavor with somebody, but I don't have a

20

partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC.

21

know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to dc

22

this deal together?

23

buy a lot.

You

We'll go up to summit county and

24 I

Q.

So a joint venture.

25 |

A.

Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't
30
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1
2
3
4

have any outgoing partnerships.
Q.

Any interest in any limited liability

companies?
A.

No.

I had an interest in an limited

5

liability company in California called

6

Shores, LLC.

7

underneath it.

8

for it, but I know that no longer exists.

9

Simmons

The property got foreclosed out from
I made some money from raising loans

I had an interest in an outfit called

10

Western Equities, LLC, but that is no longer

11

functional.

12

corporations.

13
14
15

Q.

I have no interest in LLCs or

How about Summit Insured Equity Limited

Partnership?
A.

I had -- that was a -- I had shares of

16

stock in Summit

17

and sold them, I'm thinking, in either late 1997 or

18

'98, early '98.

19

Q.

20

that I got in exchange for legal work

So you no longer have any interest in

that limited partnership.

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

And you received no income.

23

A.

No.

24
25

It was a small amount of money.

I

got three grand from it.
Q.

Do you own any real estate?
31
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1

A.

No.

I would have to be crazy to own real

2

estate with the SBA trying to get all my real estate.

3

I've been working on this SBA loan when it was first

4

taken out, I think, in '85, and we, as you know, had

5

a lot of litigation.

I don't have any real estate.

6

Q.

What's your wife's occupation?

7

A.

She's a mom and she does a little bit of

8

paralegal work, and she had some real estate business

9

for a while.

She was working with a hospital, kind

10

of a billing situation.

11

school.

She wants to go back to

12

Q.

Currently is she employed by anybody?

13

A.

Yeah.

14

doesn't get a W-2.

Well, she's not employed.

She

She sits on the board of

15 J Johnson & Associates.
16

Q.

Does she earn any money for that?

17

A.

Yeah, I think she does.

I think she

18

covered all that with you.

I can't recall.

Yeah,

19

she was on the board of Johnson & Associates.

I

20 I think she's -- well, she's no longer on the board of
21

the Caldwell Memorial Hospital.

That ended.

She

22

wants to go back n o ; and she wants to get a job and

23 I come to work for the SBA, I think.
24 l

Q.

Good.

25 |

A.

You get paid so well.
32
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1

2
3

Q.

So if Johnson & Associate pays your wife

money it's for her services as a trustee.
A.

Yeah.

She sits on the board.

She

4

Also -- yeah, she also -- she did some other things

5

for them occasionally, but not much.

6

Also, you know, I think our income will

7

be substantially less.

8

and hers will be lower.

9

longer around, so, you know

10
11

Q#

I think mine will be higher
Caldwell is gone.

It's no

I've noticed that Lexington Law Firms

would pay her checks of $465.

What would that be?

12

A.

That's like services.

13

Q#

What kind of services?

14

A.

Well, let's see.

The same kind of

15

services that the 20 other people up there provide

16

generally, whatever.

17
18
19

Q.

I know initially --

So your wife goes into the office there

and does work or -A.

She does some work, yeah.

She does some

20

minimal work.

She's also on the board.

She also

21

donated, you know, as she told you in her deposition,

22

early on a bunch of computers and furniture and, you

23

know, a lot of facilities to get it started.

24

got a combination of things there.

It's

I mean, I think

25 | you know this because we've given you the checks, or
42
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she's given you the checks or Johnson & Associate
have given you the checks.
3

All of those checks have

been made available to you.

4

Question.

Never mind.

Hey, what do you

5

think the SBA would like to take to settle this?

6

it up to $400,000 yet, this loan?

7
8

Q.

I don't know.

Is

It's over three.

You keep saying you'll

make an offer and you dcn't.
A.

9

It's because I'm only now starting to

1 0

recover.

1 1

Davis is around.

1 2

Kent Davis was the source of this problem.

1 3

you have heard me say that, you know, we've got this

14

SBA loan.

1 5

a TRO and prevented me from going to the business.

16

sued them, got the IRS on them, and then the business

1 7

collapsed.

1 8

SBA to try and sell the property.

1 9

deal of $60,000, a settlement from me.

20

happen.

We talked about my suing Kent Davis.

You recall that whole argument.

I demanded an accounting.

21

Kent

He went bankrupt.

I mean,

He actually got
I

I negotiated with the
We actually had a
It didn't

They sold the property to the same guy

22

for $60,000.

They went after me for the deficiency.

23

I litigated that and I lost.

24

about a 20-page opinion.

25

all done you want $300,000 from me, but Kent Davis,
43
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1

charge, but they're just giving it to us.

That whole

2

basement is just basically half deserted now, so

3

they're not having to pay rent.

4

Q.

So Wasatch Credit is not

5

A.

Wasatch Credit is no longer there.

6

Q.

And you're just paying the 175 bucks a

A,

I'm just showing up and paying it.

7
8
9
10
11

there?

month?
I try

to keep my overhead pretty low.
Q.

So your wife at this time is still on the

board of Johnson & Associates.

12

A.

Yes.

What was that you just turned off?

13

Q.

That was just this leather chair here.

14

A.

I thought maybe you turned something off.

15

1 thought you had an infrared polygraph beam you were

16

beaming at me or something, some new government

1 7

scheme.

18
19

What do you think the SBA would take if I
came in and gave them some money?

20

Q.

I don't know.

21

A.

You don't you have enough information to

22

extrapolate my financial condition.

23

me the judgment

24

wanted to buy it?

25

Q.

Would you sell

if I -- would you sell it to me if I

Well, what good would that do you?
80
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1

income from

Louisiana.

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

So the LLC's main source of income right

4

now is Danell's trusteeship in Johnson & Associates

5

and some of these hard money deals.

6

else?

7
8

A.

Lex.

You mentioned $465 payment from

Q.

Lexington Law Firm does credit repair,

A.

Uh-huh.

Lex.

9
10

And anything

right?

11

Danell gets payments from Lex.

12

Then she also has -- well, if a big deal comes along

13

she gets some of that money.

14

real estate.

15

the fall.

16

Q.

The spring of 1999?

17

A.

Yeah, the tax sale when we went up to

We sold some of that

We bought some lots and sold them in

I mean in the spring.

18

Summit County.

19

know, the payments on the house coming from Knudsen

20

would probably be treated as income to her to the

21

extent it pays out on that first mortgage $3,700 a

22

month.

23

a year or something, I mean on the receipt of the

24

payments of that house.

25

I mentioned that to you.

And, you

That's about -- that comes out to be $45,000

Q.

So is your wife in the lawsuit trying to
87
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Exhibit 8

oe Cartwright #7697
vttorney For Defendant
Veils Fargo Center
99 South Main Street, Suite 1700
lalt Lake City, UT 84111
el: 801-363-5255

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AYSON ORVIS
Plaintiff.
vs.

)
I
)

AMIS JOHNSON
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF JAMIS
JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO
JAYSON ORVIS" MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

\
\

Civil No. 010907449

AMIS JOHNSON and DaNell JOHNSON,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

I

VS.

;

AYSON ORVIS

;

Third-Party Plaintiffs.

i

j

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

(Oral Argument Requested)

Defendant, Jamis M. Johnson, by counsel, Joe Cartwright, hereby submits Jamis
Johnson's Memorandum in Opposition To Jayson Orvis' Motion For Summary
Judgment, as follows:
FACTS
Please note that the below paragraphs are supported by the Affidavit of Jamis
Johnson filed concurrently herewith, and each paragraph below matches the
corresponding paragraph of the said Affidavit Reference will not be made in each
paragraph to the affidavit.

1. This case involves millions of dollars.

2. It is estimated that Jayson Orvis is today personally taking $500,000 to
$800,000 monthly from the credit repair ventures, one third of which belongs to
the Johnsons. (Ex. 1, Vigil Deposition p. 70 line 6-15) (Lexington web page:
lexingtonlaw.com) (Ex. 2, Deposition of Tommy Triplett p. 20,1. 9, where Orvis
takes in $153,000 in one month several years ago.)

3. Lexington Law Firms has 75,000 to 150,000 clients each paying $35 monthly
and Orvis takes the lions portion of this money. (Ex. 1, Vigil Deposition supra.)

4. This case is an effort by Orvis to end the partnership of Orvis and the
Johnsons and involves claims by the Johnsons of embezzlement, fraud and
concealment by Orvis of profit share; establishment of secret companies to
siphon profits from Johnsons, use of sham companies to hide from the U.S.
Government the Orvis purchase of an SBA judgment; it involves the active
complicity of a Utah attorney. The actual damages to Johnsons exceed several
million dollars.

5. In or about 1994, Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis, and three others, John
Hollingshead, Merrill Chandler, and Steve Paige, founded a consumer services
enterprise to engage in the business of "credit repair".

2

6. DaNell Johnson, wife of Jamis Johnson, would hold the beneficial interest in
this business venture, and she would receive monies derived therefrom, and
would separately incur and pay the tax liability thereof. Jamis Johnson would
work with the venture representing their interest and interfacing with Orvis and
the other partners.

7. This arrangement between DaNell and Jamis Johnson is evidenced by,
among other things, Powers of Attorney dated in 1995 and 1996. (Ex. 3 Powers
of Attorney) and is long-standing with similar arrangements between them
extending back to as early as 1987. It is reflected in prior business ventures
involving the Johnsons such as in the Caldwell Memorial Hospital business. (Ex.
4 Deposition of Jamis Johnson, March 98 page 20 line 3 and on.)

8. DaNell Johnson was to, and did, receive the profit share from this venture and
Jamis Johnson would do much of the work (Ex. 3, Powers of Attorney), interface
with the business, and would also incur significant personal liability.

9. The credit repair venture used many different business entities, two of which
were Johnson and Associates, a Utah non profit corporation (sometimes referred
to asMJ&A) and Lexington Law Firms (sometime referred to as'Lexingtorf).

10. Three of the founding partners would depart from the partnership for various
reasons at different times. They were Chandler, Paige, and Hollingshead.
Hollingshead left the partnership in approximately September of 1997.

11. Hollingshead's departure left Orvis and the Johnsons remaining in the
partnership and conducting the credit repair business.

3

12. DaNell sat on the Board of J&A along with Orvis, Victor Lawrence, Sam
Spendlove, etc. (Ex. 5. Resolutions By Unanimous Consent of The Board of
Trustee of Johnson and Associates.)

13. Orvis ran the marketing of J&A and Lexington and an entity called eClient
and provided the day-to-day management. Orvis controlled all money and
performed all accounting and financial controls, and interacted primarily with
Jamis Johnson for the Johnsons (per the Power s of Attorney, and the practice
and arrangement of the Johnsons).

14. Jamis Johnson was the signatory on all checks for Lexington and J&A. His
computerized signature appeared on thousands of checks. The trade name
Lexington Law Firms was held in his name.

15. By September of 1997, Jamis Johnson had incurred significant personal
liability for the ventures, thus shielding DaNell Johnson and Orvis: The State of
Tennessee had sued him under a federal regulation; (State of Tennessee vs.
Jamis Johnson, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Civil No: 3-960344) The Utah Division of Consumer Affairs,, and The Utah State Bar were
pursuing an administrative action relative to the credit repair business; and
Johnson & Associates had incurred back tax liability placed in the name of Jamis
Johnson though he was not on the Board of Trustees (Orvis and DaNell Johnson
were on the Board).

16. Indeed, On/is would acknowledge that he felt compelled to keep paying profit
share because of the ongoing liability of Jamis Johnson. (Ex. 2, Triplett
deposition, page 38 line 10-12 )

17. Jamis Johnson and Orvis would engage as many as four attorneys to help
with Lexington and with J&A. Jamis Johnson was originally designated as
'directing attorne/for J&A and Lexington.
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18. One of these attorneys hired in approximately early 1997 was Victor
Lawrence. Victor Lawrence received a modest salary and free office, telephone,
reception, etc.

19. Victor Lawrence also represented DaNell Johnson in significant individual
business matters for example, in litigation with Bruce Giffen, as a creditor in the
Utah Agrisource Bankruptcy, against First Security Bank to recover on an
agriculture lien on cattle; and also Victor Lawrence represented separately Jamis
Johnson in his Utah Bar matters and several other matters including briefly with
the SBA.

20. DaNell Johnson profit share checks were sporadic in the credit repair
ventures at first.

21. By late 1997 to early 1998, the credit repair ventures started to consistently
generate revenue for profit share. Orvis provided verbal monthly accountings of
revenue for eClient, Lexington and J&A which Jamis Johnson either kept in a
journal or were recorded on Invoices".

22. Profit share was divided between Orvis and DaNell Johnson at a ratio where
Orvis received twice what DaNell Johnson received. In other words, Orvis 2/3ri DaNell Johnson1/3 of profit share. (Ex. 6. Outline Agreement, unsigned, dated 923-97.) These ratios were based on Jayson's day to day management of the
business affairs and marketing, and on the Johnsons' less active role after the
ventures were established.

23. After Hollingsheacfs departure, and as the Johnsons and Orvis continued to
operate the credit repair businesses, tensions arose between the parties.

5

24. Johnsons would later learn that Orvis. during this time, was secretly taking
partnership funds and setting up separate parallel companies to conceal profits
and divert profits and not truthfully disclosing profit share revenues by greatly
under representing revenues to Johnsons. (Ex. 2, Deposition of Tommy Triplett
p. 22,1. 23-p. 26,1. 22-p. 28.1. 25-p 39,1. 8) (See also Vigil Deposition Ex. 1
supra, page 49 line 5, page 53 line 10).
25. In September 15, 1997, the SBA obtained a judgment against Jamis
Johnson. (Ex. 7, Order For Entry of Judgment, U.S. v. Jamis Johnson.)
26. In March of 1998, the SBA deposed Jamis Johnson in post-judgment
proceedings. There Jamis Johnson explained the arrangement between DaNell
Johnson and himself where they worked together and she was allocated the
profit share, as evidenced, for example, by the Caldwell Memorial Hospital
business.
27. In early May of 1999 at the request of Orvis and after discussion, the parties
entered into various agreements:
28. First, Orvis and Jamis Johnson executed an agreement wherein Orvis would
hold all of the assets of the credit repair ventures of the Johnsons and Orvis, for
the economic benefit of Orvis and the Johnsons. This is referred to as the OrvisJohnson Profit Share Agreement. (Ex. 8, Orvis-Johnson Profit Share Agreement.)
29. This Orvis-Johnson Profit Share Agreement states in relevant part as follows:
WHEREAS, Orvis and Johnson have developed over the last
several years, enterprises that provide credit repair services to
a nationwide clientele. Such credit repair services include, but
are not limited to a range of activities, including telemarketing,
internet marketing, consulting, law representation, and the
enterprises have grown over the years, and have a variety of
tangible and intangible assets including, without limitation, for
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example, equipment, computers, software, furniture,
knowledge, methods, techniques in marketing, lead sources,
internet operations; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for the unimpaired
continuation and growth of the business to the mutual benefit
of the parties; and
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that an agreement was
put in place reciting that all assets of this enterprise are placed
in the name ofJayson Orvis so as to protect these assets and
provide for continued growth and mutual profitability; and
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that they have governed
and operated these enterprises under an outline agreement
and under a course of performance that they desire to
continue;
1. Governance and compensation/allocation of
profits shall continue in the percentages as
heretofore provided under the operating
arrangements and as the enterprise continues to
grow, however, all monies shall be paid to Jayson
Orvis or his business entity as may be
established and Jayson Orvis shall provide
Johnson's share or allocation to any party
directed by Johnson. The intent herein being that
these enterprises shall continue to grow, expand.
multiply as directed bv the parties under their
outline agreement and course of performance to
their mutual economic benefit (Emphasis added).
30. References therein to the "course of performance" and the percentages" are
references to ratios of profit share paid to DaNell Johnson or her entities. The
outline agreement refers to Ex. 6, the unsigned document that sets out the ratios
of Johnson and Orvis, etc.
31. In the second of these agreements, Johnson resigned as directing attorney
for Lexington and J&A, and Victor Lawrence stepped into that position. (Ex. 9,
Victor Lawrence Agreement) This agreement required Lawrence to continue to
use the credit repair marketing of Orvis (and Orvis had entered into the above
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Orvis-Johnson Profit Share Agreement holding all for the joint profit of On/is and
the Johnsons.)

32. In resigning as directing attorney, Jamis Johnson did not relinquish the
partnership interest and profit share that he and DaNell Johnson held. The
Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement (evidencing the ongoing partnership of the
Johnsons and the prior course of performance) and the Victor Lawrence
Agreement (where Jamis Johnson resigned as directing attorney) were executed
simultaneously. Thus even though Johnson resigned as directing attorney, the
partnership with Orvis was intended to continue and indeed did continue until
Orvis filed this lawsuit.

33. Profit share accounting and profit share checks divided between Orvis and
Johnsons continued unabated after this time, regardless of the resignation of
Jamis Johnson as directing attorney.

34. In April of 1999, the SBA subpoenaed DaNell Johnson for deposition on May
18,1999.

35. At that deposition, DaNell Johnson was represented by Victor Lawrence. At
this deposition, DaNell Johnson truthfully disclosed her business relationships.

36. Victor Lawrence himself questioned DaNell Johnson thusly:
[Q= Questioning by Mr. Victor Lawrence.)
4= Answer by Danell Johnson
Q

A
Q

A

Okay. When that business first started, it
was just a handful of friends and
associates"
Right
Now that has somewhat blossomed, but
you don't know really what the company
does now, is that correct?
Yes, because it has expanded quite a bit
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A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

P««* it

A
Q

In fact, aren't the funds that you received a
profit share that you receive?
That's what I understood it to be, yes.
Are you being paid for anything else? Do
you do any type of consulting for Johnson
and Associates right now?
(Nodded no.)
You have to answer audibly.
I'm sorry.
Do you do any consulting for Johnson and
Associates?
No
Do you do any consulting for Lexington
Law Firm?
No.
You may sit on the board and you may
receive a compensation for that, but you
are aware that you receive a compensation
in some type of profit sharing arrangement,
is that correct?
That's right.

(Ex. 10, Deposition of DaNell Johnson.)
37. Later, in this litigation against the Johnsons to deprive them of their profit
share interest, Victor Lawrence would argue that the Johnson's had no profit
share interest and specifically ignored DaNell Johnson's profit share interest, in
direct repudiation of the sworn testimony that she gave to the SBA under his
representation and counsel.
38. November 17,1999, the SBA deposed Jamis Johnson. (Ex. 11, Jamis
Johnson Deposition, November, 1999)
39. In his deposition, Jamis Johnson accurately disclosed the information
requested by the SBA. The following are excerpts and references of some of the
deposition:
Jamis' role at D.M. Johnson and Associates, LLC, (DaNell Johnson's
y

PU lines 1-3
9

Q. Are you a member of D.M. Johnson & Associates, LLC?
A. No.
and further.
Ownership of Lexington dba
P22 14-25 and P23
Q. Do you still operate your law practice under the assume name of
Lexington Law Firms?
A. I never operated my practice under an assumed name of
Lexington Law Firms.
Q. Okay. The state records show that the d.b.a. is registered to you and
has been ever since 1994 and will be until the year 2000.
A. I think that's accurate. The state records show that.
Q. So who do you claim uses the name?
A. Oh, Lexington Law Firms?
Q. Yes.
A. I think we provided you with a bunch of that information before,
and you should know that, and Cm surprised you don't. But I resigned with
any involvement in Lexington Law Firms because of the pending bar
problem.
Bar Status affects Jamis' operational Lexington role
P24 lines 1 - 1 0
A. ..I don't know if we've ever registered the fact that it was assigned [to
Orvis]. I was sued by the State of Tennessee, you know, personally
because Lexington Law Firms was in my name, but since that time and
with my bar problem I have completely relinquished any interest. They
paid me a little bit, made my payment, and I resigned. Now, if its listed as
an assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're going to have to go in and
change that. But, you know, they're operating without me.
Interests in any partnerships P30 lines 16-25 and P31 lines 1-24
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships?
A. No. I mean, you know, often Fll have a joint endeavor with
somebody, but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC.
You know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together?
We'll go up to summit county and buy a lot.
Q. So a joint venture?
A. Yeah, you can call it that, but I dont have any outgoing partnerships.
Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies?
A. No. I had an interest in an limited liability company in California
called Simmons Shores, LLC. The property got foreclosed out from
underneath it. I made some money from raising loans for it, but I know
that no longer exists.
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1 had an interest in an outfit called Western Equities, LLC, but that is no
longer functional. I have no interest in LLCs or corporations.
Q. How about Summit Insured Equity Limited Partnership?
A. I had-that was a-l had shares of stock in Summit that I got in
exchange for legal work and sold them, I'm thinking, in either late 1997
or'98, early'98.
Q. So you now longer have any interest in that limited partnership.
A. No.
Q. And you received no income.
A. No. It was a small amount of money. I got three grand from it.
DaNell sits on the board at J&A
P32 lines 12-15
Q. Currently is she employed by anybody?
A. Yeah. Well, she's not employed. She doesn't get a W-2. She
sits on the board of Johnson & Associates.
Q. Does she earn any money for that?
A. Yeah, I think she does. I think she covered all of that with you....
DaNeli's Lexington compensation for board position and certain
contributions
Page 42 lines 1-5 and lines 17-25(page 43 lines 1-3)
Q. So if Johnson & Associates pays your wife money ifs for her services
as a trustee.
A. Yeah. She sits on the board. She also-yeah, she also-she did some
other things for them occasionally, but not much.
• * *

Q. So your wife goes into the office there and does work orA. She does some work, yeah. She does some minimal work.
She's also on the board. She also donated, you know, as she told you in
her deposition, early on a bunch of computers and furniture and, you know,
a lot of facilities to get it started. Its got a combination of things there. I
mean, I think you know this because we've given you the checks, or she's
given you the checks or Johnson & Associates have given you the checks.
All of those checks have been made available to you.
DaNell still on board of J & A
Page 80 lines 10-12
Q. So your wife at this time is still on the board of Johnson & Associates.
A. Yes. What was that you just turned off?
DaNell Johnson's LLC's sources of income. Lexington makes
regular payments to DaNell
Page 87 lines 3-15
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Q. So the LLCs main source of income right now is the DaNelfs
trusteeship in Johnson & Associates and some of these hard money deals.
And anything else?
A. Lex. You mentioned $465 payment from Lex.
Q. Lexington Law Firm does credit repair, right?
A. Uh-huh. DaNell gets payments from Lex. Then she also has-well, if a
big deal comes along she gets some of that money. We sold some of that
real estate. We bought some lots and sold them in the fall. I mean in the
spring.
Jamis' holdings/assets
Questions about Jamis' personal accounts and holdings (checking,
etc.)
Page 24 lines 1-25
DaNelFs sources of income, which are separate from Jamis1
Pages 33, 37, 38-39,40
DaNell and Jamis pay separate taxes
Page 70 lines 1-3
40. After several years of work, Johnson obtained a favorable settlement of the
federal action against Lexington in Tennessee. (Ex. 12, Consent Agreement,
State of Tenn. vs. Jamis Johnson.) On August 28, 2000, Johnson wrote Jayson
Orvis to advise him that the Tennessee case had been settled and of the steps to
take to make sure there was compliance with the Tennessee Federal District
Court Consent Agreement. (Ex. 13 Letter: Johnson to Orvis re. TN compliance 828-00;)

41. Orvis responds by letter of August 30. 2000 that includes the following
statement:
Might I make as suggestion? I would suggest that we just let our
foggy little business relationship continue down its foggy little
course...I am committed to making a bigger pie for as long as it is
feasible and that has been nothing but good for both of us.
(Ex. 13, Letter of Orvis, 8-30-01) Orvis clearly references a business relationship
with Johnson.
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42. The trade name, Lexington Law Firms has remained in the name of Jamis
Johnson throughout this time.

42. On January 12, 2001, Johnson assigns the Trade Name to Orvis. (Ex. 14,
Assignment of trade name)

43. The Assignment specifically sets out the existing and ongoing partnership. It
says:

WHEREAS, the said trade name (Lexington Law Firms] is an asset
actually owned jointly bv Jamis M. Johnson and Javson On/is. and
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson and Javson own intellectual property
and tangible and intangible assets for the business of credit repair
and per prior agreement this trade name is to be assigned bv Jamis
M. Johnson to Javson Orvis. and
WHEREAS, Jayson Orvis has established a limited liability company
called Attorneys For People, LLc, of which he is the only member in
which he was to hold some of these joint assets and through which
he administrates Fsicl some of the credit repair business, and
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson desires to assign the trade name to
Jayson Orvis/Attomeys For People and it shall form and is part of
these assets jointly owned bv Johnson and Orvis and administrated
by Orvis;
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing recitals and upon the
prior agreement of the parties ... [Johnson assigns trade name to
Orvis] [Emphasis added]
46. This Assignment is retrieved from Johnson's office by Tommy Triplett who
signed a receipt for it, and it is accepted by Orvis who acknowledges that he
accepts the Assignment in the complaint he filed.

47. The Assignment by its very terms and recitals evidences the ongoing
partnership. It is unambiguous. And clearly the assignment is per the Orvis-
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Johnson Partnership Agreement of May 1999, and the trade name is still a joint
asset.

48. In an astounding display of hubris, after the Assignment, which clearly
reaffirms the existence of a partnership with the Johnsons, Orvis had his
assistant, Tommy Tripiett, deliver a mock agreement that is intended to mock
Johnsons and to reveal to Johnsons that Orvis thinks he has successfully taken
away the Johnsons' partnership interest.

49. That mock document states in various parts:

ASSIGNMENT made this day by Jayson Orvis (hereinafter referred to
as "Lord") and Jamis M. Johnson (hereinafter referred to as
"Peasant")
WHEREAS, Lord holds complete and sole ownership of everything
Peasant wants, including all credit repair methodologies, strategies,
operations, computers, [ and Peasant's]
career...Firstborn, ...hookers...friends...wife...
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson ("Peasant") owns absolutely nothing
and can do doodley squat about it...
WHEREAS, Lord delights in torturing Peasant and making him
wonder every month ...[regarding profit share]...
[signature line] Jayson Orvis, Master of the Universe
(Ex.15 Mock Assignment)

50. Johnson senses that Orvis is not truthfully accounting, and is setting up
parallel and secret companies to divert profit share, This will; turn out to be
correct. (Ex. 2, Tripiett Deposition. See references in para. 24 of this Affidavit,
supra. See also the deposition of Will Vigil attached as Ex. 1)
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51. On August 16, 2002 Johnson sends Orvis a demand for an accounting. (Ex.
16, Demand for Accounting from Johnsn). Such will reveal that Orvis has not
been honestly accounting for profit share.

52. On August 11, 2001 Orvis will purchase the SBA judgment against Johnson.
(Ex. 17, Assignment of SBA judgment to Orvis by All Starr Financial, LLC.)

53. He will not reveal his identity to the SBA but rather will engage a suspended
Utah LLC, All Star Financial, LLC to negotiate with the US Government to buy
the SBA judgment. All Star is operated by the brother-in-law of Dion Steckling, a
party to this lawsuit.

54. All Star Financial, will not disclose to the SBA that it is a Lexington affiliate
that is seeking to acquire the judgment and upon information and belief, the
money to acquire the judgment flowed through All Star from Orvis. All Star will
get the judgment on August 10, 2001 and within 24 hours, it will be re-assigned
to On/is. (Ex. 17.).

55. On August 30, Johnson will be summoned to the office of Dan Berman who,
with Orvis present, informs Johnson that
i.

Orvis had purchased the SBA judgment against Johnson;

ii.

Orvis had sued Johnson to end the partnership,

Hi.

Orvis has acquired the judgments to use to end the partnership
and will satisfy the judgments if Johnson will accept a settlement
and end the Partnership; and

iv.

It will cost Johnson probably $300,000 to litigate this so
settlement is advisable.

56. Johnson writes a confirmatory letter to Berman outlining the above. (Ex. 18.
August 30, 2001 Letter of Jamis Johnson to Dan Berman.)
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57. Johnson later learns that Victor Lawrence, former counsel to DaNell with the
SBA, participated in counseling and aiding Orvis in acquiring the judgment
(Triplett Deposition page 45 lines 11-25). Victor Lawrence will further attempt to
buy another action involving Johnson and former partner Hollingshead.

58. On information and belief, Victor Lawrence has received a significant
increase in personal revenue once the Johnson profit share was stopped upon
the filing of the Orvis lawsuit. Orvis controls Lexington Law Firm through his
marketing agreement with Victor Lawrence. (Ex. 19, Orvis-Lawrence Marketing
Agreement.)

59. The SBA judgment was purchased at precisely the discount that Johnson
was discussing with the SBA and had discussed with Victor Lawrence. And, the
fact that the SBA judgment could be obtained at a discount, was never revealed
by Victor Lawrence to his client, DaNell Johnson or his former client, Jamis
Johnson.

60. Currently, In this month, May of 2004, Orvis has, as the assignee of the SBA
judgment, subpoena both Jamis Johnson and DaNell Johnson, in an exercise in
post judgment discovery. This action is in federal court and the Johnson will
seek to void the judgment in the hands of Orvis because of the duplicity
discussed herein.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. THE TESTIMONY OF JAMIS JOHNSON TO THE SBA IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE FACTS AND IS NOT A MISREPRESENTATION; ORVIS
MISCONSTRUES THE JOHNSON QUOTES ON WHICH HE RELIES; AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS UNSUPPORTABLE BASED ON THESE QUOTES;
A.

JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISAVOW AN INTEREST IN ORVIS
CREDIT REPAIR BUSINESSES BY HIS RESIGNATION AS
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DIRECTING ATTORNEY OF LEXINGTON AND J&A, NOR BY
DISCLOSING THAT IN HIS SBA DEPOSITION.
B.

JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISCLAIM CREDIT REPAIR
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST; NOR DID HE MERELY ANSWER "NO"
TO THE SBA QUESTION AT ISSUE.

2.
IF THERE IS AMBIGUITY IN SUCH SBA TESTIMONY, THE
INTERPRETATION OF SUCH TESTIMONY IS A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
3. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE AND
CANNOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
1. THE TESTIMONY OFJAMIS JOHNSON TO THE SBA IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE FACTS AND IS NOT A MISREPRESENTATION; ORVIS
MISCONSTRUES THE JOHNSON QUOTES ON WHICH HE RELIES; AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS UNSUPPORTABLE BASED ON THESE QUOTES;

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Orvis submits only two
quotes by Jamis Johnson from the November 1999 SBA deposition: (i). One
quote is to the effect that Jamis Johnson withdrew and resigned as directing
attorney for Lexington Law Firms and J&A.; and (ii) the other quote is supposedly
that Jamis Johnson answered "nd" when asked about any partnerships.
These quotes are misconstrued by Plaintiff and do not mean what he
claims they mean. They are not dispositive of this action.
A. JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISCLAIM CREDIT REPAIR
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST; NOR DID HE MERELY ANSWER "NO" TO
THE SBA QUESTION AT ISSUE.
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Orvis quotes a section of Jamis Johnson's SBA deposition wherein Johnson
accurately discloses to the SBA that he resigned from Lexington and Johnson &
Associates as directing attorney.

Orvis then states that Johnson '.'.completely disavowed any interest,
partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair business ofJayson Orvis?
(emphasis added). It does not follow from Johnson's statements concerning
resignation as directing attorney that all interests in the credit repair partnership
had been disavowed.

Orvis does marketing for, and operates credit repair businesses. He does
this for law firms as well as non-law firms. Orvis does not claim to be a partner in
the law firms for which he does marketing. (See the marketing agreement
between Orvis and Victor Lawrence. Ex. 19)

Likewise, DaNell and Jamis Johnson do not claim to have a profit share
interest in Victor Lawrence's law practice or Lexington Law Firms of J&A (which is
a non-profit organization and so no one could have a partnership therein). Their
claim is directly against Orvis for a profit share of the credit repair entities that
they helped develop jointly.

Indeed Orvis* initial lawsuit starting this action against Johnson was to
declare that Johnson had no partnership with him, (not with Victor Lawrence or
Lexington and J&A), and Orvis sought by his lawsuit to both cut off the profit
share that was monthly divided by Orvis with the Johnsons up to that time, and to
avoid the accounting demanded by the Johnsons for misappropriated profit share.

At the time Jamis Johnson resigned as directing attorney in May of 1999,
he entered into an agreement with Victor Lawrence providing for continued
representation of the clients, and continued use of the Orvis credit repair
businesses in which Johnsons had an interest.
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Simultaneously with Johnson's resignation as directing attorney in May of
1999. Orvis and Johnson reaffirmed their ongoing partnership arrangement
between Orvis and DaNell and Jamis Johnson. That Orvis-Johnson Partnership
Agreement states unequivocally that the partnership between Orvis and the
Johnsons continues unabated. Please se paragraph 29 above. That document
states clearly the partnership.

Here, Orvis squarely acknowledges the ongoing partnership arrangement
with the Johnsons that had existed prior to this agreement and continued after.
Orvis had accounted for profit share to Jamis Johnson and divided profit share
with DaNell Johnson as agreed and as directed by Jamis Johnson before, during
and after the May 1999 resignation of Jamis Johnson from Lexington and J&A,
and the execution of this Orvis-Johnson partnership agreement.
The claim that Jamis Johnson "disavowed1 any interest in the credit repair
businesses of Orvis is false and will not support summary judgment.

C.

B. JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISCLAIM CREDIT REPAIR
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST; NOR DID HE MERELY ANSWER "NO"
TO THE SBA QUESTION AT ISSUE.
Orvis alleges that Jamis Johnson answers "No." when asked if he had'any

partnership^. To support this motion, Orvis extracts only one word, 'No", out of a
52 word quote.

The complete and uncut version is:
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships?
A. No. I mean, you know, often 111 have a joint endeavor with
somebody, but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or
an LLC. You know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this
deal together? We'll go to Summitt County and buy a lot
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In this deposition, both before and after this response, Johnson would
discuss Lexington and J&A and the beneficial interest of DaNell Johnson and the
flow of monies. It is clear from the deposition that Jamis Johnson, when asked
here about "any partnership^ by the SBA was not thinking that the SBA was
asking about the Lexington and J&A credit repair businesses since those had
already been discussed in the deposition previously by Johnson and would be
discussed again later in the deposition.

The un-cut quote of that answer to the question about "any partnership
interests reveals that Johnson was thinking about other joint endeavors and real
estate in particular, and whether he actually "set upf or prepared partnership
documents. ('„.. / don't set up a partnership or an LLC" and'You know, If I get
a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go to Summitt
County and buy a lot")

Further, in context, this question to Johnson about any interest in
partnerships comes in a series of general questions about stocks, trusts, cash
value in life insurance, partnerships, limited partnerships, etc.

The Orvis memo relies on the single wordTMd'to support Plaintiffs motion.
This clearly distorts the context of Johnson's answer.

Further, any full reading of the Jamis Johnson deposition to the SBA
demonstrates that Jamis Johnson's statements are reasonable and accurate
responses. In the full SBA deposition, Johnson covers his and DaNell Johnson's
relationship to Lexington Law Firms, and to Johnson and Associates. He
explains that DaNell receives the flow of funds related to Lexington and J&Af not
himself. He also explains their long standing business arrangement where she
holds the beneficial interest in other businesses. (See paragraph 39 above for a
synopsis of the foregoing.)
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The SBA deposition testimony of Jamis Johnson is congruent with the
actual situation and does not disavow an Orvis partnership.
2.
IF THERE IS AMBIGUITY IN SUCH SBA TESTIMONY, THE
INTERPRETATION OF SUCH TESTIMONY IS A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Because Jamis Johnson's SBA testimony is truthful and unambiguous, and
does not support the interpretation of Orvis, the Orvis summary judgment motion
cannot be sustained. Moreover, it is sufficient here, to defeat summary judgment,
to demonstrate that Johnson's SBA testimony, on which Orvis' motion relies, is
susceptible to a credible difference of interpretation.
Again, this ambiguity raises a material issue of fact which precludes
summary judgment.
3. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE AND
CANNOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Orvis claims that Jamis Johnson contradicts his position in this lawsuit
when he made statements to the SBA in a deposition to the SBA. Thus, claims
Orvis, Johnson is'judicially estopped'from maintaining his counterclaim against
Orvis here for a share of the staggeringly huge profits from these partnership
businesses, and so, Orvis argues, Jamis Johnson's counterclaim here must be
summarily dismissed.
Even if Orvis' contested interpretation of Johnson's deposition is correct,
such SBA deposition testimony simply cannot estop Mr. Johnson from claiming a
partnership in this case.
Under Utah law, three elements must be shown before a court may
judicially estop a litigant from denying a position taken in a prior judicial
proceeding: (1) the prior proceeding must be between "the same persons or their
privies"; (2) it must involve "the same subject matter"; and (3) the prior position
must have been 'successfully maintained." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax
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Commission. 2001 UT 74, H 15, 34 P.3d 180, 187; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork
Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996); Tracy Loan & Trust Co.. v.
Qpenshawlnv. Co., 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942).
None of these elements is present here.
First, the SBA litigation was clearly between different parties than the
Orvis-Johnsons litigation.
Second, the SBA case concerned a different subject matter. The SBA
case dealt with foreclosure on real property and a guarantee.
Third, there is no indication that Johnson "successfully maintained1 any
position. The SBA case was already closed resulting, in a judgment. The
deposition was merely incident to general post-judgment discovery. No hearing
or procedure was looming and no position was to be advocated, argued, litigated,
adjudicated or'tnaintained'.
Of far graver concern, and in direct opposition to the Orvis claim about the
Jamis Johnson quotes, is that Orvis and Victor Lawrence actually helped Jamis
and DaNell Johnson set out their position to the SBA4ie same position that On/is
now, and Lawrence earlier, repudiate. Victor Lawrence actually represented
DaNell Johnson to the SBA in a separate earlier deposition only months before
the Jamis Johnson deposition at issue here. There DaNell, under Lawrence's
counsel, explained the nature of her beneficial interest regarding Lex. J&A, Jamis
Johnson and Orvis. (Lawrence has never disclosed to the court that he actually
represented DaNell Johnson in the very SBA case he, earlier, and Orvis, now
use.
Lawrence never disclosed to the Court that he in reality had actual
knowledge of the specific profit share arrangement with the Johnsons).
Orvis helped to provide to the SBA sundry J&A and Lexington documents
that support DaNelfs testimony and the position of Jamis Johnson.
The current Orvis arguments are incredible in light of his and Lawrence's
aiding of the SBAs understanding of the DaNell Johnson-Jamis Johnson
relationship. If any person should be estopped form an assertion, it is Orvis here
(and Victor Lawrence in a prior summary judgment) where they fail to disclose to
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the Court that they actually helped shape and verify the Johnson's' partnership
position vis-3-vis Orvis, that Orvis now seeks to avoid by this motion.
The quotes cited by Orvis in the Jamis Johnson SBA deposition, do not
support, under any standard, summary judgment, based on the doctrine of
judicial estoppel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of Orvis for summary judgment
should be denied. Johnson did not misrepresent anything to the SBA; he did not
disavow an interest in the profit share of the credit repair enterprises; and the
doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable.
Dated this 27th day of May, 2004

CARTWRIGHT LAW FIRM

Joe Cartwright
Attorney for Defendant, Jamis Johnson
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Exhibit 9

In an effort to conserve paper and reduce the bulk of this pleading, Exhibit 9 of
this Verified Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Disposition has
been included only once as exhibit 3 of the addendum to the Brief of Appellant
Jamis Johnson.

Exhibit 10

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAYSON ORVIS,
CASE NO. 010907449

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS JOHNSON,

FMBWmiCTCWIT

Defendant.

Third Judicial District

OCT 2 0 2004

JAMIS JOHNSON and
DaNELL JOHNSON,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

"*

OtputyCferfc

vs.
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE,
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1 - 1 5 ,
Third Party D e f e n d a n t s .

Before
Judgment.

the

Court

is

:

the

plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Following argument of c o u n s e l , t h e Court took the matter

under advisement t o f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r the arguments of the p a r t i e s ,
particularly
estoppel.

the

arguments

surrounding

the

issue

of

judicial

After t a k i n g t h e matter under a d v i s e m e n t , the Court has

received correspondence from both the p l a i n t i f f
with attached c a s e

authority.

and the defendant,

ORVIS V. JOHNSON

The Court,

PAGE 2

since

MINUTE ENTRY

taking t h i s matter under advisement and

receiving the supplemental materials of the p a r t i e s , has revisited
this matter on a number of occasions.
read the materials

submitted

In doing s o , the Court has

by the

parties

once again,

has

reviewed this Court's p r i o r rulings d e a l i n g with the question of
judicial estoppel,

and based upon that review,

the arguments of

counsel, and the p e r s u a s i v e law presented, the Court i s satisfied
that the p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as
prayed.
The Court continues to be f u l l y s a t i s f i e d that the doctrine of
judicial estoppel a p p l i e s in t h i s circumstance.

Mr. Johnson i s

judicially estopped from asserting that he had an interest in a
partnership

where

he,

in

testified that he had none.

a

separate

proceeding

under oath,

There i s no q u e s t i o n of mistake. Mr.

Johnson t e s t i f i e d as he d i d , so as to avoid c o l l e c t i o n efforts from
the Small Business
estoppel prohibits

Administration.
Mr.

asserting a d i f f e r e n t

The p r i n c i p a l

Johnson from in

this

of

judicial

l a t e r action now

position.

As the claims a s s e r t e d by Johnson must flow from the existence
of an ownership in the partnership, a p o s i t i o n that Mr. Johnson
previously denied in a separate proceeding, h i s claims must f a i l .
Accordingly, in accordance with the p l a i n t i f f ' s request, the
Court will enter a d e c l a r a t o r y Judgment i n d i c a t i n g that Mr. Johnson

ORVIS V. JOHNSON

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

has no claim or i n t e r e s t in the credit r e p a i r business or any of
the other e n t e r p r i s e s i n question.
Counsel for the p l a i n t i f f i s to prepare an appropriate Order
granting the r e l i e f requested in the Motion for Summary Judgment,
and submit the same t o the Court for review and signature.
Order should comply with Rule 52(a) of

The

the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, s e t t i n g f o r t h i n d e t a i l thflf b a s i s upon which this Court
grants the p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion.

/
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the
foregoing Minute E n t r y , t o t h e f o l l o w i n g , t h i a oCO day of October,
2004:

Peggy A. Tomsic
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
50 S. Main, S u i t e 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Joe Cartwright
Attorney for Defendant Jamis Johnson
299 S. Main S t r e e t , S u i t e 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

(pud^JjlmfiAmJ
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FILED BltfftJCTCOUBT
Third Judicial District

NOV 2 3 2001
NTY

1 CrUtflMlh/A"-

0 •putyCI
Clark

Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant, Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

-{ORVIS'S PROPOSED]-V
JUDGMENT
Case No. 010907449

JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant,

JAMIS JOHNSON.
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYSON ORVIS. SAM SPENDLOVE,
DEON STECKLING. VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15.
Third-Party Defendants.

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Based on the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Minute Entry
dated October 27, 2004, THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT as follows:
1.

The Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on

Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Complaint and all claims asserted therein. Defendant
has no right, claim or interest in any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit
repair, in which Plaintiff has any ownership interest.
2.

The Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on

Defendants Counterclaim against Plaintiff and all claims asserted therein, and the
Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.
3.

The Court enters judgment in favor of Third Party Defendant Deon

Steckling and against Defendant on Defendant's Third party Complaint against Deon
Steckling and all claims asserted therein, and the Third Party Complaint is dismissed
with prejudice.
DATED thi

of November. 2004.
BY THE COURT-

t/foJi\
Monorable Timol
/Third Judicial Dist?
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the * I day of <WoveTTfl5eT', I caused a true and correct
copy of the JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street
#304
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Blake S. Atkin
Atkin & Hawkins
136 South Main Street, #610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Third Party Defendants
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FILEt BICTUCT COBBT
Third Judicial District

NOV 2 3 2001
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street. Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant, Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

jQRVJSiG PROPOOCD] '
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JAMIS JOHNSON,
Case No. 010907449
Defendant.
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

vs.
JAYSON ORVIS. SAM SPENDLOVE.
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15.
Third-Party Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Jayson Orvis is the Plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action. Orvis

provides consulting to law firms or businesses providing credit repair services. These
services consist of assisting in removing false or erroneous entries from the clients'
credit reports. Additionally, Orvis owns and licenses software, trademarks and trade
names, and other intellectual property used in the credit repair business to these law
firms and businesses, through various entities which he has established. P/aintiff seeks,
in this action, a judgment declaring that the Defendant has no right, claim or interest
relative to any business or venture relating to the credit repair business in which Plaintiff
has any ownership.
2.

Defendant Johnson, the Defendant in this case, asserts that a partnership

exists between him and Orvis and that he is therefore entitled to partnership proceeds
from intellectual property lease payments and consulting fees paid to Orvis by various
credit repair entities, including an entity called The Lexington Law Firm.
3.

In addition to claiming a partnership interest in Orvis's credit repair

businesses, Johnson filed a Third Party Complaint against three third-party defendants,
including Deon Steckling. In Johnson's Answer and Third Party Complaint, he alleged
that Steckling, as well as the other third-party defendants, conspired with On/is to
exclude Johnson from the partnership interest he allegedly had in Orvis's credit repair
related businesses. Johnson charged that the third-party defendants had
2

misappropriated the funds of the alleged partnership and had been unjustly enriched
thereby.
4.

Prior to Orviss filing of the Declaratory Judgment Action, Johnson was

sued by the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and judgment was entered against
him in that case on September 29, 1997. United States of America v. Jamis Johnson.
2:95-CV-838J, in the United States District Court for the Central District of Utah.
5.

In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes in the

SBA case. Johnson was deposed by the SBA. In his deposition, Johnson, under oath,
disavowed any interest, partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair business of Orvis.
There was no question of mistake. Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection
efforts by the SBA. Johnson testified, under oath:
Q:

Do you have any interest in any partnership?

A:

No.

Q:

Any interest in any limited liability companies?

A:

No.

[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Jayson
Orvis, at 30:16-31:4].
A:

Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship. . . .
Lexington Law Firm|] was in my name, but since that time and
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any

3

interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. But,
you know, they're operating now without me.
[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 5 to Affidavit of Jayson
Orvis, at 23:6-24:10].
6.

On August 8, 2 0 0 1 , the SBA assigned its judgment against Johnson in the

SBA case to an entity called All Star Financial, L L C .
7.

On August 1 1 , 2001, All Star Financial, L L C . assigned the judgment

against Johnson in the SBA case to Orvis.
8.

On March 30, 2004, Plaintiff Jayson Orvis filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Johnson from
claiming a partnership interest in any credit repair business of Orvis because of
Johnson's testimony under oath before the SBA. Third-party defendant Steckling
joined in Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

On August 9, 2004, the Court held a hearing on Orvis's and Steckling's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following
conclusions of law.

4

1.

The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting a

different position in this later action from the position to which he testified under oath in
the SBA case. That is, judicial estoppel will not allow Johnson to contradict his
testimony before the SBA and claim a partnership interest here. See Salt Lake City v.
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731. 734 (Utah 1995) (the purpose of judicial
estoppel is "to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the
judicial process from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the
court.").
2.

Judicial estoppel does not require that the parties to the prior and present

litigation be the same. See International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515. 517. n.4
(Utah 1979) (noting "a concededly overbroad statement in [the Court's] case of Tracy
Loan and Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co.. et aL 102 Utah 509.132 P.2d 388. to the
effect that one would not be 'judicially estopped' unless the parties and the issues are
the same in the instant and the prior suit. Any misstatement of the rule was corrected
and superseded by our decision in Richards v. Hodson. [485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)]").
3.

Even if Utah law requires that the parties to the prior and present

proceedings be the same in order for judicial estoppel to apply, such is not
determinative in this case because Orvis, having purchased and having been assigned
the judgment owned by the SBA. is in privity with the SBA. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 663 (2004) f a privy is one who, after the commencement of the action.
5

has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or
under one of the parties, as by . . . assignment."); Searle Brothers v. Searle. 588 P.2d
689 (1978) (The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property.).
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismisses Johnson's counterclaim against Plaintiff with prejudice. The
Court will enter a Declaratory Judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in
any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has any
ownership interest. The Court also grants Deon Steckling's Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismisses the Third Party Cpmplaint against him with prejudice.
DATED this^?3of November, 201)4.
BY THE COURT:

ionorable Timothy
"hird Judicial Distrid^$%fr,;;g\&
Salt Lake County, S t a r * 0 " * * * ^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on October 29,2004,1 caused a true and correct copy
of [JAYSON ORVIS'S PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street
#304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Blake S. Atkin
Atkin & Hawkins

136 South Main Street, #610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Third Party Defendants

Jt^-r^
IrfAA-e**- fh.^\jj
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AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT entered into by and between Jayson Orvis and Jamis
Johnson.
RECITALS
WHEREAS. Orvis and Johnson have developed over the last severalyears enterprises that provide credit repair services to a nationwide
clientele. Such credit repair services include, but are not limited to a
range of activities, including telemarketing, internet marketing,
consulting, law representation, and the enterprises have grown over
the years and have acquired a variety of tangible and intangible
assets including, without limitation, for example, equipment,
computers, software, furniture, knowledge, methods, techniques in
marketing, lead sources, internet operations; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for the unimpaired
continuation and growth of the business to the mutual benefit of the
parties; and
WHEREAS the parties acknowledge that an agreement was put in
place reciting that alt assets of this enterprise are placed in the name
of Jayson Orvis so as to protect these assets and provide lor
continued growth and mutual profitability; and
WHEREAS the parties acknowledge that they have governed and
operated these enterprises under an outline agreement and under a
course of performance that they desire to continue;
NOW THEREFORE, for good consideration, the parties agree as
follows:

1. [Governance and compensation/allocation ol profits shall continue
in the percentages as heretofore provided under the operating
arrangements and as the enterprise continues to grow, however, all
monies shall be paid to Jayson Orvis or his business entity as may be
established and Jayson Orvis shall provide Johnson's share or
allocation to any party directed by Johnson. The intent herein being
that these enterprises shall continue to grow, expand, multiply as

directed by the parties under their outline agreement and course of
performance to their mutual economic benefit
2. The agreement is to kept confidential between the parties and the
parties shall not disclose the arrangement herein to third parties
ut mutual agreement
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September h i 994

To:

Merrill ChandlerJ o h n HoUmgshead. Jam* Johnson, Jayson Orvis, Steve Paige

From:

Merrill Chandler J o h n HoQingshead Jamisjohnsoa Jayson Orvis, Steve Paige

Re:

Gentleman's Agreement

Whereas, Merrill Chandler has expertise in computers, databases, operations and business management,
systems devetopmeni as wett as rents computers and software to businesses, and owns a third of the e quay m
N AC A. and
Whereas John Hofflngshead has expertise m business consulting, leasing, financing and funding, and owns a
third of the equity in NACA, and
Whereas Jamts Johnson is an attorney and is an expert in the law, and one hundred percent of the equity of
Law Offfces of Consumer Affairs P.O. and fifty percent of the profits of Lew Offices of Consumsr Affairs, and
Whereas Jayson Orvts has expertise m writing, marketing, advertising, clarity, and fifty percent of the profits
of Law Offices of Consumer Affairs, and
Whereas, StevePaige has export** in consumer credit, marketing, worry, shell games, cost cutting, and owns
a third of the equity in N AC A,
Therefore, in acceptance of the aforementioned contributions we agree to:
1.

Establish a limited liability corporation. The Geneefr Project, whose purpose « t o create and manage
profitable entities for the five partners.

2,

Divide equally the equity and profits of The Genesis Project

3»

Provide vehicles and mechanisms to have ALL profits from N AC A, LOCA and any other related
company or subsidiary be tunneled mto The Genesis Project

4.

Meet weekly to discuss the items pertment to the mission of The Geness Project

To these ends we will do the following:
1.
Merrill- Act as Executive Director of the North American Consumer Alfeance and have responsibility
over NACA personnel issues, oversee marketing programs, business operations, member services,
etc, committing at least 40 hours per week to the task.
2.

John HoUmgshead - Act as business consultant to NACA and LOCA commiung at least 20 hours per
week to the task.

3.

Jatnc Johnson - Protect LOCA/NAC A and all other endeavors legacy, perform all fegal functions
except where a majority indicates outside counsel is required, committing at least 20 per week to the
task.

4.

Jayson Orvts - Business Manager of the Law Offices for Consumer Affairs and have responsibility over
LOCA personnel issues, marketing programs, oversee business operations, cbent relations, e t c
commuting at least 40 hours per week to the task.

5.

Steve Paige • Act as a marketing and operations consultanx regarding credit and debt issues and
matters as surface from tone to time and will commit 20 hours per week to the task.
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ASSIGNMENT
ASSIGNMENT made this * *- day of ^AMWH
. 2001, by Jamis M. Johnson to Jayson
Orvis/Attorneys for People, LLC., a Utah limited liability <x^pany, as follows:
WHEREAS, the name Lexington Law Firm is a duly registered assumed name and/or d.b.a. of
Jamis M. Johnson with the State of Utah, and constitutes a valid trade name having been used extensively
in the business of credit repair, and
WHEREAS, the said trade name is an asset actually owned jointly by Jamis M. Johnson and Jayson
Orvis, and
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson and Jayson Orvis own intellectual property and tangible and
intangible assets for the business of credit repair and per prior agreement, this trade name is to be assigned
by Jamis M Johnson to Jayson Orvis, and
WHEREAS, Jayson Orvis has established a limited liability company called Attorneys for People,
LLC, of which he is the only member, and which he was to hold some of these joint assets and through
which he administrates some of the credit repair business, and
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson desires to assign the trade name to Jayson Orvis/Attorneys for
People and it shall form and is part of the assets jointly owned by Johnson and Orvis and administrated by
Orvis;
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing recitals and upon the prior agreement of the
parties,
Jamis M Johnson does hereby assign to Jayson Orvis/Attorneys for People, LLC., the trade
name/assumed name Lexington Law Firm.
Johnson agrees that the name may reside in his name on the files of the State of Utah, if Orvis so
desires.
DATED on the date first above written,

k^/i/vJ
State of Utah

)

:ss

County of Salt Lake )

OnthisJ^day(
signer of the foregoing ASSI«

_, 2001, personally appeared before me, Jamis M. Johnson, the
, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
KIM A. RENAK
220 SOUTH 200 EAST STE. 110
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
SEPTEMBER 26TH 2004
STATE OF UTAH

S ^ ^ o q . ~&fr^JZ^
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
Angela W.Adams (9081)
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Telephone: (801)328-2200
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant, Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant.

JAMIS JOHNSON and
DaNELL JOHNSON,

PLAINTIFF,
COUNTERDEFENDANT AND
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
JAYSON ORVIS' SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT.
COUNTERCLAIMANT AND
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF JAMIS
JOHNSON'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010907449
vs.
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE,
DION SCHNELLING, VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15,
Third-Party Defendants.

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

As a licensed attorney, he was responsible for running the legal side of the practice
entirely. By putting himself in a position to be disciplined by the Utah State Bar, and,
therefore, incapable of fulfilling his responsibility under their agreement, he breached
his agreement with Orvis.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all payments from you or the Orvis entities
to Johnson or to an assignee of Johnson during the relevant time period as alleged in
Paragraph 24 of the Complaint and the Eighteenth Defense of the Third Party Answer
by stating the amount, the date, and the reason for each such payment.
RESPONSE:

The following payments were made by Jayson Orvis to Jamis

Johnson, or Johnson's assignees, voluntarily, and in Orvis' full discretion as to both
amount and frequency:
1.

12/16/99 - Payment made to Millgate, L.L.C. in the amount of $3950.

2.

12/17/99 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $3000.

3.

1/18/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $1500.

4.

1/18/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $3500.

5.

1/21/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $3750.

6.

2/2/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $9250.

7.

2/17/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $2500.

8.

3/13/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $14,500.

9.

3/24/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2500.

10.

4/12/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $13,500.

11.

5/9/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2750.

12.

5/9/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $19,500.

J

13.

6/5/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2000.

14.

6/5/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $19,500.

15.

7/13/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $10,000.

16.

7/18/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $10,500.

17.

8/4/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $17,000.

18.

10/9/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $24,750.

19.

10/17/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2000.

20.

11/6/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $25,229.26.

21.

12/11/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $31,500.

22.

1/11/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $30,760.

23.

2/7/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $31,500.

24.

3/1/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $33,020.

25.

4/6/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $30,300.

26.

5/7/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $24,058.

27.

6/7/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $33,510.

28.

6/27/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $500.

29.

7/3/01 - Payment made to DM Johnson in the amount of $13,000.

30.

8/1/01 - Paymejtt made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $1000.

31.

8/8/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $34,875.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Explain the basis for your contention that Johnson

is limited to payments in an amount equal to 25% of the profits originating from
intellectual lease payments resulting from the Lexington Law Firm eClient program and
from Johnson & Associates.

1
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Jam is Johnson
HAND DELIVERED
January 22, 199
Dear Jam is,
I wanted to put a couple of things in writing so that you're clear on my position.
I have a lot on my plate right now and I really don't want to spend more of my time
trying to work out your contingency plan. I would like you to work that out and let me
know what your plan is when you feel ready. I'm fine with anything that meets the
following criterium:
1.

those of us with profit share and salary commitments will continue to receive our
sarme compensation and will continue to receive it in proportion to growth and
revenue.

2.

that the arrangement be fully disclosed (or disclosable) to the Bar Association
and other authorities without fear of the appearance of impropriety,

3.

that Victor Lawrence not feel shorted or "ripped off by the arrangement, and

4.

that all current commitments to team members be honored.

I'm glad that you've turned away from the idea of a straight buyout, as I was becoming
increasingly uncomfortable with the figures being discussed.
But, it reminded me how distracted I was becoming by this transition while I'm in the
midst of several pivotal Lex projects.
Another note: if you are in need of financial statements for whatever reason, it looks
better if you get those through me. I really don't want myself or Trina getting the idea
that you don't trust me enough to follow our traditional chain of authority.
Warm regards,

Jayson Orvis

November 0, 1999
Jayson Orvis

220 So. 200 East
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Ut 84 111
Re: Contract/partnership relations between Johnson and Orvis
Dear Jayson,
This letter .s to outline the substance of our conversations and understanding regarding the management and
operations of our ventures and the way forward.
We agree tnai you will continue to manage these businesses for our joint benefit. You may have "control" to
manage these businesses and 1 will not attempt to exercise managerial control over these endeavors. There will be
a good faith effort on my part not to be disruptive of the day to day operations of the business and you will use
reasonable business skjll, fidelity, judgment and your best efforts in such management.. You will aid in good faith
\n making z\\ financial, accounting and operations data frccry available to me on request if! want to review or audit
any such matters. We will continue lo communicate about all aspects of the business operations as I request from
time to time. The goal here is to leave you free to run the operations and let me be "passive**. Ultimately the whole
point is to grow the business and make it profitable for aljj You correctly understood, as you stated In our last
meeting, that "We don't want to go backwards" in relation to income/benefits established thus far in our businesses.
I affirm \ha. However, v/c have decided to cease paying cell phones for all people out of these businesses
including ourselves and our wives. I agree with thai.
Jn addition, such ongoing obligations that affect us and the businesses such as Tennessee litigation* attorney's fees,
trust account management, back IRS tax withholding, Stale Consumer Division/bar issues will continue lo be paid
attention tc» and dealt with economically so that all these matters zr.d any others will ultimately be put tc bed.
With regard to the Lexington/telemarketing portion of die business (a* opposed to e-client) and wilh regard to
Jade's 10% profit share from that Lexington/telemarketing portion of the business—you have acquired that interest
yourself by paying Jade from your own resources. 1 assert no claim to any of Jade's interest.
With regard re the arrangements that wc made with the phone system a few months ago wherein you and Sam arc
paid an extra $500 each ( until I believe it was November, December or January) for the guarantee on the phones
that you entered into, we agreed that Sam would put this arrangement into writing. As yet, I have not received a
written outline of this arrangement I will ask Sam xo prepare it for both of us to have in our files.
Also, as we discussed, it probably is time for Johnson & Associates to have another board meeting to keep the
proper corporate formalities. As you suggested 1 am glad to help gel this together. This meeting should only
involve sinply a report on the status of J&A and any housekeeping you all feel might be necessary. The prior
minutes should have caught everything up. 1 will proceed to arrange a meeting and get minutes prepared in the next
short while.
I think this outlines our understanding of the various issues discussed above. If you want to add anything please
feel free to put it down in writing. I think I h3VCTcoVered mush of it.
Thanks for your consideration.' ^sihcerely hope that a ) this may resuirln business growth, exceptional mutual
prosperity, and^drtnership tranquil in-between us
J
/
I

/
cc: Victor Lawrence.

I

/JamiyM. Johnson
l

l

/
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To:
From:
Date:

JAYSONORVIS
Jamis M. Johnson
1/5/00

Re:

You arc piece of dog shit

0i/©«vei e

"»6P p.eoi

Jayson,
OK. Here I go. I am going to jump into the void. It ain't easy to
exercise faith. But I shall. I appreciated our conversation
yesterday greatly—you don't even know how much. Thank you.
In spite of the fact that you are indeed a total piece of dog shit
albeit a genius, I am going to leap anyway. I am coming to believe
that you deserve the trust- Meantime, in the ongoing attempt to
kccp.thc spirit .of.whatever our_contract is,, try to get me to $45,000
per month from the growth. That is a worthy goal. And J in the
meantime will try to be relatively normal—not an easy task for me
as you may know. I am going to try the faith/trust thing, iliank
you again Jayson .
Regards,
Jamis, the Faithful One

ORV019
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To:
J ay son
From: Jamis
Dale: August 29, 2000
Jayson,
This memo sets forth a few issues that have come up in the last month or so
that we deed to get resolution on. We last met face to face about four weeks
ago before your trip to Alaska.
I.
We have discussed Lexington's and affiliated companies* work on a
move to a new location- You mentioned lhat you have a cubicle there. I
realize that your office is primarily at your home. I expressed an interest is
having space there in the new premises as well. 1 am not sure I want a lull
blown office or just some space set asidc.jor the use of your space. I don't
really have a lot of energy over this but let's kick it around. I need to
discuss this with you and with Sam as he plans the space.
In any event, this move disrupts several key services that are in place here
and represent considerable cost benefit to mc. Currently, our organization
pays my rent down in my basement space. I also am currently a part of the
Lex phone system with some shared receptioning (Kim and Teny do some
trading off both as telephone operators and in reception.) I use our copier
and our faxes as well. I have mentioned to Sam briefly thai since our phone
system has remote capabilities that I will need an extension connected here
at least so the phone receptioning can continue and I still hook into the
phone system. Obviously the cost to replace these items such as phone
system, copier leases, long distance, etc., is reduced if we just move my
offices to the new location—though I am not sure I want to go. Otherwise,
we need to figure out the cost of this change and I guess take it out as a cost
2.
With regard to the lease, you mentioned to me m passing in our last
meeting that you and Sam want to receive an extra fee to yourselves for
personally guaranteeing the lease. This is similar to the fee we negotiated
that you both received for your securing the telephone system lease. The
system is now paid for and that payment is finished and we own the system.
With regard to the lease, T don't have a problem with this lease guarantee
payment concept necessarily. I want lo see what you arc proposing—the
amount you propose that you two are paid, what is being guaranteed, the
term of this payment, i.e. when il expires, etc. Again I don't think 1 have a
problem with something reasonable. Once we have agreed on the
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arrangement, we need to memorialize it in writing for our records. You and
I did this on the payment of my rental space and it was painless. Please get
me the specifics of your proposal in the next few days. Also, J haven't seen
ihe latest copy of the lease. I guess I can get a copy from Sam. Please get
me the latest if you can.
3.
You have me rather excited to see the results of the new clientfiricndly-extend-the- payment efforts that Sam and Spencer Bingham have
been working on. Profit share was down in July as you predicted because of
the equipment expenditures, the hiring of Spencer, etc. but as we both
know, even one extra month of client payments (based on increased client
care and satisfaction) is extremely profitable. I have great hopes for profit
share at the end of this month but even greater hopes for the fourth quarter of
the year.

F)l coll you on this stuff shortly and if you are in lets get together.
Jamis

ORV021

To: Jamis
From: Jayson
Date August 30, 2000
Jamis,
I am struggling a little with this latest series of written
correspondences. As you surely recall you and I have a marked
difference of opinion as to the nature of our business relationship.
Within your correspondences, you present as premises several
positions with which I disagree. That makes it a little tough for me,
as I'm forced to respond and realign those assumptions so that it
doesn't appear that I'm acquiescing to them. As I have recorded my
opinion of what our relationship is (and isn't) in the past, I will not
bore you with it again. However, I would prefer that you not
continue with written correspondence, as you have, so that I can stop
playing anti-lawyer and go back to the business of business.
With regards to your issues:
1. Victor's firms are moving to a new location and I will have no
space there whatsoever. In the spirit of "keeping the peace," I'll throw
my weight behind whatever feels necessary and equitable to keep
you as unaffected as possible by their move.
2. No personal guarantee was necessary in their new lease, so this
discussion is probably moot either way. Victor has been actively
reviewing and negotiating the lease, and since he is the signer, I'm
pretty confident that he's on top of it.
3. Again, I feel awkward discussing the particulars of firm
management with you^As-l have stated in the past, I am pleased to
continue paying, your company as an adjunct consultant to my
consulting services_agenty. As I have also stated, I take the opinion
that you have no control whatsoever in the management of any firms
with which I associate. While the terms of the compensation I pay
your company are foggy at best I believe that you nave been pleased
with the amount of compensation afforded. I, too, feel that it nas
been reasonable and fair. fYiowever, I'm unwilling to hold it out that
you hold an ownership interest in these firmsj I am sure that that
would constitute some kind of complicity in defrauding personal
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creditors to whom you have represented that you draw no income
from these organizations and that you hold no controlling interest
I am not pleased to have been compelled to say these things, but I'm
feeling a little backed into a corner by the nature of the last two
letters that you have sent me. Since I can see only more positioning
and time-wasting brinksmanship arising as a result of this letter
campaign, 1 again suggest that we let this be.
Might I make a suggestion? I would suggest that we just let our
foggy, little business relationship continue down it's foggy, little
course. You have no reason to believe that I will stop compensating
your company for consulting services along the lines already
established. Attempting to fortify your position can only heat up the
debate. I am committed to making a bigger pie for as long as is
feasible, and that has been nothing but good for both of us.
I'll call you right now, but, bummer that we had to talk about this
now.
Warmest regards,
Jayson

MEMORANDUM
RE:

Voice mail received by Jamis Johnson from Jayson Orvis approximately
mid-August 2001, to the phone number 680-3333

Hey dirt bag, this is Jayson. Hey, uh, Gavin just told me that he talked to you a
second ago. Profit share is slow this month because we switched accounting systems,
controllers and all that, so they are dragging it out, it looks like for a couple of days.
Hey, if you want me to float you some funds between now and then, I don't know if
you're tight or what, but I'd be happy to just cut you ten grand or something to tide you
over for a couple of days. Uh, in fact, I think I owe you a little bit from last month still.
Uh, there were some checks that we had to hold from Lexington that I think I could
deposit now. So if you want a little bit of interest though, what's today Thursday, I
would think, uh Wednesday, I would think we'd be done by the end of the week where
we'd be ready to cut, but, I'm far from sure that, you know, it's really no problem if you
want me to cut you a few bucks. Uh, if you want that, you can call me at 652-1801 or
Gavin at 243-3325, and we'll be happy to do it. He's bringing Kim's check over this
morning, so if you'd call in the next little while, that'd be cool. Talk to you later.
End of message.

F:\USERS\CMW\JJohnson\vra8.2001 .wpd
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provide for the continued representation of clients and
of the credit law practice."

Do you see that?

A.

Yes,

Q.

So by t h i s agreement you were d e s i r i n g to

stop a c t i n g i n t h e c r e d i t law p r a c t i c e ; i s that r i g h t ?
MR. MARSDEN:

I o b j e c t t o t h e form of the

question.
A.

With r e g a r d t o , I g u e s s , t h i s body of claims

that would be c o r r e c t .
Q.

Okay.

Let me ask you t h i s .

Mr. Johnson,

t h i s agreement t a l k s about a n a t i o n a l c l i e n t e l e of
c r e d i t law p r a c t i c e t h a t you developed under the name
of Lexington Law Firm.

Did you have a c r e d i t law

p r a c t i c e o u t s i d e of t h i s c l i e n t e l e t h a t ' s being
described in t h i s agreement?
A.

That's a difficult

q u e s t i o n t o answer, but

the answer would be y e s .
Q.

And what was t h a t ?

Who were those c l i e n t s or

what was t h a t p r a c t i c e o u t s i d e of t h e Lexington Law
Firm p r a c t i c e ?
A.

I t was -- i t ' s hard t o d e s c r i b e , but if you

look in t h i s c o n t r a c t we i n d i c a t e t h a t Victor Lawrence
will have no ownership of the t r a d e name Lexington Law
Firm and t h a t would be r e s e r v e d t o Jayson Orvis.
Mr, Orvis and I had an ongoing p a r t n e r s h i p that did a
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1

lot of credit repair business and what could also be

2

called credit repair law.

3

counsel.

4

so the credit law practice, the credit law business

5

would still be going forward probably even using the

6

name Lexington Law Firm, but with regard to the clients

7

Victor Lawrence was really stepping into that

8

situation.

9

that I hired.

10

Q.

We had approached other

We had concepts to co-counsel with others and

He had been one of four or five attorneys
So he was more or less continuing on.

Let me ask you this.

Was it not correct then

11

when you stated in this agreement that Johnson desires

12

to discontinue credit law practice?

13
14

MR. MARSDEN:
Q.

I object to form.

Was that not a true statement?

Were you

15

being truthful when you stated in this agreement that

16

Johnson desires to discontinue credit law practice?
MR. MARSDEN:

17

Objection to the form of the

18

question.

It's argumentative.

Calls for a legal

19

conclusion.

20

A.

I would imagine I was being truthful.

21

Q.

Now in this agreement you've identified a

22

national clientele that had been developed under the

23

name of Lexington Law Firm.

24

clients that you continued to serve as a lawyer after

25

the date of this agreement, that you didn't pass over

Were there credit law

13
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Tell me how that factored into your agreement

with Victor Lawrence.
A.

Well, we had just talked to the SBA, a

creditor holding a judgment against me.
spoken with them.
discussing it.

Victor had

Jason had been involved in

They had deposed my wife.

They had

sought some documentation, I believe, from Johnson &
Associates that had been subpoenaed.

And we wanted to

preserve our business and not be a big target for the
SBA.

I don't think we realistically thought I would be

disbarred at that time and we knew that it would be
going on for many years to come.
Q.

And just so I can understand, what was your

concern with regard to the SBA that they would try to
take over or somehow the credit repair law firm?
A.

The concern was vague and generated mostly by

Jayson Orvis, so it's hard me to articulate exactly the
concern, but I was willing to take the steps that we
had discussed which would be to take Victor, who was
already running portions of the credit law practice,
and put him in and Jayson and I would deal with our
ownership of assets as well in contemporaneous
agreements.
Q.

Now you've alluded to this before.

Victor

22
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1

identify them.

2

A.

I think I got them from you.

3

Q.

Tell me what those agreements are.

4
5
6
7
8

Tell me

how you would identify them.
A.

There's an agreement where Jayson and I agree

to hold everything in his name for our mutual benefit.
Q.

First of all, if you would, tell me who the

parties are to that agreement.

9

A.

It's an agreement between Jayson and Jamis.

10

Q.

Jayson Orvis and Jamis Johnson?

11

A.

Right.

We agreed to hold everything jointly.

12

We would hold it in his name, but it's for our mutual

13

benefit, all credit repair businesses.

14

Q.

So that agreement was that the business --

15

give me the substance of that again.

16

own the business for the mutual benefit of you both?

17

MR. MARSDEN:

18

mischaracterizes his testimony.

19
20
21

Q.
testimony.
A.

I object.

That Jayson would

That

I'm not trying to mischaracterize your
Give me again what you -That agreement contemplates that all of the

22

assets, intellectual property that we own jointly would

23

be held in Jayson's name for our mutual benefit and

24

that the payment arrangements and profit shares would

25

continue and that the businesses would expand and our
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A.

Well, I think I just answered that.

I think

I said that I may have that information and at this
time I don't know,
Q.

Okay,

Do you know how Sam Spendlove acquired

the software?
A.

I don't have specific knowledge of how he

acquired it .
Q.

And then you talked about some entities that

Sam Spendlove had an interest in that you claim some
interest in or ownership in.

Do you know what entities

Sam Spendlove owns that you claim to have some right to
an interest in?
A.

You know, whatever my answer was last week, I

mean last time, but any entities that deal with credit
repair that he shares with Jayson Orvis jointly or
directly or indirectly I would claim interest in.
Q.

And on what basis would you claim an interest

in any entity that Sam Spendlove owns?
A.

Well, I don't know, that I can list all of the

bases exhaustively and it may call for a legal
conclusion, but I have a partnership agreement with
Jayson Orvis that we share all the credit repair
business that he does.

And Sam was one of our

employees and anything that he does with Jayson I would
claim an interest in.

20
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wife's company?

You don't own any interest in that

company?
A.

No.

Q.

And did your wife ever perform services for

Johnson & Associates?
A.

Well, it indicates here that she's on the

board.
Q.

Other than being a member of the board, did

your wife ever perform any services for Johnson &
Associates?
A.

She provided some equipment, furniture,

computers for the original company.
Q.

And was her -- was the compensation that she

received in any way tied to services that you were
performing for Johnson & Associates?
A.

The compensation she received or DM Johnson

received, I'd assigned to her.

So whatever I was

negotiating would have gone to her.

So whatever that

negotiation resulted in would nonetheless have been to
Johnson & Associates.
Q.

So there was some compensation that Johnson &

Associates owed to you that ended up being paid to DM?
A.

No, I don't think that's accurate.

Q.

Then explain to me what you're talking about.

A.

From the outset of our partnership I had
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explained that the beneficial interest of this endeavor
would be owned by my wife or her entity and that the
payments should go to my wife or her entity and that's
what happened.

And I have a power of attorney that I

represented that entity and my wife in a number of
companies, these and elsewhere.

And everything that I

would negotiate in my name nonetheless would result in
that remuneration to that entity as our agreement would
have been.

So whenever you have money going out of

these companies it almost always goes to an entity
owned or controlled by DaNell Johnson.
Q.

Okay.

What services did DaNell Johnson

perform if any for Johnson & Associates?
A.

I think you asked and answered that.
MS. ATKINSON:

Yeah, that's asked and

answered,
Q.

Other than being a trustee did you identify

any other services that she performed?
A.

I did.

Q.

What were those?

A.

I identified the contributions she made at

the start of the endeavor.

In addition, based on my

power of attorney and my agency relationship with that
entity and her, what I did often were down to the
benefit of my services and could be attributed to her.

69
MERIT REPORTERS

Exhibit 18

ATTORNEY AT LAW

UTAH. NEW YORK
AND IDAHO BAR

220 South 200 East, Suits 110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Telephone
(801)5304100
Fax
(801)533-0000

August 30, 2001

Daniel L. Berman
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Re:

VIA FACSIMILE & U.S. MAILS

Jayson Orvis v. Jamis M. Johnson

Dear Dan:
This confirms the substance of our meeting yesterday, August 29, 200L Jayson Orvis was
present and you also were there with an associate. You indicated at the meeting that your firm
hadfileda complaint for declaratory relief in behalf of Jayson Orvis against me. (I have since
been served with that complaint.) In that meeting you extended an offer of settlement to resolve
all matters between Jayson Orvis and myself. The substance of that offer as I recorded in my
notes, is as follows: Jayson Orvis has acquired two judgments against me personally that total
approximately $700,000. Jayson indicated that these judgments are the SBA judgment and a
judgment held by an Arizona resident, Pamela Bdding. Jayson offers to pay me between $16,000
and $18,000 per month for a period of two yean (provided the businesses don't sufifer economic
set backs that would prevent those payments) after which time all further payments would stop.
Also at the end of that payment period, Jayson Orvis would have the two judgments satisfied and
they would be of no further force and affect against me. My notes do not indicate an expiration
date for this offer, but we have scheduled to meet again in your offices at 4:00 p.m. next
Wednesday, September 5, 2001.
I write this letter so that we may have an accurate record of our interactions to date. If I
have mis-stated the facts above in any way or have misunderstood the offer as presented, would
you kindly please correct me.

JMJ/kr
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JANUARY 29, 2003
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Good morning.

Jayson Orvis v. Jamis

Johnson; Jamis Johnson and Donnelle Johnson v. Jayson Orvis,
Sam Spendlove, Deon Schilling and Victor Lawrence,

Appearances

please.
MR. F.GAN:

Your Honor, Sean Egan.

I'm from

Bendinger, Crockett on behalf of Jamis Johnson,
MR. ATKIN:

Blake Atkin representing Victor Lawrence

and Sam Spendlove, Your Honor*
MS. ADAMS:

Angela Adams representing the Plaint ill'"

Jayson Orvis.
THE COURT:

Okay.

The things we want to take up

today, this first would be the third party defendants Lawrence
and Spendlove7 s Motion for Summary Judgment and then secondly
we'll talk about some attorney's fees being sought by the
plaintiff on an unrelated matter today.
happened to Schilling?

All right.

Whatever

Did he ever get served or make an

appearance?
MS. ADAMS:

His name is actually Deon Steckling and

he's a third party defendant.
THE COURT:
MS. TOMSIC:
THE COURT:

I represent him as well.

Oh, okay.
Itrs S-T-E-C-K-L-I-N-G.
All right.

Let's hear from Lawrence and
1

Spendlove.
MR. ATKIN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

represent Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove.

Blake Atkin, I

I presume that the

Court has read our moving papers.
THE COURT:

You presume correctly.

MR. ATKIN:

Great.

I'll try not to be to repetitive.

When I first came into this suit, Your Honor, I thought it
would be a relatively straight forward matter.

I had a copy of

the May, 1999 agreement whereby Victor Lawrence bought this
credit repair law practice from Mr. Johnson and that agreement
specifically required Mr. Lawrence to continue to use the
consulting services and paralegal services that were provided
by Mr. Orvis and my client assured me that while he complied
with that portion of the agreement and substantial funds were
paid by the law firm to Mr. Orvis and his companies for those
services, that there wasn't any flow of money the other way and
I thought that we would be able to that to the plaintiff's in
this case and at least end the matter with regard to Lexington
Law Firm and Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove.
Talking to plaintiff's counsel, I was informed it. was
more complicated than that and so I took Mr. Johnson's
deposition and in his deposition I attempted to lay out that it
wasn't really more complicated than that, that we had a
contract whereby Mr. Lawrence had purchased this law practice
an6 that Mr. Lawrence had been complying with the contract and
2

really shouldn't be involved in this dispute that was existing
between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis.
to me that in order to

Mr. Johnson then explained

understand the agreement between him

and my client, one had to understand two other agreements that
had been entered into contemporaneously, he called it, with
that agreement and so I began asking him about those
agreements.

And the first of those agreements that he

described is what I've called the backdated agreement, an
agreement dated April, 1997 but which Mr. Johnson testified was
actually executed in May of 1999, and quite frankly I was
shocked about testimony when he was asked why this backdated
agreement had oeen prepared, he explained that the 5BA, the
Small Business Administration, had a judgment against him and
he and Mr. Orvis were trying to protect the partnership assets,
the partnership that he now suffuses is the basis of this
lawsuit, from the SBA and so they entered into this agreement
to make it appear that all of those partnership assets belonged
to Mr. Orvis and not to Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson.
He described an elaborate fraudulent scheme where
they intentionally used different computers, different
typewriters, to prepare these different agreements to make it
look like they had been prepared upon the dates that they bore
rather than being a part of this scheme.

And then he talked

about the secret agreement that he had with Mr. Orvis in which
they basically agreed that the backdated agreement didn't
3

accurately reflect their relationship, but that they had an
ongoing partnership relationship with each other and that
secret agreement by its own terms says that they're not going
to disclose it to anybody else and I asked him if he had
disclosed that to anyone else and he said no, that was
something simply between me and Mr, Orvis,
Then I wanted to make the record clear what we were
looking at here and I asked Mr, Johnson, was this backdated
agreement designed to defraud your creditors or did it
accurately reflect the facts as they existed in April of 1997?
And Mr. Johnson gave an answer to that.

He said it did not

reflect the facts as they existed in April of 1997, and he said
that it had also been created for the purpose of providing a
continuum.
Now T didn't understand at first what he meant by
providing this continuum so I continued to question him about
that and he explained the continuum in this way, explained that:
in April of 1997 what had actually existed was a group of
people working together to provide these credit repair and
legal services that included him and Mr. Orvis, and a Mr. Page
and a Mr. Holiingshead and a Mr. Chandler and of that group,
only Mr. Johnson was a lawyer, the rest of them were not
lawyers, and so they entered into this backdated agreement.
But Mr. Johnson in addition to having the SBA chase him as a
creditor, Mr. Johnson had some problems with the Utah State

Ba r.
THE COURT:

I know about those.

MR. ATKIN:

And so he was concerned about having to

THE COURT:

Unless there's more than one.

I know

about the one that he got disbarred for.
MR. ATKIN:

Right.

And so he was looking for someone

to take over the credit repair law firm and so with the Law
practice being so combined with these non-lawyers, there were
issues about illegal practice of law or illegal, inappropriate
fees with non-lawyers, and so another purpose of this backdated
agreement was to make it appear that the Lexington law firm
that Victor Lawrence would be buying was a separate entity and
not part of this partnership arrangement with these nonlawyers.

And so that was what he was trying to accomplish In

that regard.
So, his testimony, specifically, in a sussinct way he
was asked, "So the reason this was backdated to April of 1997
wets in connection with your concerns with the SBA?"
Answer:

''That's not accurate actually."

"Okay, why was it backdated to April, 1997?"
"One reason was the SBA."
"Okay."
"The other reason was that it would difficult to have
an agreement where I conveyed to Victor Lawrence the Lexington
Law firm and we have all sorts of agreements out there where
5

Jayson and I and John Hollingshead and Steve Page and M e n ill
Chandler are all running this operation together so we wanted
something that would be viewed as a continuum."
So that's what he meant by this continuum.

He wanted

to create an appearance that Lexington Law Firm had been a
separate entity since at least 1994 so that he could not only
prevent the bar that was already concerned about him from
learning that he might have been involved with the illegal
practice of law or illegal splitting of fees with non-lawyers,
but it would also be difficult to try to attract a lawyer to
take over that law practice if it had this unsavory past.

So

this backdated agreement was not only designed to defraud his
creditor, it was also designed to defraud the Utah State Bar
aim I'm not sure if Victor Lawrence was a specific target o!
that fraud or if he was just a dupe of that fraud, but in any
event, Mr. Lawrence entered into this May 1999 agreement
understanding that he was buying a law practice that was
separate from this other partnership entity that was being run
by Jayson Orvis.
THE COURT:

Did he have any knowledge of these two

agreements, this backdated agreement or this secret agreement?
MR. ATKIN:

Not the backdated agreement, Your Honor.

Mr. Johnson's testimony was that that was between him and Mr.
Orvis and tie had not disclosed it to anyone.
THE COURT:

How about the other one?

MR. ATKIN:

Mr. Lawrence was - I'm not sure it he was

specifically aware of the backdated agreement, but he was aware
of: the continuum idea he was being told and the agreement Mr.
Lawrence entered into, the May 1999 agreement, describes
Lexington Law Firm as a separate entity and then Mr. Lawrence
also entered into an agreement with Mr. Orvis to contract lor
these management services, paralegal services that was, for

Jill

Intensive purposes a mirror image of the backdated April 19,
x

97 agreement.

And so he was certainly aware of the continuum

concept that they had created and the representation of the
relationship between those parties.
Now, Mr. Johnson comes into this Court and wants to
repudiate the April 1997 agreement and say

xx

No, it doesn't

accurately reflect the facts as they existed.

You know, I luve

an ongoing partnership with Mr. Orvis that has continued since
1994 and Mr. Lawrence, you know, you're not entitled to rely
upon that agreement that made the Lexington Law Firm separate
from the Orvis entities, so now, you know, you have to deal
with the tact that I'm claiming to be a partner with Jaysou
Orvis, this is a partnership that included the Lexington Law
Firm back through the past.
Mr. Lawrence is entitled to receive what was
represented to him in this May 1999 agreement that he enteied
into.

He's entitled to rely upon this continuum that had been

created by Mr. Johnson in the 1997 agreement.

He's entitled to
7

1

that not only to avoid having to continue with this litigation

2

and receive a summary judgment in this case but he's also

3

entitled to that because of the problems that it might create

4

tor him with the Utah State Bar is he's now saddled with al

^

least two non-lawyers who claim to be his partners, Mr. Orvis

6

who is not a lawyer and Mr. Johnson who is no longer a lawyer.

7

And there are a number of legal theories that support Mr.

H

Lawrence's request that this Court grant him judgment and allow

9

him to continue on practicing law and serving his clients as he

10

contracted to do in this May 1999 agreement.

11

The first legal theory that we've asserted is fraud.

12

It's an old concept in the law but we believe still a valid

13

concept in the law in this state and that is the law, when the

14

law finds people who have entered into illegal contracts, it

15

will leave those people where it finds them, that the Court

16

won't allow someone to come into court and try to change their

17

position from the position that they've taken in an illegal

18

contract.

19

contract with regard both to the SBA, with regard to the Utah

20

State Bar; and with regard co Mr. Lawrence.

21

to allow Mr. Johnson to repudiate that backdated agreement by

22

reference to the secret agreement that he didn't disclose to

23

anybody or even by saying, my claims are based on an agreement

24

that started in 1994 and not affected by that '97 agreement,

2b

then the SBA becomes a subject of his fraud and the Utah State

The backdated, 1997 agreement, was an illegal

if the Court were

8

Bar would be and Mr* Lawrence would be THE COURT:

It sounds like the SBA has already been

MR. ATKIN:

They have been, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Has the U.S. Attorney heard about ail

MR. ATKIN:

The lawyer from the SBA, I've talked with

defrauded.

this?

him about it.
THE COURT:

Somebody ought to be looking into it.

If

there's any substance to it, it's serious business.
MR. ATKIN:

It is very serious business, Your Honor,

and that brings me to the next theory that we would rely on Lo
prevent Mr. Johnson from being able to recover fiom Lhis

case,

from my clients and that is estoppel and this is even mure
serious than the fraud argument, Your Honor, and that is, I'd
like first of all to talk about judicial estoppel.

As the

Court has some genuine concerns about what Mr. Johnson is
trying to do in this case, judicial estoppel as our Supreme
Court has said, prevents a party from seeking judicial relief
by offering statements inconsistent with its own sworn
statements in a prior judicial proceeding.

Then the Court went

on to explain the purpose of judicial estoppel.

The purpose of

judicial estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from conduct
such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the court.

1

Now, in supplemental proceedings in that SBA action

2

where the SBA was attempting to collect from Mr. Johnson, he

3

was asked this question, "Do you have any interest in any

4

partnerships."

5

said, xxYou know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody

6

but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an

7

LLC, you know.

8

this deal together?

9

lot." Question, "So a joint venture."

Answer, "No." He went on to elaborate.

He

If I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do
We' 11 go up to Summit County and buy a
Answer, "Yeah, you can

10

call it that but I don't have any ongoing partnerships."

11

Now, that supplemental proceeding was taken on

12

November the 18 ', 1999.

13

reporter's certificate that Jamis M. Johnson was by me before

14

examination duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth

15

and nothing but the truth in said cause.

16

1999.

17

Mr. Johnson, according to the court

That was November 18,

Now in this case, in response to our Summary Judgment

18

Motion, he comes into Court saying I'm making my claims based

19

on a partnership that existed in the beginning of 1994 and so

20

we'd ask, where was this partnership when he was under oath to

21

tell the SBA the truth?

22

18, 1999 when he swore under oath that he had no ongoing

23

partnerships?

24

when someone can, under oath, make an answer to that kind of a

25

question and say I don't have any ongoing partnerships and then

Where was this partnership on November

I hope I don't live long enough to see the day

10

come into this Court and on the basis of what would have to be
perjured testimony, try to establish that he does have.
THE COURT:

Well, one of them (inaudible) perjured,

that's for sure,
MR. ATKIN:

Yeah.

So on the basis of whether you

call it judicial estoppel or whether you call it equitable
estoppel or whether you just term it the Court's inherent
discretion to not allow people to assert claims that are
diametrically opposed to testimony they gave under oath to tell
the truth, the Court should grant us summary judgment.
I'd be happy to answer any questions.
THE COURT: No.
MR. ATKIN: Thank you Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Explain to me how Mr. Spendlove all 1 Its

MR. ATKIN:

Mr. Spendlove is an employee of Lexington

into this.

Law Firm.

He also has businesses in which he provides similar

services to Lexington Law Firm, consulting services.
THE COURT:

Similar to Mr. Orvis?

MR. ATKIN:

Similar to Mr. Orvis's services.

THE COURT:

Okay.

And the claim is he's involved in

this conspiracy as well as I understand it?
MR. ATKIN:

There is that claim but again, Your

Honor, all of those claims go back to a conspiracy to divert
assets from a partnership that Mr. Johnson claims he's a part
11

1

of which he disavowed in the backdated agreement in which he

2

disavowed in his sworn testimony to the SBA and that's the

3

basis under which we think summary judgment should be also be

4

granted for Mr. Spendlove.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

6

MR. ATKIN:

Thank you.

7

THE COURT:

Mr. Egan?

8

MR. EGAN:

9

making time for us.

Thank you, Judge.

We appreciate the Court

I think at the outset, I know the Court

10

has read the papers and I am content, Your Honor, to rely on

11

the briefing to identify disputed facts and point out the

12

pertinent controlling authority which I think makes summary

13

judgment inappropriate.

14

points particularly in response to some of the remarks Mr.

15

Atkin has made.

16

an oral agreement, a long standing course of conduct and a

17

number of agreements, not simply those that Mr. ALkin has

18

identified and I think it's important with respect to the

19

remarks made about the SBA to try to differentiate and unravel

20

as best we can, the nature of the Johnson interests.

21

checks that Jayson Orvis wrote were actually written to

22

Donnelle Johnson or to entities controlled by Donnelle Johnson.

23

Jamis Johnson has had a long standing relationship with his

24

wife whereby he acts as a power of attorney for her and so

25

there has been some imprecision perhaps created in part by our

But I did want to raise a couple of

The Johnson's claims in this case are based on

The

12

own pleadings and certainly by the pleadings and remarks of
others, confusing Jamis Johnson with Donnelle Johnson with
respect to whc owns what.

But for purpose of this case

and

what we're trying to assert here, it's an interest that's owned
beneficially by Donnelle Johnson although it's true that Jamis
Johnson has been involved in representing that interest and
interacting i i\ that interest and so there may be some
imprecision with that.
THK COURT:

Wait a minute.

Are these Donnelle

Johnson's claims or Jamis Johnson's claims in this third party
complaint?
MR. EGAN:

I think they're both but with respect to

the existence of an interest in the Orvis entities, it is
Donnelle Johnson who has received money and has received checks
from Jayson Orvis in recognition of the interest and 1 think
that's an important distinction to make.
THE COURT:

How does she become a third party?

I

assume Donnelle Johnson is —
MR. EGAN:

Because I think, Your Honor, and 1

apologize, I don't mean to duck your question, I'm a late comer
to the case, bur I think the case came about because there was
a declaratory judgment filed by Jayson Orvis to say that Jamis
had no partnership interest with Jayson Orvis and we have
responded by saying Donnelle and Jamis have interests that
spt«ad across, but with respect as to who actually had the
13

1

partnership interest with Jayson Orvis, it was Donnelle but

2

Donnelle is represented and has given power of attorney to

3

Jamis and I think that is an important point to bear in mind.

4

THE COURT:

That doesn't solve the question, how does

5

she become a third party plaintiff if she's not a defendant to

6

start with?

7

MR. EGAN:

Well, I think because she's instituting a

8

separate action by way of the counterclaim.

9

point, Your Honor, and I'm not sure how to remedy it at this

10

I mean, I see your

stage.

11

THE COURT:

She's an improper party.

It's as simple

12

as that.

If she wasn't named as a defendant, she can't assert

13

a third party complaint and she cannot assert a counterclaim.

14

If she becomes a defendant, then she can but no one has sued

15

tier, have they?

16

MR. EGAN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. EGAN:

No, I don't believe anyone has sued her.
Then she ought not to be in this lawsuit.
Well, that may be the subject of an

19

appropriate pleading either for me to amend and get her in

20

properly or on the part of Jayson Orvis and Spendlove, Victor

21

Lawrence's interests to get her out but we're here now and a

22

number of important points have been raised so I think we ought

23

to proceed.

24
25

THE COURT:

Just because everybody has done it the

wrong way, doesn't mean that I'm going to just go along with
14

It.

MR. EGAN:

No, and I wasn't suggesting thaL you

should, Your Honor.

I think you've made an important

observation that's passed us all.
THE COURT:
•jumped out to me.

That's one of the first things that

1 don't know how anybody could have missed

that, but, that all aside, proceed.
MR. EGAN:

It's important, Your Honor, to make clear

that as I said a moment ago, the Johnsons are not attempting or the Johnsons are pursuing an interest based on far more that
the agreements that Mr. Atkin has identified.

The Johnsons are

not attempting to recover from Victor Lawrence or Sam Spendlove
or the Lexington Lav; Firm based on any of these agreements.
They're not claiming that Victor Lawrence or Sam Spendlove are
partners with them.

What the Johnsons are claiming is that

Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove are part of a scheme to
deprive the Johnsons of their beneficial interest in the
partnership arrangement they have with Jayson Orvis and thai
there's been conduct that Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence have
been involved in or have abetted in some fashion which we' re
still trying to work out a way through the discovery process to
assist Mr. Orvis in his efforts to deprive Mr. Johnson of his
interests.
THE COURT:

I thought Mr. Johnson told the SBA under

oath that he didn't have a partnership interest?
15

1

MR. EGAN:

No.

What he said - he doesn't but this

2

yets back to the distinction between Donnelle Johnson and Jamis

3

Johnson.

4

Now, with respect to the SBA testimony, Judge, 1

5

think that obviously the quoted testimony is there.

I could

6

not come before the Court and tell you that I have a full

7

understanding of what is proper asset shielding and improper

8

asset hiding.

9

his affairs with the SBA to his advantage, whether in that

I know that Mr. Johnson was attempting to manage

10

testimony he cuts it too close, is too cute or is affirmatively

11

misleading the SBA, I quite frankly believe is an issue for the

12

jury to decide after all of the evidence is in about what was

13

said to the SBA and what they're doing with Jamis Johnson and

14

what they were doing with Donnelle Johnson.

lb

interesting to note and it's of great concern to us, that at:

16

some point during Mr. Johnson's involvement with the SBA he was

17

represented by Victor Lawrence.

18

involvement with the SBA, Donnelle Johnson was represented by

19

Victor Lawrence.

20
21

THE COURT:

I think it's

At some point during her

Did Victor Lawrence tell them to lie Lo

the examiner under oath in the SBA supp order?

22

MR. EGAN:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. EGAN:

2t>

THE COURT:

No, I don't think he did that.
I'm sure he didn't.
I'm sure that's true, Judge.
T h e n why do you tell m e alL

that?

16

1

MR. EGAN:

I'm telling you that because I think that

2

it's far more complicated than Mr. Atkin is making it appear

3

and that's—

4

THE COURT:

I understand your claim.

You say you' re

h

not basing anything on any of these agreements and so

6

therefore, you've got some type of an oral deal here based on

7

course of conduct that's a big conspiracy that Lakes your

8

client's interest that is not the subject of a writing,

9

basically, isn't that it?

10

MR. EGAN:

Well, there are additional writings but

11

the bottom line is the course of conduct and the oral

12

understandings of the parties entered into over the course of

13

many years, that's true.

14

and the additional point that the SBA sold their judgments to

15

Jayson Orvis or an Orvis controlled entity, is to suggest. Lo

16

you that it's not nearly as clean or not nearly as black and

17

white as Mr. Atkin has presented to you and I think that what

18

went on in front of the SBA to the extent that it's pertinent

19

to these claims, is a matter for the jury to decide that you're

20

being asked to come in and make credibility determinations and

21

make factual determinations with a record that is not, in my

22

judgment, complete about what the SBA was told.

23

things I can tell you, Your Honor, it's my understanding the

?A

SBA had full access to Mr. Johnson's finances, Cull access to

25

his documentation and nothing was held back but we're isolating

The reason I'm raising these points,

One of the

17

on this testimony as a sign and literally prooE that there was
some elaborate scheme to defraud the SBA.

I don't think that

the evidence will support that and that's what I'm suggesting
about not rushing to judgment about what Mr. Johnson was saying
to the SBA and not allowing it to serve as the basis tor a
summary judgment here.
I think Mr. Atkin did not - Mr. Atkin summarized the
testimony.

he only read a little bit of it.

He only included

a little bit more in his briefing papers, but I think the
inference - they don't say what Mr. Atkin says they do.
summarized it.

He has

He may be able to convince a jury of that, but

1 think that for summary judgment purposes under Rule 56, Mr..
Johnson and Mrs. Johnson are entitled to favorable interences
about what thar testimony meant, what the significance of it
1 s.
THE COURT:

Well, have they come forward with

affidavits to explain what their testimony is in this case,

to

explain why they made what appears to be a false representation
- Mr. Johnson?
MR. EGAN:

They have not come forward with testimony,

Your Honor, because I don't think the way the issue was framed,
1 don't think the way the issue was framed, allows or makes
that necessary and also the testimony itself doesn't support
that.

You've reached the conclusion that Mr. Atkin wants you

to reach in your question to me which is, this is fraud and I'm
18

suggesting Lo you that THE COURT:
fraud.

Well, you know, I don't even care if it's

Just a flat lie is bad enough for me, particularly from

someone who used to be a lawyer.
MR. EGAN:

Well, again, Your Honor, the factual

Ioundation for that remark has not been laid out by anybody.
I'm attempting to provide some information and lay out some
foundation for the Court but if Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence
are mis-perceiving the claims, suddenly this issue of what, was
said to the SBA becomes the tail that wags the dog and I'm
suggesting to the Court that that's not accurate.
THE COURT:
claim on.

Well, tell me what you're basing your

Tell me about all this course of conduct and all

these other documents that supports this claim.
MR. EGAN:

The course of conduct is an understanding

between Jayson Orvis and Jamis Johnson that Jayson Orvis would
pay money to Donnelle Johnson based upon a preexisting
established relationship between Jamis Johnson and his wite and
checks were cut routinely for several months.

But as the

business grew —
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me ask you before you move

on,

who was doing this work that Mr. Orvis was paying for, Mr.
Johnson or Mrs. Johnson?
MR. EGAN:

I think it was more in the form oi: - at

first, Mr. Johnson was doing work as part of the partnership,
19

as part of the arrangement.

As time progressed, Mr*. Johnson

became more ot a passive investor because ot his own issues .ind
so it wctsn' L consideration necessarily for work done, it was
payment for an interest in the business entities that Jayson
Orvis —
THE! COURT:

Did he assign this partnership interest

that Wcis creatud by his relationship with Mr. Orvis to his wife
and then lie became her attorney in fact —
MR. EGAN:
Your Honor.

I don't think that's quite what happened,

T think what happened is that any entity that Mr.

Johnson was involved in long before his involvement or his
disciplinary problems with the Bar, long before the SBA, Mr.
Johnson routinely, when he would set up or get involved in ci
business interest, would have his wife be the beneficial owner
of the interest.
MR. JOHNSON:
MR. EGAN:

She sat on the boards as well, Jjean.

Yeah and Mr. Johnson is reminding me that

Mrs. Johnson sat on the Board of the various entities, not
simple these credit repair entities.

I know, for example, thai

Mr. Johnson had, or Mrs. Johnson was on the Board of a hospital
that Mr. Johnson was involved in Louisiana THE COURT:
MR. EGAN:

The whole thing smells.
Well, no one is coming into this courtroom

completely clean, Judge.
THE COURT:

No, they're not.
20

MR. EGAM:
THE COURT:

I have no problem conceding that.
There's the degree ot odor but it's not.

looking too good foi Mr. Johnson.
MR. EGAN:

Well, I understand what you're saying,

Your Honor, but I'm also urging the Court to place Mr.
Johnson's position in the context of Rule 56 and who gets to
decide whether it stinks and if so, from whose side of the
fence the odor is emanating most from.
important.

That's, I think, very

I share Your Honor's concerns.

I understand them

but I'm also suggesting that in businesses of this sort as in
many other commercial transactions, there's a lot of stutl.
that's going on and the best way to approach this is to allow
the litigation process to run its course so that we can Li.nd
out what happened, so that a jury can decide whose telling the
truth here and whose not, so that there can be a full
explication of the facts and not simply some cherry picked
testimony that looks bad right now and, Your Honor, I'm not
trying to run away from it.

It says so right there.

troublesome bit of testimony.
What did Jamis Johnson mean?

It's \

But what is its significance?
What was going on in other

portions of those SBA proceedings?

Why is Jayson Orvis buying

the judgments and then calling Mr. Johnson up to the Bernuii
otrice and being presented with them as a threat to resign any
interest in a partnership?

Why did he do that?

We're not the

only people that have mud on our shoes.

21

THE COURT:

I don't know about Mr, Orvis.

I'm

concerned about Mr. Spendlove and Mr, Lawrence.
MR, EGAN:

And I understand that, Your Honor, but

what I'm suggesting to you is, what is troubling the Court is
best resolved by allowing the case to proceed forward and then
by truncating it or preempting it based on a summary judgment
motion tor which I'm not sure they even having standing to
raise as to some of these agreements.
suggesting to Your Honor.
that this is a rose.

That's all I'm

I'm not trying to suggest to you

It's not a rose, but there is more going

on here and there are explanations that a lot of people have to
give and not simply Mr. Johnson and there will be a time and
place for that and I'm suggesting respectfully, Your Honor,
that the time and the place for that is at a trial and not. in a
summary proceeding.
The bottom line of the case, Your Honor, is there's
an effort on the part of Jayson Orvis with the assistance of
Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove to deprive Mr. and Mrs.
Johnson of their interests in the Jayson Orvis entities.
THE COURT:

Tell me exactly what Mr. Lawrence did

upon which you base your claim, this conspiracy he had with Mr,
Orvis and Mr, Spendlove to beat whoever owned this, Mr. Johnson
or Mrs. Johnson, out of their interest, assuming they had one?
MR. EGAN:

Let me answer this two ways.

First, if we

refer Lo the brief and the specific facts, facts 23, 24 and 2b

sets out the detail of the claims against Mr. Spendlove and Mr.
Lawrence.

But generally speaking, Your Honor, we believe Llu.it

Mr. Spendlove was advising Mr. Orvis and assisting Mr. Orvis
with the strategy of in part, purchasing SBA judgments to use
the SBA judgments against Jamis Johnson to obtain leverage over
Mr. Johnson to renounce any interest that he or his wile had in
the Jayson Orvis entities and there was a meeting prior to the
tiling of suit at Mr. Berman' s office where Mr. Johnson was
presented with all this and was basically told to renounce your
interests or we're going to sue you, we're going to chase you
down.

That's the primary claim that we have against Mr.

Lawrence.

There hasn't been discovery taken of Mr. Lawrence.

We got dropped several boxes right on the eve of having them
respond to the motion and I would suggest that more time would
be useful to develop further theories.
1 know that these are serious allegations being made
against Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence.

I'm trying very hard

not to come here waving my arms about it because I understand
that reputations are important but I also want to proceed with
caution and say let me take some discovery.
Lawrence.

Let me depose Mr.

Let me depose Mr. Spendlove.
THE COURT:
MR. tIGAN:

Where is your Rule 56F request?
Because the motion is predicated as a

motion based on law and it's not really a question of tact
necessarily.
:13

1
2

THE COURT:

You don't need to take anybody's

deposition to respond to this motion,

3

MR. EGAN:

4

THE COURT:

l>

discover more facts?

0

That's right, but I'm also-

MR. EGAN:

Then why are you telling me we need to

Because you've asked me some additional

7

questions about what else is going on.

o

to do is point out the conduct of Mr. Spendlove and Mr.

9

Lawrence as identified in the brief and you've said what did
It's there.

1 think what I've tried

10

they do?

11

generally our approach is to explore his relationship with

12

Jayson Orvis as it relates to getting the Johnson's interests

1J

extinguished.

14

THE COURT:

lb

MR. EGAN:

lb

THE COURT:

17

Mr. Atkin?

18

MR. ATKIN:

That's where it is and then more

All right.
Thank you, Judge.
All right, thank you.

Your Honor, today is the first time thai

ly

I've heard any attempt to articulate that Donnelle Johnson's

20

interests somehow is different from that of Mr. Johnson and

21

with regard to the explanation that has been attempted for the

22

testimony that was given to the SBA, not only do T point out in

23

our reply briet, that if there was an explanation, it's in

24

response to a summary judgment motion that they need to give

2b

that explanation, not by counsel making statements that aren't
24

1

under oath but through admissible evidence, explaining what
that testimony meant if it meant something different.

It

there

'i

was going to be this argument that Donnelle Johnson was the

4

owner of the partnership interest, that should have been set

h

out but that wasn't set out and, in fact, the testimony oi Mr.

b

Johnson in his deposition, precludes that kind of an argument.

I

Had that been made, we would have pointed the Court to this

H

testimony which is in fact in our reply memorandum but was put

y

in for a different reason, but the Court will see the obvious

10

relevance of it.

11

And the question was asked, "And was this agreement

12

in May of 1999 between you and Victor Lawrence, was that part

13

of your contingent plans for your preparations in the event

J4

that you were disbarred?"

llj
lb

Answer, "That may have been part of it.

There were

other considerations."

17

Question, "What were the other considerations?"

18

And then he gives this answer, "Jayson Orvis and I,

1H

we had this credit repair business and we wanted to protect it

1!0

i rom creditors as well."

;l
2'.\
1! 5

No mention of Donnelle Johnson or her being involved
in it.

But his testimony in recent deposition, setting out

that these agreements were entered into for the purpose ot

;'4

defrauding the SBA.

2!3

creditors as well.

They wanted to protect this business trom
"You wanted to protect the credit repair
;!b

business from creditors?"

Answer, "Yes.

We wanted to preserve

our business and not be a big target for the SBA."

And so, not

only has there been no attempt to try to explain that testimony
to the SBA in a way that would take it outside the realm ot
fraud, but the evidence that he has given makes it clear that
there was that testimony for the purpose of defrauding the SBA
and judicial estoppel.
THE COURT:

Let me cut to the chase here.

Evon

assuming that I was convinced that your theory that fraudulent
contracts can't be relied upon by Johnson or Johnsons or
whoever owns the interest, or that estoppel does not apply for
statements made under oath that are contrary to what the
assertions are here, if the allegation is that the Johnsons
claims are based upon a long standing course of conduct and
oral agreements that don't have anything to do with these
written agreements, then how do I grant a summary judgment?
MR. ATKIN:

On the basis of judicial estoppel, Your

THE COURT:

But judicial estoppel only implies to the

Honor.

basis of the contract, that he didn't have a partnership
agreement.

I suppose - I understand what you're saying.
MR. ATKIN:

If he didn't have a partnership

agreement, if he's precluded from relying on a claim that he
had a partnership with Jayson Orvis, then—
THE COURT:

Well, what if Mrs. Johnson owned this
2

interest?
MR. ATKIN:

Well, Your Honor, again, there's i\o

evidence of that and Mr. Johnson's testimony in his deposition
is exactly to the contrary.

"Jayson Orvis and I, we had this

credit repair business and we wanted to protect it tram
creditors as well."

Throughout all the briefing, there's been

no suggestion that it was Donnelle Johnson's interest.

The

argument has been that it was Jamis Johnson's interest and to
bring that kind of thing up at this point without evidence,
just by unsworn statements of counsel, doesn't comply with Rule
56.

We're entitled to not be ambushed by that kind oi

thing

without evidence.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

MR. ATKIN:

Only Your Honor, I'd like to comment, 1

sat patiently while there were suggestions made that there was
some kind of odor, some kind of improper conduct by the other
parties in this lawsuit.

There is no evidence of any improper

conduct: by Mr. Lawrence of Mr. Spendlove and I just wanted to
make that clear on the record.
THE COURT:

Well, there's a suggestion that at least

Mr. Spendlove - there's been some question on Mr. Spendlove but
nobody has said anything about Mr. Lawrence but the question,
when I asked about what did Mr. Spendlove do to engage in this
conspiracy, there was that he encouraged Mr. Orvis to buy these
things with SBA and then use that against Mr. Johnson to divest
21

him and I guess now his wife from the interest that they had in
this property.

What about that?

Is there any support for that

in the record?
MR. ATKIN:

Again, that needs to be based on evidence

and not just unsworn statements by counsel.

Your Honor, I'm

not sure that there would be anything improper in a person
buying a judgment and then using that to negotiate the
settlement of a civil lawsuit.

I'm unaware of any law that

would suggest that that's illegal or improper.
THE COURT:

Has Mr. Spendlove's deposition been

MR. ATKIN:

It has not.

THE COURT:

Has Mr. Lawrence's deposition been taken?

MR. ATKIN:

It has not.

THE COURT:

Has Mr. Orvis's deposition been taken?

MR. ATKIN:

It has not, Your Honor.

taken?

There's been

ample time to do that and, in fact, we produced documents way
back in October that would have shown them that we haven't
received any monies from Mr. Orvis but the money has been going
the other direction and they simply haven't come over and
looked at those documents even after we got them ready for
them.
THE COURT

Okay.

MR. ATKIN

That's all, Your Honor.

THE COURT

Thank you.

Anything else?

I'll think about the matter

1

I'll take the matter under advisement,

2

briefs.

3

made my notes.

It's been a couple of week since I looked at them and

Let's turn briefly to the issue about fees on this

4
5

I may revisit the

matter.

I suppose this is directed to Ms. Adams.

6

Ms. Adams, I believe there was an order that I issued

7

granting a protective order regarding certain conduct oi a John

8

Boqart, Mr. Johnson's attorney in a deposition that somebody

9

else was being deposed.

I indicated tees would be appropriate

10

and asked for an attorney fee affidavit.

I got your affidavit

11

and I realize there was no objection to it and perhaps that

12

should have been enough but my concern is that the amount of

13

the lees requested were somewhere around $9,000 and I'm having

14

trouble understanding how we get $9,000 worth of fees l'or

15

having to file a Motion for Protective Order and having to

16

retake a deposition.

17

M3. ADAMS:

I was under the impression from the

lb

order, maybe this was a mistaken impression that I'll have to

19

remedy in a new affidavit, but I was under the impression that

20

the order granted attorney's fees on the taking of the

21

deposition, the preparing of the motion and the preparing for

22

the first deposition.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

I'm sure it did.

I've got it right here

and we can see what the minute entry says.
MS. ADAMS:

I brought with me so that you could take
29

a look at them if you wanted.
THE COURT:
said here.

I don't need it.

Let me just read with 1

I know it was rather broad because 1 was rjtiioi

upset with - yes, here is the minute entry of November IS.
Preparation tor Mr. Vigil's deposition, attendance at.
deposition and preparation for the motions.

And that's what

you've included in your affidavit?
MS. ADAMS:

Yes.

If you'd like to see I brought I lie

statements that were sent to Mr. Orvis.

I didn't provide them

wit.n my affidavit because they're obviously attorney/client and
work product issues but I highlighted them for you so you could
look and see where the expenses went.
THE. COURT:

Well, but just give me a representation

here today as an officer of this Court that you've already done
your affidavit, but I just want to be clear that all this time
was

necessary.
MS. ADAMS:

All this time was necessary.

The bulk of

the beginning, you'll see in the affidavit I'm sure you've got
a copy of that, the hours that were spent in preparation lor
the deposition, the bulk of the time, at that time 1 had no
knowledge of i;uw Mr. Vigil was involved in this situation at
all, but as it turns out he was an employee who knew both the
defendant and the plaintiff and the third party defendants
quite well, boi_h personally and professionally and was involved
in the business during the process, during the time period,
30

during the relevant time period while all of this was go.inq on
so J*yson

and I, Mr. Orvis and I spent the first two listings -

the iirst two listings on there are meetings between he and I
where he was just listing to me all of the meeting lie had with
Mr. Vigil that he could recall and ail the interactions with he
and Mr. Vigil and Mr. Johnson and the then the bulk oi

the rest

of that time in the preparation was me going through, rereading the transcripts of the recording of our conversations
and then calling him and asking him further followup questions
on all of thai and all of it was necessary to prepare for the
deposition.

I, in fact, only spent about, I believe an hour

and a half, two hours, questioning Mr. Vigil, but I believe
I've got, another day or two full of questions to ask him when
we reconvene that deposition.

He's pretty well involved as tar

as I can tell in a lot of what went on between - in the
interactions between these parties and in working with
Lexington Law Firm for a brief period of time and so he's got
quite a bit of information that needs to be looked at very
seriously.

The time of the deposition obviously was necessary

and then there's two listing on there after that, where 1 was
preparing the motion and that's simply a case of going back
through.

I re-read the deposition two or three times I believe

to make sure that we had all of the pertinent, important pieces
of the record in that motion and then also doing the research
tor that, the legal research on the cases and things and then

31

putting that together and then the last couple ot entries on
that are just going through and revising that and making sure
that it was as streamlined as possible for the Court to take
care ot and then obviously there's a reply memo.
I've also got in here, highlighted on these sheets,
the time that Peggy Tomsic who is a partner in my firm, spent
on this and there's actually about $1,500 worth of charges that
were not included on my affidavit because I hadn't specifically
asked for attorney's fees for both she and I, so 1 didn't
include that information in my affidavit.
THE COURT:
my concerns.

Okay.

Thank you.

I think that expLains

I'll allow the attorney's fees and the request

for attorney's fees and the costs in the amount of $9,297. 10.
I don't know - have you submitted an order on that?
MS. ADAMS:

I have not.

THE COURT:

No, you haven't.

MS. ADAMS:

Okay.

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, you may do so.

Thank you.
Well, the only final thing

I'm concerned about is Donnelle Johnson.

This Motion tor

Summary Judgment goes to her and I don't think she's a party.
There may have been no motion but I'm going to take care ot
this on my own motion.

Unless somebody can tell me a reason

why a person who is not a party to a lawsuit can file a third
party claim, or for that matter a counterclaim, if a
counterclaim has been filed on behalf of Donnelle Johnson, I'm
12

1

going to strike her from this lawsuit.

2

MR. ATKIN:

3

MR. EGAN:

Can anybody do that?

I think that's correct, Your Honor.
Your Honor, rather than strike hor tioni

4

the lawsuit, I would request an opportunity to correct the

5

pleadings so that she can become properly joined in the suit.

6

I understand the Court's point.

1

notice but rather than strike her, I'd rather keep her in and I

8

will set to work on getting her into the case properly through

9

the proper channel.

10
11
12

THE COURT:

It's obviously escaped our

Well, but in the meantime, what do I do

about this motion?
MR. EGAN:

Well, you can hold it in abeyance or you

13

can deny it because I think there is basis to deny .it

14

regardless of whether she's properly —

15

THE COURT:

I don't think I ought to be entering

16

orders against people that I don't think are proper parties to

17

a lawsuit.

13

if there is or not.

19

of thought but I do know that the rules do not allow a third

20

party complaint by some intervener that just cruises in from

21

the side without leave of the Court and all of a sudden she

22

just appears here and if she needs to be here, fine.

23

tar as this motion is concerned, I'm going to decide it as far

24

as Mr. Johnson.

25

outcome but I'm not going to have one of the appellate courts

There's a way to bring her in - well, I don't know
I mean, I haven't even given her an ounce

Rut as

I don't think it make any difference in the

33

shaking their iieads saying what the hell is Hanson doing?

He's

hearing motions against parties and granting motions or denying
motions regarding parties that shouldn't even be in the lawsuit,
and he knows it.

Donnelle Johnson is out of this lawsuit.

has been improperly included in the lawsuit.

She

She has no claims

that are properly asserted in this lawsuit and as Car as these
pending motions are concerned, she's a non-party.
I'd like an order in that regard, Mr. Atkin.
MR. ATKIN:

I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Just indicate that the Court oi\ it:; own

motion is striking Donnelle Johnson from these pleadings
because she has been improperly named and has improperly
asserted in claims herein and that's not a bar to her
attempting to get into this lawsuit as a proper party through
legitimate means, but at this point in time, she's out, she's a
non-party.
I'll let you know in a written decision on my
decision for your Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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2 |

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING

3 I

P R O C E E D I N G S

4 ,

THE COURT:

'5

MS* TOMSIC:

6

THE COURT:

7

Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Jayson Orvis v. Jamis Johnson, 010907449.

Appearances please.

8 I
9

Good afternoon.

MS. TOMSIC:
Jayson Orvis-

Peggy Tomsic representing the plaintiff,

Today Your Honor, I have with me Heather Keoyo

10

who has just joined our firm but has not as yet been admitted

11

to the bar, who's helping me.

12

wife, Pam Orvis, are also present in the courtroom.

13 |

THE COURT:

14

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

15

Johnson, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Orvis, the plaintiff and his

Thank you.
Joe Cartwright here representing Mr.

Thank you.

17 I Motion for Summary Judgment.

This is on for Plaintiff's

I've reviewed the pleadings that

18

you've filed counsel, so if you'd like to proceed Ms. Tomsic,

19

you may.

20

MS. TOMSIC:

Your Honor, as you know this action is a

21

declaratory judgment action that was brought by the plaintiff,

22

Jayson Orvis, seeking a declaration from this Court that the

23

defendant, Jamis Johnson holds no interest, title, or right to

24

the credit repair businesses of Mr. Orvis and seeking the costs

25

involved in that case.

Mr. Johnson has filed a counterclaim

asserting various claims against Mr. Orvis and other third
j
2 I parties, two or whom you've already granted summary judgment
3 I on, all of which, regardless of the label are predicated on the
4 I assumption that Mr. Johnson has a partnership with Mr. Orvis
5

relative to these credit repair businesses.

6

'

Previously Your Honor, just in terms of history, two I

7

of the defendants, Mr. Lawrence and a Mr. Spendlove moved the

8

court for summary judgment and the Court had granted that

9

Motion for Summary Judgment basically on two grounds, one of

10

which was judicial estoppel.

Mr. Orvis has moved this Court

11

for summary judgment on one ground, Your Honor, and that is

12

judicial estoppel, that is that as a matter of law, Mr.

13
14

Johnson, Jamis Johnson, the defendant and counterclaim
plaintiff and third party plaintiff in this action, cannot
]

15

i

assert that he has a partnership interest or any right or title
i

16

to the credit repair businesses of Mr. Orvis or the proceeds or

17

profits from those businesses.

18 I

Your Honor, as you know, judicial estoppel is a

19 j doctrine that was created in the late 1800s and has been
20
adopted by those courts who have considered it including the
21 j Supreme Court of the United States and obviously was applied by
22

this Court in granting the summary judgments for Mr. Lawrence

23 j and Mr. Spendlove. Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that the
24
courts have created which is an equitable doctrine; that it is
25 I a doctrine that is applied by a court as in matter of law where

r
1

you have a party coming into court and asserting a position or

2

making a claim that is inconsistent with a position or claim

3

that they have asserted in a prior case.

4

Your Honor, we have a situation where Mr. Johnson was sued by

5

the Small Business Administration, SBA, back in 1997 and they

6

got a judgment against him for money owed.

7

subsequently engaged in supp hearings to determine whether Mr.

8

Johnson had any assets including any interest in any

9

partnerships, any limited liability companies, any businesses

And in this case,

The SBA

10

on which the SBA could execute to collect on its judgment.

11

In the course of those supp hearings, the SBA in

12

1999, took the deposition of Mr. Johnson.

13

sworn to tell the truth in that deposition as all deponents are

14

and given an opportunity to correct the deposition prior to the

15

time it becomes final.

16

testified to tell the truth and purported to tell the truth, he

17

never corrected that deposition and never made any changes and

18

in fact has never made any assertions before this Court that in

19

anyway that his testimony before the SBA was somehow mistaken

20

or wrong, and in fact, has stood by that testimony.

21

Mr. Johnson was

In this case, while Mr. Johnson

We have submitted the testimony that Mr. Johnson gave

22

in the SBA proceeding and that testimony, Your Honor, flatly

23

contradicts Mr. Johnson's position in this case both by way of

24

a defense and in its counterclaim and third party claims that

25

he has a partnership issue in these credit repair businesses.

i

1 j

And Your Honor, what I'd like to do is I'd just like
i

2

to read from the pages that I have attached to Mr. Orvis'

3

affidavit.

They are attached as Exhibits 5 and 6, if I could,
i

4

and I'm beginning on page 23 on line 3 and again, this is the

5

supp hearing that is being conducted by the SBA to determine

6

whether Mr. Johnson holds any interest in anything that they

;

7 I can execute on and this is Mr. Johnson's testimony beginning at
8

line 3 on page 23 and he states, testifies under oath, "But I

9 j have resigned with any involvement in Lexington Law Firms
10

because of the pending bar problem,"

11

talking about Johnson and Associates, not Lexington Law Firms?"

12

Answer, "No.

13

under Jamis M. Johnson and Jamis M. Johnson and Associates.

14

Johnson and Associates is a not-for-profit corporation and

15

you've been told this.

16

from that.

17

Question, "'Aren't we

I resigned from anything.

I have practiced law

Ncbody has shares of stock.

I resigned

Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another

attorney have taken over all of that.

I've indemnified them.

]

18

They have indemnified me.

I've resigned from any relationship.

19

Lexington Law Firm was just an operating entity that was doing

20

credit repair."

21

entity, it's an assumed name registered to you?"

22

Mr. Hugey.

Question, "Now Lexington Law Firm is not an
Question by

Answer, "Actually, I think what happened, and I'll

23 I have to recall this but I assigned, a couple of years ago there
24

was a corporation being set up but that was assigned, the name

25

was assigned to - it was going to be assigned into a

1

corporation.

I don't know if we've ever registered the fact

2 I that it was assigned."

And then he goes on to talk about a

3 I suit by the state of Tennessee and this is the next page, page
4

24. Beginning on line 4 he says, "But since that time" that's

5 I the time of the Tennessee suit and his problems with the bar,
6

"and with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any

7

interest.

They paid me a little bit, made my payment and I

8

resigned.

Now if it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis

9

Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that but,

10

you know, they're operating now without me." So he testified

11

to that in terms of Lexington Law Firm which was the credit

12

repair business that was being run by Mr. Johnson and then by

13

Mr. Lawrence and it was a credit repair business that was

14

utilizing intellectual property and equipment of Mr. Orvis,

15

part of the intellectual property and equipment that's at issue

16

here but Mr. Johnson didn't stop his testimony there, Your

17

Honor.

18

geez, okay, we're talking about Lexington Law Firm and we're

19

talking about Johnson Associates, you're saying you've resigned

20

any interest, you don't have anything at all, well, I'm going

21

to be real categorical about this and beginning on page 30 at

22

line 16 the lawyer says, question, "Do you have any interest in

23

any partnerships?"

24

oath, "No." Now he does go on to say in that he says, "I mean,

25

you know, often I'll have a joint venture with somebody but I

The attorney for the SBA really wanted to find out

On line 18 Mr. Johnson testifies under

1

don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC.

2 I You know, if I get a deal I say, hey, do you want to do this
3

deal together?

We'll go up to Summit County and buy a lot."

4 \ Question, "So a joint venture."

"Yeah, you could call it that

5 , but I don't have any outgoing partnerships."

I believe that's

6

a typo.

I believe it's ongoing, Your Honor, partnerships.

7

Question, "Any interests in any limited liability companies?"

8 | Answer, "No." And then he goes on on line 11 on page 31 and
9

says, "I have no interest in LLCs or corporations."

10

Clearly Your Honor, the supp hearing was to determine

11

what if any interests he held in anything.

12

specifically put to him under oath as to whether he had any

13

interest in Lexington Law firm, Johnson and Associates, any

14

partnership, any LLC, any corporation and he categorically said .

15

no.

16

The questions were I

«

In this proceeding Your Honor, Mr. Johnson has done

17

an entire about face and his answer, all you have to do is look

18

at his answer to the declaratory judgment in this action and

19 I his counterclaim and third party claim and he says VXI, Jamis
20

Johnson, am a partner with Jayson Orvis.

21

interest in these credit repair business." That is the

22

foundation of his defense.

I have a partnership

That is the foundation of every

!

23

single claim he has made against Mr. Orvis, the plaintiff in

24

this case and every third party defendant including the two

25

third party defendants who were let out of this case on summary

I
I

1

judgment.
Your Honor, so I would say as a matter of law, under .

2
3

the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Mr. Johnson is estopped from

4

claiming he owns a partnership and Mr. Orvis, as a matter of

5

law, is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Mr. Johnson

6

does not have an ownership interest.

7

And I want to address a couple of issues that were

8

raised by Mr. Johnson in his opposition because I think that

9

they're ones that I'd like to address in my opening and then if

10

there are further issues, I'd like to deal with that in my

11

rebuttal.

12

Mr. Johnson takes the position that the doctrine of

13

judicial estoppel does not apply here even though this Court

14

applied it relative to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove because

15

he says that under Utah law, you have to have been a party or

16

privy with a party in this prior action and it had to involve

17

the same subject matter and he cites to a Utah Supreme Court

18

case that quotes from a 1942 decision, the Tracy Loan case by

19

the Utah Supreme Court and says that's the state of the law.

20

Well, Your Honor, the problem with that position is

21

that the Utah Supreme Court subsequent to that Tracy decision

22

stated that in fact to the extent there was that type of broad

23

language in the Tracy case, that it had been revisited and

24

reconstructed in a later decision by the Supreme Court, the

25 | Hodge decision which he said has clarified what that is and in

1

the Hodge decision, Your Honor, they were talking about

2

collateral estoppel and on collateral estoppel there had been

3

prior case law just like there had been on judicial estoppel,

4

that you had to be same parties in the same suit or privy on

5

the same subject matter and the Court made it clear nhat that

|

6

is not correct.

i

7

you have someone in a prior proceeding who takes a position and |

8

if they're doing it under oath before a tribunal or in a case,

9

and that position is contrary to a position they're not

What you have to demonstrate is that in fact

10

asserting before a court, that you do not have to be the same

11

parties, that what you have to show is they are contrary

12

positions and in this case, the defendant got a benefit out of

I

i

13
14
15
16

it-

Well, clearly in this case Your Honor, Mr, Johnson got a

i

benefit out of it because the SBA didn't collect on anything

1

because be claimed he didn't own anything including this

I

partnership interest.
i

17
18
19
20
21

And so Your Honor, I would say there is not a Supreme i
Court case after the Supreme Court basically overruled the
Tracy decision on the grounds of having to have identities of
parties and subject matter.

Where this Court, being the

•

I

22

Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or even a district court has |
held that in order to utilize judicial estoppel, you have to be '

23

the same parties in the sarre action.

24

Your Honor, because as you stated in your opinion explaining

25

why you had granted summary judgment to Mr. Lawrence and Mr.

And that's important,

1

Spendlove, the purpose for judicial estoppel is to make sure

i

2

that the courts are not being utilized to commit fraud and that

3

they are not allowing people to lie in one tribunal and use it '

4

to their benefit in another tribunal and, Your Honor, I would

5

say that the issue that this Court decided relative to Mr.

6

Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove on the issue of judicial estoppel is

7

identical as that raised by Mr. Orvis.

1

8

The courts are clear that when you're talking about

9

judicial estoppel versus equitable estoppel, the relationship

10

you're looking at is the relationship between a party of the

11

tribunal.

12

system?

13

the summary judgment motion against Mr. Johnson by Mr.

14

Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence, this Court stated and I'm quoting

15

Your Honor from page 4 of your opinion in that case that was

16

entered, I believe, more than a year ago in February 2003, you

17

stated, "Mr. Johnson is also estopped from asserting any claims

18

in this action which are based on the partnership he denied

19

under oath when questioned by the SBA."

20

impediment which precludes allegations denial of a certain fact

21

or state of facts in consequence of a previous allegation or

22

denial or conduct or admission.

23

entitled to its benefits in the same position as if the thing

24

represented were true." And you're quoting Black's Law

The question is, are you misusing the justice

And that's the relationship you're looking at and on

25 I Dictionary.

"Estoppel is a bar or

It operates to put a party

And then you go on to say, judicial estoppel

1 I "prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by offering
2

statements inconsistent with its own sworn statements in a

3 J prior judicial proceeding."
i

4 I

You then go on to state on page 5, "Mr- Johnson seeks

5 I judicial relief in this matter by offering statements that are
6

inconsistent with his own sworn statements in the proceedings

7

brought against him by the SBA.

8

Johnson told the SBA that he had no interest in and had no

9

right to receive payments from Lexington Law Firm.

In a sworn deposition, Mr.

He went on

10

to aver that he had no partnership interest nor interest in a

11

limited liability company.

12

against Lawrence and Spendlove are expressly negated in Mr.

13

Johnson's prior testimony where he was attempting to avoid

14

payment to the SBA, the claims must be dismissed."

15

those claims, Your Honor, were all predicated on an assumption

16

that Mr. Johnson owned a partnership interest or had a

17

partnership with Mr. Orvis.

18

Because each of the claims asserted

And again,

So I would say Your Honor, one, you have visited this

19

issue with regard to other defendants.

You clearly have laid

20

out what judicial estoppel is and what the purpose behind it is

21 I and why it would apply in this situation.
22

Your Honor, the arguments that the Defendant Johnson

23

asserts here are exactly the arguments that he asserted in

24

opposition to Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence's motion and which

25 I were rejected by the court in finding summary judgment based at
10

1 I least in part on the judicial estoppel doctrine.
2 |
3

Finally Your Honor, the argument that Mr. Johnson

•

raises again which he raised in the last hearing on the other

I

4 J summary judgment motion, is that, well, geez, you know, my wife j
5 j and I both have this interest in the partnership and it's
6

really her interest in the partnership.

7

attach as Exhibit A to our reply an order from this court that

8

was signed and was basically reflected your ruling at the oral

9

argument in connection with the last Motion for Summary

10

Well, Your Honor, we

Judgment, that his wife, Danelle Johnson is not a proper party j
i

11

before this Court and you ordered that any reference to her in '

12

any pleadings, be stricken and the reason this had arisen is

13

because the Memorandum in Opposition, just as the Memorandum in

14

Opposition to our motion was styled, Jamis and Danelle

15

Johnson's opposition and your point was, she's not a proper

16 j party in this case.

She's not a party.

She cannot be

17

asserting claims and that is not before the court. Well, that

18

was back in February 2003, Your Honor, and here we are again

19

with the same point.

20

And I might point out, Your Honor, even if she were a

21 , party to this action, it would make no difference and that is
22

because to the extent she's claiming any interest and I believe

23
that Jamis has described it as a "beneficial interest" it all
24 I derives and is part and parcel of his claim that he is a
25 J partner and has a partnership interest with Mr. Orvis in credit
11

1

repair and that he has given the benefit of that, that is in

2 I profit sharing to his wife.
3

So even if she were before this

court which she's not, it would make no difference because

4 ' judicial estoppel, estops Mr. Johnson from making that claim
5

I

and he can't give a benefit to his wife that he's estopped from-

6 J claiming.
7

!
Finally Your Honor, I would just say, this is an

8

issue that is firmly established in the law.

The record is

9

uncontroverted in this record that Mr. Johnson made those

j

10

statements under oath before the SBA.

11

with the position he has taken here and as a matter of law, the

12

Court should grant our Motion for Summary Judgment, both on our

13

declaratory judgments and on his counterclaim and third party

14

claims predicated on him having an ownership interest.

15

would ask that our motion be granted.

16

THE COURT:

17

Mr. Cartwright?

18

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

They are inconsistent

We

Thank you.

Good afternoon, Your Honor.

I'm

19

somewhat new to this case and I want to first address a

20

misunderstanding I had when I first got involved in the case

21

because I think that may be a misunderstanding that is taking

22 j place here in the way this motion is being presented.
23

What had

happened here as explained in Mr. Johnson's affidavit was there

24 j were initially five guys who created a partnership in doing
25

credit repair, the credit repair business, where they dispute
12

1 I certain things on people's credit and challenge them.

After a I

i

2 ( period of time three of those partners dropped out and there
3 I were just two guys left, Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson.
4 I the two remaining partners.
5

|

They were ,

Now this credit repair partnership'

that existed between the two of them - and here's where my

6 1 misunderstanding was - was not called Lexington Law Firm.
7

partnership had many different organizations that it was

8

managing, some LLCs, this law firm.

9

manage the law firm including Lexington Law Firm but the

This

It hired attorneys to

10

partnership existed outside and separately of Lexington Law

11

Firm.

12

against him by the SBA and after that judgment there was a

13

deposition and he was asked about his interest in Lexington Law

So later on Mr. Johnson, there was a judgment obtained

14 I Firm and at that time Mr. Johnson truthfully stated that he had
15

disclaimed all interest in Lexington Law Firm.

Now even though

16

he didn't have that interest in Lexington Law Firm, there still

17

remained this partnership between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis and

18

Mr. Orvis isn't an attorney but this was the marketing arm that

19

was generating clients for Lexington Law Firm, contract between

20 I the law firm and Mr. Orvis, where all this money was being
21

poured into the partnership and therefore, in accordance with

22

the partnership agreement between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis, he

23

was receiving a cut of that.

24 , issue right now.

So I just want to clarify that

It isn't - Mr. Johnson still isn't claiming I

25 I own Lexington Law Firm.

He's saying I have a partnership with
13

Mr. Orvis.

i

THE COURT:

That's swell but why did he tell the SBA •

he didn't have any interest in any partnerships?
MR. CARTWRIGHT:
of this statement.

Let me look at the broader context

I

I

Mr. Johnson earlier in this deposition had

talked about - and in his other deposition with the SBA and in |
his wife Danelle's deposition with the SBA, explained that
I
there was a lot of money coming to Danelle Johnson.
was pretty much a figurehead.

Danelle

Jamis was the one with the

involvement and was doing ^he work and so they had talked about
that in this deposition and in previous ones.

Now we get to

the specific question where they asked about partnerships and
that was done in the context of the laundry list of things do
you own or not own.

Do you own stocks?

No.

a big list and it gets down to partnerships.

Bonds?

No.

It's

No. Now in Mr.

Johnson's mind set as explained in his affidavit, he thought
that had to do with real estate or other partnerships not
having to do with this one that he'd already talked about
extensively with the SBA and that his wife had talked about
extensively with the SBA.
THE COURT:

So being a lawyer, he, of course, said to

the question, are you just talking about the Lexington Law Firm
or what partnerships are you talking about?
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

I don't think that he was being that

tap dancing around the issue at that time.
14

1 I

THE COURT:

Of course he didn't because he said no.

2

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

He said no in the context of his

i
i

3

mind that they'd already talked about these other issues and

|

4

that that question meant other than the partnership that

j

5 I Danelle's already talked about, that you've already talked
6

about, that the SBA knew that money was coming to Danelle and

7 1 so in his mind it wasn't even a tap dance.
8

i
I

It was thinking in

the context of the entire deposition, other partnership

9 I interests other than the one with Mr. Orvis.

So in his mind,

10

he answered that question truthfully.

11

that and it wasn't any legal lawyer tap dancing around the

12

issue asking about definition.

13

question to the best of his knowledge with his understanding,

14

as he explains in his affidavit, that the SBA was well aware of

15

the relationship of the partnership and the money going to

16

Danelle Johnson and Jamis' involvement in the partnership.

17 .

It wasn't referring to

He was just answering a

Now that's what he's testified in his affidavit.

18

doesn't have to do with Lexington Law Firm.

19

an ownership in that.

20 I relationship.

It

He doesn't assert

He asserts a continuing partnership

He says no there but the reason he says no, his

21

intent is that he's already talked about that and that was

22

related to real estate holdings or other types of partnerships

23

that he was involved in.

24

Now, having said that, we shouldn't even get as far

25 j as his answers in this prior proceeding because the law I agree

1 I is clear that judicial estoppel does not apply in this case.
2

think counsel has clearly, is clearly mistaken as to what the

3

law of judicial estoppel is in the state of Utah.

4

indicated that there was no more recent law in the United

I

She

5 I States Supreme Court than this Hodge case in 1971 and that
6

ignores two separate cases that are far newer.

One is in 2001

7 I and one is in the year 2000 and following these cases, we don't
8

even get to what's in this deposition.

In Nebeker which we

9 I cited in our Memorandum in Opposition, the Utah Supreme Court
10 I outlines what judicial estoppel is.

"Under judicial estoppel a

11 I person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any
12 I position taken in a prior judicial proceeding 'between the same
13

persons or their privies involving the same subject matter and j

14

if such prior position was successfully maintained.'"

15

Utah Supreme Court is setting forth three requirements; number

16

one, between the same persons or their privies; number two,

17

involving the same subject matter; and number three, if such

18

prior position was successfully maintained.

19

clearly not satisfied here. Number one, it isn't the same

20

persons or privies.

21

it's Mr. Orvis.

22

In the SBA case they were litigating issues over the contract

23

liability under the SBA loan.

So the

Those elements are

In that case it was the SBA.

In this case

Number two, involving the same subject matter.

After a judgment was entered,

24 j this isn't litigating a claim, he made a statement that can be
25 I construed several different ways in a post judgment,
16

1 I supplemental proceeding.
2

And number three, I don't see how

this can be met under any reasoning, if such prior position was

3 ' successfully maintained.

There was no position taken in there

4 ' that was asserted or litigated or decided by anyone. He lost
5 j that case.

He made a statement in a post judgment deposition, j

6 | There wasn't any successfully maintaining this.

Interestingly, ,

7

in the plaintiff's memorandum, they say that this element is

8

met successfully maintained because the SBA hasn't received a

9

cent from Johnson on the judgment and that that constitutes

10

meeting this element.

11

didn't tell the Court that Mr. Orvis bought that judgment from

12

the SBA.

13

than not receiving a cent on this and it certainly doesn't

14

satisfy if such a prior position was successfully maintained.

15

Simply put, under judicial estoppel, it doesn't meet any of the

16

requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court.

17

Well, the fact of the matter is, they

The SBA got I believe $30,000.

That's a lot more

The Utah Supreme Court, this is 2001 in Nebeker

18

Trucking versus the Utah State Tax Commission and that's not

19

the only case that talks about it.

20

- it cites I believe to a 2000 case, Salt Lake City versus

21

Silver Fork Pipeline Corporation and in that they talk about

22

the requirements that you have to have for judicial estoppel to

23

apply.

24

judicially estopped and the Utah Supreme Court again said,

25

SFPC's contention is untenable for two reasons.

The Nebeker Court actually

In this, SFPC claimed that Salt Lake City was

First, SFPC
17

!

1

was not a party to Progress, that's another party, that

2

detrimentally changed its position by reason of Salt Lake' s

3

inaccurate representation of Utah's water law in progress.

4

Then they cite the law.

5

not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position

6

taken in a prior judicial proceeding, one - and these are my

7

ones - between the same persons or their privies; that doesn't

Under judicial estoppel, a person may i

8 I apply in this case; (2) involving the same subject matter; SBA
9

subject matter and this one is different; and (3) if such prior

10

position was successfully maintained.

The exact same elements

11

and they're citing an earlier case involving the same parties

12 I and they also cite Tracy Loan and Trust Company versus
13 ] Openshaw.

Again, there's two Supreme Court cases, 2000 and

14

2001 which directly say here's the elements to judicial

15

estoppel and in this case they say because these elements

16

weren't met, judicial estoppel does not apply.

17

Now, this 2000 case also cites to AMJUR, talking

18 J about what the judicial estoppel is. Now AMJUR, if you go to
19

section 70, it lists the requirements.

Number one, the

20 i inconsistent position first asserted must have been
21 I successfully maintained; two, a judgment must have been
22

rendered; three, the positions must be clearly inconsistent;

23

four, the parties in question must be the same; five, the party

24

claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his

25

position; and six, it must appear unjust to one party or permit I
18

1 I the other to change.

Now these elements in AMJUR also aren't

|

2 I met here. The parties in question must be the same. Clearly
3

they're different parties in the SBA case and this one. The

I

I

4 | party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed '
5 ! its position.

Here there's been zero reliance by Mr. Orvis

j

6

upon any statements made in this SBA deposition.

In fact, he

'

7

wasn't just misled, he actually bought that judgment and he is '

8 J right now continuing to trying to collect on that judgment in
9

.

federal court and we've been over there in federal court just a

I
10 I couple of weeks ago arguing this other case and there's been no
11

- he wasn't misled and Mr. Orvis has never changed his

12

position.

13 j

And the last requirement, it must appear unjust to

14

one party to permit the other to change, that clearly hasn't

15

happened here because after this deposition was taken by the

16

SBA, post judgment, Mr. Orvis continued to provide checks to

17

Danelle Johnson and one actually to Jamis Johnson every month

18

for, well, that's what we're fighting about, what those

19 j payments are for and this is significant money.

It went all

20

the way up to $35,000 a mcnth.

It's not that he changed his

21

position or was unjust, he continued to make these payments

22

and, in fact, we have partnership agreements that we presented

23

to the court and we have statements by Mr. Orvis indicating a

24 I business relationship between the two that we presented to the
t

25

court and there are also depositions taken after the Victor

I
19

1 j Lawrence judgment was done that indicate Mr. Orvis was being
2

deceitful about the accounting provided to Mr. Johnson and the

3

monies that were owed to the Johnsons.

4

to what was said in the deposition or how the court or a jury

5

should characterize that because judicial estoppel simply

6

doesn't apply.

8

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

THE COURT:

12

it.

13

estoppel

15

What do you mean we can't

Well, judicial estoppel doesn't

apply..

11

14

Wait a minute.

get to it?

9
10

Interestingly in AMJUR, section 70-

THE COURT:

7

But we can't even get

Okay.

That's fine.

You can still geJ^tp

You have to get to it to decide whether it's judicial 3

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

You're right, and I guess what I

mean is that the plaintiffs are making certain

16 | characterizations on what he meant by saying no in the context |
17

of the deposition and I'm saying we don't get that far to the

18

saying no because it doesn't meet any of the elements of

19

judicial estoppel.

20

dishonest person in the world and he sat there and lied during i

21

his deposition, which he didn't and the evidence shows he

22

didn't, but assume that he did.

Let's assume that Mr. Johnson was the most

j

Even if he did and was the

23 ! biggest liar in the world which he's not, it doesn't matter in
24

this case.

25

presented to the jury but it's not judicial estoppel because

It would be evidence against him that could be
j

20 I

1

the requirements aren't met.

2

getting that far,

3 1
4

That's what I mean about not

Now the plaintiffs have indicated that, I believe
their language is that Tracy has been expressly overruled.

5 I That's simply mistaken.

Tracy was not expressly overruled.

6

There's two cases they cite where they talk about how Tracy

7

shouldn't apply and I notice they don't even mention, it's

8

almost pretending like the 2002 and 2001 Supreme Court

9

decisions don't exist.

But what they argue - they're pretty

10

much trying to ignore judicial estoppel and go into cases that

11

talk about res judicata versus collateral estoppel. What they

12

say supports their position, they're talking about the

13

International Resources v. Cremfield case and there the Utah

14

Supreme Court said, "Concerning the doctrine of res judicata it

15 I is said that both parties the issues must have been the same
16 j and also judgment is conclusive and then certain issues tried.
17

This court explains - and then it talks about race adjudicata

18

versus collateral estoppel, not judicial estoppel, collateral

19 I estoppel and there they talk about how you can have different
20

parties in collateral estoppel unlike res judicata where you

21

need the same parties.

22 I

THE COURT:

I understand the difference.

23 j

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

But they even say in collateral

24 I estoppel that operates only as to issues which were actually
25

asserted "and tried" in that case.

There's no allegation here

1

that these statements made in a post judgment supp order was

|

2

tried in the prior case.

3

the material issue was not actually asserted and determined,

4

there is no basis upon which it could be concluded that it had |

5

actually taken a different position on the issues.

6

arguing this collateral estoppel, that doesn't go but when it's

i

It simply wasn't and it indicates if

So even

,

7 I talking about the difference between the two, there's a
8

footnote in the case and this is where the plaintiffs say Tracy

9

was expressly or explicitly overruled.

Here's the footnote,

10

"We so state an awareness of a conceitedly, over broad

11

statement in our case of Tracy Loan and Trust to the effect

12

that one would not be judicially estopped unless the parties

13

and the issues are the same in the instant and the prior suit.

14

Any misstatement of the rule was corrected and superceded by

15

our decision in Richard v. Hodson."

16

they talk about judicial estoppel in this case.

17

talking about collateral estoppel before and they refer to

18

Richard v. Hodson.

19

this is where they clarified it, and again, it doesn't talk

20

about judicial estoppel.

21

versus res judicata.

22

two and then it says, "This doctrine known as collateral

23

estoppel differs from res judicata not only in the fact that

24

all the parties need not be the same, but also in the fact that

25

the estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and not

So this is the first time
They were

Going to Richard v. Hodson where they say

It talks about collateral estoppel

It talks about the difference between the

22

1

as to those that could be determined."

So again, talking about

2 ' collateral estoppel and issues actually litigated.
3
4
5

THE COURT:

The Supreme Court doesn't know what

judicial estoppel is.
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

No, I think what I'm saying isI

6
7
8
9
10

THE COURT:

Wait a minute.

THE COURT:

I

And they referred to a case that talks

about only collateral estoppel?
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

12

THE COURT:

14

I

footnote judicial estoppel?
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah.

11

13

Didn't they say in the

i

That's correct.

j

Then I guess they don't know what they're

talking about, huh?
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

I can't figure out why they were

15

saying that because in International Resources they're talking

16

about res judicata versus collateral estoppel.

17

footnote that says our Tracy Loan and Trust with judicial

18

estoppel as clarified by this other case.

19

case and I see them talking about collateral estoppel and res

20

judicata in talking about elements there.

21

cases together and I'm not sure why they talk about that.

22

I'm left with is - and this Hodson case is 1971. All I'm left

23

with is two Supreme Court cases in the year 2000 and 2001 that

24

don't deal with collateral estoppel but talk about judicial

They have a

I go to the other

I can't fit those
All

25 1 estoppel and it outlines the specific requirements there.
23

Putting aside the issues of law that judicial
i

estoppel doesn't apply here, I'd like to point out to the Court
that judicial estoppel is the only claim asserted before the
Court in this motion and judicial estoppel based upon really
one thing and that one thing only is what he said in this
deposition transcript.

In the reply memorandum we get for the

first time new arguments and that new argument talks about a
prior order that the judge entered in this court in regards to
Victor Lawrence.
THE COURT:

That's me and I said judicial estoppel

applied.
MR. CARTWRIGHT:
THE COURT:

Did somebody appeal that?

MR. CARTWRIGHT:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Yes, he should if that's a-

Did someone appeal that?

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

No, because it hasn't been certified

as a final order to be appealed.
THE COURT:
third party defendant.

Third party action, wasn't it?

Yeah, a

I guess that kind of ended the third

party complaint, didn't it?
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

Your Honor, I'm not aware that

that's been certified a final issue or not.
THE COURT: Why would you have to certify it if it's a
third party?
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

That could be and here's where this
24

1 I argument should not apply.

First of all, I haven't had the

2

opportunity to respond to this issue because it was presented

3

to the Court for the first time in the reply memorandum and

4

under Rule 56, what they're stuck with and what they elected to

5

argue then was judicial estoppel based upon the statements that

6

were made in the deposition only and not this subsequent order

7

and if they want to bring this in a subsequent motion, that

8

would allow Mr. Johnson and I the time and the opportunity to

9

fully respond to that and to address the issue of whether it's

10

a final order or not, but they didn't.

11

at the very beginning in their reply memorandum and the Utah

12

Court of Appeals - we filed a Motion to Strike that.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

They raised that issue

I know.
The Utah Court of Appeals indicated

15

that you may grant a Motion to Strike on issues raised for the

16

first time in a reply memorandum and we're not saying that

17

they've lost their chance forever.

18

should have the opportunity to submit affidavits and other

19

evidence in response to that, that it's too late now.

20

We're simply saying, we

Number two, I've indicated that it's my understanding

21

that it's not a final order, that they're still able to appeal

22

that or even more importantly, Your Honor can, based upon

23

additional information presented here and the evidence that he

24

presented in his affidavit here is much more comprehensive than

25

it was before, would justify not only denying this motion, if
25

I

1 ! that were at issue, but changing the court's order previously
2

and we're saying that - we haven't made that motion now.

3

saying it's not—

4 j

THE COURT:

I
We're j

Assuming a year has gone by and I haven't

5 I seen any motion to change it and it hasn't been appealed, final
6
7

or not, the chances of my changing that are about slim to none.
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

Okay.

Also, Your Honor, there's

8

been things that have happened which doesn't make that - while

9

it may apply to Victor Lawrence, it shouldn't apply to Jayson

10

Orvis and the reason why is the relationships of the parties

11 I are completely different.

The relationship between Victor

12

Orvis and Mr. Johnson was that of attorney and client.

13

this is no attorney.

14

not making partnership claims against Victor Lawrence.

15

making various other claims that the Court dismissed.

16

arguing that those are right or wrongly dismissed.

This is partnership, partnership.

17 j that the relationships are very different.

Here
He was
He was
I'm not

I'm saying

The claims that

18

were made against Victor Lawrence are different than Jayson

19

Orvis and that even if they had raised this for the first time

20

and we'd had the opportunity to respond, the circumstances are

21

different.

22 I

Also, between then and now there's been the

23

additional discovery that Mr. Johnson has obtained that talks

24

further about the relationships between the parties and that

25

includes an assistant of Mr. Orvis that testified in a
26

1 I deposition about Mr. Orvis' payments of monies to Mr. Johnson
2 * and how those payments were false and were basically/ it was

I
3

cheating one to the other and also an assistant of Victor

4 I Lawrence. And we believe that with that additional testimony
5

presented to the Court, that Your Honor would find differently

6 I if that matter were raised now with Mr. Orvis.

But in any

7 | event, we shouldn't get that far because judicial estoppel 8

this one isn't even close.

These elements don't apply and
l

9 > that's it and that's our position.
!

10 '
'
11 |

'

THE COURT:
MS. TOMSIC:

All right, thank you.
I
'

Your Honor, briefly if I could just

i

12

address a couple of points.

13 I
14
15

THE COURT:

Okay.

'

MS- TOMSIC: First of all, Your Honor, relative to
the order, obviously it's part of the record in this case and

j
I
I

16 j the reason obviously we cited it, was in direct reputation as
i

17

to their position as to what the required elements for judicial:

18

estoppel which is clearly would be contrary to Your Honor's

I

|

19 I order and it is basically the law of this case at this point
i

i

20 I given that it was issued almost a year and a half.

j

21 j

I

Second, Your Honor, in terms of Mr. Johnson's

22

purported explanation of his testimony before the SBA, it's all I

23

well and good for Mr. Cartwright to stand up here and try to

24

explain it to the Court but we don't have anything before this

25

Court in any way explaining that.

If you look at Mr. Johnson's
27

1

affidavit, all be talks about is that his testimony was

2

truthful and he quotes it, it says what it says.

3

had any partnership interest.

He denies he

Here he claims he has one.

4

And I think what else is important, Your Honor, is

5

when they're taking the position that somehow the SBA lawyer

6

that knew it was Danelle Johnson who had it, it's just not

7

true, Your Honor, and I would ask Your Honor to look at pages

8

40 through 42 of Mr. Johnson's deposition before the SBA and

9

I've got a copy for Your Honor and a copy for opposing counsel

10

if I could.

And Your Honor, the SBA - if I may approach?

11

THE COURT: Yes.

12

MS. TOMSIC:

- is asking them about Danelle Johnson

13

and where she's getting her income and if you go to I believe

14

it's page 44, he's talking about getting payments from

15

Lexington Law Firm to the SBA and Jamis Johnson takes the

16

position that basically, she's receiving those payments because

17

she's a trustee on these boards, that she had performed some

18

services for them that are undescribed and that she had donated

19

some computer equipment, furniture.

20

assertion in there that says, gee, well, I thought you were

21

talking to me about me owning an partnership interest.

22

wife is the one who owns it.

23

own a partnership interest contrary to his position here, he

24

tells the SBA that the reason his wife is getting any money is

25

because she was doing services, acting as a trustee and had

There's absolutely no an

No, my

So not only did he say he didn't

28

1

contributed some things.

So, Your Honor, I just say, his

2

deposition says what it says.

It's unequivocal on its face

3 : that he is denying any type of a partnership or any type of an
4

LLC interest or a corporation.

5

absolutely contrary to that.

6

You can see it in their answer to the declaratory judgment and

7

you can see it in his third party complaint and counterclaim.

You can see it in their papers.

And Your Honor, I think the thing I want to say about

8
9

His position in this case is

Mr. Cartwright's representation of the Utah Supreme Court

10

authority, it's true that the Nebeker and Silver Fork cases

11

were decided after the International case that we cite to Your

12

Honor but I think, Your Honor, in fairness, if you look at

13

those decisions, the issue before the Court in neither of those

14

decisions was whether or not the party asserting judicial

15

estoppel was the same party.

16

the court made a decision, and I think if you look at the cases

17

we cited - and I've got copies if you would like a copy.

18
19

THE COURT:

That was not the issue on which

I would, uh-huh (affirmative).

I can

find them but I guess I better read them.

20

MS. TOMSIC:

21

THE COURT:

If youWhat do you say about this thing in the

22

footnote the Supreme Court talks about judicial estoppel being

23

clarified in a subsequent case that talks about collateral

24

estoppel?

25

MS. TOMSIC:

Your Honor, I think - let me tell you, I
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1

can't speak to what's in the minds and heart of the Supreme

2

Court.

3
4
5

THE COURT:

Neither can I, not can ones that have

gone before.
MS. TOMSIC:

But what I can tell you, Your Honor, is

6

this is that the Tracy Loan case which is really the prodigy

7

that is cited that they rely on in subsequent decisions, the

8

Nebeker decision and the Silver Fork decision, is a case

9

involving judicial estoppel and at the time of that case there

10

also was a law, both with regard to judicial estoppel and

11

collateral estoppel that the parties had to be the same as in

12

the prior suit and when they're citing to Tracy Collins, while

13

they may be looking to a case dealing with collateral estoppel,

14

basically the same principles were being applied on collateral

15

estoppel and judicial estoppel, that is requiring the partie*

16

and the subject matters to be the same and the way I read this

17

footnote, Your Honor, is saying, look, we were really broad in

18

our language that we were using in Tracy Collins. Take a look

19

at this Hodson case because what we've done is we've redefined

20

those elements and that would apply with equal force to

21

judicial estoppel and collateral estoppel and that's how I

22

would read it.

23

But Your Honor, I do want to say one other thing.

24

want to give you the Nebeker case and this Silver Fork case

25

because I think what you'll see is like many courts, they grab

I

1

a quote out of a case, put it up there, and then they pick the |

2

element they're talking about and that's what they decide the

3

case on.

4

the position after it cites that, which really I think if you

5

look at it in terms of the holding of the court is dicta, it

6

says that the reason they're not applying judicial estoppel is

7

because the party hadn't changed its position in the original

8

litigation based on testimony which is obviously contrary in

9

this case because the SBA did change its position.

If you look at the Nebeker case, the Court is taking

It couldn't

10

collect on a $250,000 plus judgment and while they ultimately

11

ended up selling it for $30,000, it changed its position, Your

12

Honor, because it couldn't collect on a partnership that Mr.

13

Johnson is now claiming is worth hundreds, and hundreds, and

14

hundreds or thousands of dollars in this case.

15

So, one, the cite to Tracy Collins was a quote that

16

is dicta in the case if you look at the holding of the case and

17

in terms of the Silver Fork Pipeline case, again, while they

18

quote that whole long quote out of Tracy Collins, that case,

19

the only issue before the court was, can you apply judicial

20

estoppel where there is not a knowing misrepresentation, that

21

is where somebody might be mistaken about something and may not

22

have all the facts and again, neither the Nebeker case nor the

23

Silver Fork Corporation case are situations where a party was

24

arguing, geez, they weren't the same parties, it wasn't the

25 J same subject matter.

Those were not the issues before those
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1

cases and unfortunately, the Supreme Court hasn't said anything

2

about this footnote and there is no case where it has said

3

again, after the International Resources case that it meant

4

something differently.

5

And a point I want to make Your Honor is one, I don't

6 I think it's correct that you have to have those requirements
7

because the issue again is really the relationship between the

8 I party and the judicial system which means that Mr. Cartwright's
9

argument that your prior order shouldn't apply because the

10

relationships between the parties are different, well, Your

11

Honor, the bottom line is, all you need to do is look at the

12

authorities and they make it clear.

13

estoppel.

14

You're looking at the relationship between the defendant and

15

the judiciary and what the defendant has done within that

16

judicial system and what's important here, Your Honor, is you

17

take the position that Mr. Johnson, we believe didn't tell the

18

truth.

19

it's not the truth, what he's saying, Mr. Cartwright is saying,

20

is litigants can go and perpetrate a fraud on the court and

21

then turn around and totally change their position to their

This is not equitable

You're not looking at relationships between parties.

But assuming he - if you're with me and you read it and

22 , benefit using the court again and that exactly the reason that
23

you have judicial estoppel.

It's to keep parties from lying to

24 I a court and as many courts have said, what it does is it
25 I increased the costs of lying.

If you lie in a judicial

1 I proceeding, you can't then turn around and change your story to
2 I get some benefit before another court and that's exactly what
3 | we have here.
4

Your Honor, so I'd say again, one, the requirements

5

for judicial estoppel are that you have a litigant, Mr. Johnson

6

in the SBA case, making a statement under oath in a judicial

7

proceeding where the SBA changes its position and then in this

8

case, turns around and take a totally inconsistent position and

9

says he does have a partnership interest, hoping to benefit

10

economically from that and at the same time to have deprived

11

the SBA of that money.

12

estoppel it's a deliberate false misrepresentation and it's

13

being used for their benefit and he's trying to use this Court

14

to either lie to the SBA in that case or lie to the Court in

15

this case and under the doctrine of judicial estoppel that is

16

not permitted.

17

And under the doctrine of judicial

Finally I'd say one last thing, Your Honor, and that

18

is, I think even assuming you were to buy the argument that the

19

court didn't mean whatever it said in footnote 4, and again, I

20

just want to state the language because they're talking about

21

collateral estoppel in the body of the text and then the

22

footnote, and they say "We so state an awareness of an

23

conceitedly over broad statement in our case Tracy Loan, to the

24

effect that one would not be 'judicially estopped' unless the

25 i parties and the issue are the same in the instant and the prior
I
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1 j suit. Any misstatement of the rule was corrected and
2

superceded by our decision in Hodson".

And again Hodson dealt

3

with collateral estoppel, but the elements were the same for

4

collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel prior to the Hodson

5

decision where it found you don't have to be the same parties

6 j and as long as it was an issue that was actually addressed,
7
8

you're there.
And I think one last thing, Your Honor, and that is

9

that fundamentally in this case, if the Court were to overrule

10

its prior decision relative to Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence,

11

the bottom line is even if you impose that same party of

12

privity requirement, given that Mr. Orvis is an assignee of the

13

judgment, under Utah law, he is a privy.

14

as I do, I mean, clearly the Utah Supreme Court has defined

15

privy to include that, AMJUR defines a privy as that.

16

Honor, one, that's not the law but even assuming that you

17

decided, geez, I'm going to change my opinion and I'm going to

You know that as well

So Your

18 I decide that's a requirement, it doesn't really matter for
19
20

purposes of Mr. Orvis.
And in terms of changing position, I think I've

21

covered that with the SBA.

There was detrimental reliance,

22

Your Honor, selling a judgment that now with interest is

23

probably close to $350,000 or $400,000 for $30,000 is clearly a

24

detrimental reliance on the truth of his testimony in that SBA

25

supp hearing.
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I thank you for your time, Your Honor. Do you have

1
2

any questions?
THE COURT:

3
4

MS. TOMSIC:

The name of the case Your Honor is

International Resources, and would you like a copy?

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. TOMSIC:

9

THE COURT:

10

What's the date of the case that

uses the footnote regarding judicial estoppel?

5
6

I do.

Uh-huh (affirmative).
May I approach?
Yes, of course.

That'll answer all the

questions I have.

11

MS. TOMSIC:

Let me give you the other two cases,

12

Your Honor, if I could.

13

Your Honor, and this is the Nebeker.

14

THE COURT:

This is the Silver Fork Pipeline case,

Thank you.

I'll take a look at these

15

cases.

16

a practical matter, the reason I wanted to know the date of the

17

case, I wondered who wrote it and whether or not it was

18

unanimous because I doubt seriously that all five justices

19

(inaudible) talk about when you use the words judicial

20

estoppel.

I want to read these to see what they have to say.

That would be highly unlikely.

21

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

As

May I just respond to one-

No sir, you may not.

She gets the first

and last saying.
MR. CARTWRIGHT:

But Your Honor there's been a

misstatement of the law that I'd like to correct.

I don't want
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1

to make any arguments but to point out a misstatement that was

2 • said.

'

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

5

Go ahead.

|

In the Salt Lake City v. Silver

Creek case that you have, paragraph 15, second paragraph,

|

I
6

SPFC's contention is untenable for two reasons; first, SPFC was i

7

not a party to Progress.

8

detrimentally changes its position by reason of Salt Lake's

9

inaccurate representation of Utah water law in Progress.

That's means the first case, that

Under

10

judicial estoppel, a person may not to the prejudice the other

11

person, deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding

12

between the same persons. One of two reasons this case turns

13

on is it's different parties.

14

the Court that that was not a reason.

15

one of the two reasons for the decision, different parties.

16

THE COURT:

That's all.

She indicated to

It simply is. That's

I'll read these cases and let you know.

17

I'll be interested to know whether or not - well, I suppose one

18

way or the other this issue might get addressed by one of the

19

appellate courts but I'll be interested to know whether or not

20

the appellate courts are of the opinion that a person can make

21

a representation in one court and change it in another whether

22

you're the same party or whether you're not.

23

it makes any difference but we will see.

24

I'll ler you know within a day or two.

25 J

I don't see that

Thank you counsel.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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